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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
This thesis concerns African small arms control practices and how these have emerged and 
changed over time. It especially seeks to explore the rationale behind and significance of the 
development of regional small arms control in Africa, starting in the late 1990s. For a 
continent so often and for so long portrayed as failed and dangerous, I found it utterly 
fascinating that regional cooperation to control small arms, at least in terms of form and 
content, surpasses that of almost all other continents. Yet, prior to the development of 
collective control practices are the processes of small arms diffusion and proliferation in 
Africa, with significant political and humanitarian consequences. Africa has limited small 
arms production yet the continent appears awash with small arms. How do the imports and 
impact of small arms correspond to political leaders’ attempts to control these weapons? 
 
Africa certainly is ‘ground zero’ in the international discussions on small arms.1 Its population 
has overwhelmingly carried the global burden of armed conflicts since the end of the cold 
war. Africa’s proportion of global conflict death in the period 1990-2007 has been estimated 
to be 88 per cent, yet exposure to and knowledge of African conflicts in the rest of the world 
is limited.2 Although there are vast differences between countries, Central and East Africa and 
the Horn of Africa have been especially subject to violent, prolonged conflicts during this 
period. Although comprehensive data collection on gun violence in Africa is lacking, for the 
locations where data is available, it suggests high levels of armed violence in comparative 
terms. Besides the devastatingly violent consequences of small arms, these weapons also 
challenge authority in an extraordinary way.  
 
In spite of extensive donor programmes and studies of African security sector reform and 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives, as well as conflict management and 
peacekeeping on the continent, Africa’s arms control systems have fallen off the radar in 
much research. In policy, arms control is often framed as a technical and marginalized issue, 
mentioning in passing in a long list of challenges, but seldom considered in its own right or of 
central concern. The lack of arms control in Africa is nonetheless frequently referred to, and 
assumptions are made regarding what implications the lack of arms control has for African 
security. Furthermore, while not especially focused on arms control, many scholars have 
studied issues of state building, sovereignty and state failure in Africa in the post-cold war 
context. Small arms control is central to all these processes, as it is one means to create a 
monopoly of legitimate use of armed force. There is nonetheless very little written on Africa’s 
arms control practices, those of today and those of the past–and there has been, prior to this 
study, nothing written about how the practices of the past have shaped those of today. This 
thesis cannot claim to be a comprehensive monograph of Africa’s small arms control, but it 
does seek to start filling a large gap in the literature on the issue. 
 
Arms control refers to the structures that states (or similar authorities) put in place to 
centralize oversight of particularly lethal means of violence. The types of weapons controlled 
for have changed over time–and so has the form of arms control. The term in itself says 
nothing about the impact or effectiveness, motivation behind or significance of arms control 
                                                
1 Muggah, Robert, ‘How Disarmament in Africa Got More Complicated’, 5 Nov. 2013, URL 
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/11/how-disarmament-in-africa-got-more-complicated/ (accessed 26 Aug. 
2015. 
2 Hawkins, Virgil ‘Stealth conflict: How the world’s worst violence is ignored’, 30 Dec. 2008 
https://stealthconflicts.wordpress.com/2008/12/30/new-world-maps/ (accessed 24 Aug. 2015). 
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systems or practices. To make such interpretations or assessments, we need theoretical 
conceptualizations and empirical data. 
 
During the cold war, scholars developed methods for predicting whether an arms control 
agreement was likely to lead to the desired outcome or not. Positive incentives included 
clarity of rules, low costs, positive gains, reasonable commitments and verification 
mechanisms. Much energy went into considering the possible effects of different arms control 
agreements on state behaviour. The vast majority of research emerged from the USA-Soviet 
Union political military context, although there were some exceptions.3 There appears to have 
been close contact between academic researchers and diplomats negotiating arms control 
agreements, resulting in a consensus around what I refer to as ‘classic’ or ‘traditional’ models 
for arms control. This thesis will argue that the meta-theoretical assumptions developed 
historically still constitute the foundations of arms control discourse today, even though they 
often manifest less explicitly.  
 
One such manifestation is the Western lens in the periodization of global development, giving 
primacy to the categories of cold war, post-cold war or globalization, over colonialism, 
decolonization or (neo)liberal governance reform. Many scholars and practitioners have 
argued that there has been a shift in arms control since the end of the cold war.4 Initially, the 
curbing superpower domination in arms control and concerns over weapons of mass 
destruction, seemed to give rise to a new set of issues structured around a North-South divide. 
In particular, arms trade from the global North to the global South, especially weapons 
transferred to conflicts, received more attention. At the same time, arms control gradually 
disappeared from the key foreign and security policy debate, and appeared more often in 
development and humanitarian assistance policies. By the time the focus shifted from high-
technology ‘strategic weapons’ to low-technology ‘conflict weapons’, small arms emerged at 
the centre of international arms control debates and studies–although not seldom under other 
labels. As there was no international organization for small arms control in the 1990s when 
the budgets and missions of the United Nations expanded, small- and medium-sized Western 
donor states, such as the Nordic countries and Canada and the international missions and 
development assistance programmes they largely fund (including the United Nations 
Development Programme and international civil society organizations), became more 
influential in setting priorities for small arms security. The successful application of the 
‘security and development’ discourse, as two intimately linked concepts, is still resonant in 
framing small arms in the global South. The impact of small arms on conflict became better 
understood and the weapons were frequently referred to as the typical spoiler of sustainable 
development and peace. In 2013, this work culminated in the adoption of the United Nations 
Arms Trade Treaty, a global legally binding Treaty on the trade in conventional weapons, 
including small arms. For most researchers, this is the entire story of small arms control, 
extending from approximately the mid-1990s to 2013. 
 
Over this brief period of time, small arms and arms control have more broadly diverged from 
the discussions around North-South relations, to revolve around statehood, security sector 
reform and local conflicts. In this context the regionalization of small arms control is both 
predictable and welcomed. One of the core features of small arms control in the past two 
decades is the trend of regional cooperation among importing states. Although regional 
                                                
3 See e.g. Lever, Paul (2014), ‘The Cold War: the golden age of arms control’, Cold War History, vol. 14, no. 4, 
pp. 501-513. 
4 See e.g. Gallagher, Nancy (2012) Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy (Frank Cass Publisher: 
Oxon). 
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structures and forms of cooperation in controlling small arms are evident in many regions in 
the Americas, Africa and Europe, it is in Africa south of the Sahara where the most rapid 
progress has been made in terms of developing regional cooperation on small arms control.  
 
In East, Central, Southern and West Africa, groups of states have adopted legally binding 
conventions and protocols for enhanced control of small arms at the national and regional 
levels. These regulations precede and surpass that of the UN Arms Trade Treaty. Yet African 
regional regulations have avoided much critical examination by scholars. Instead, regional 
arms control is often perceived by institutionalists as a sum-sum agreement, developed in 
response to the cross-border threat of small arms proliferation. A general understanding of the 
motivations behind the comparatively extensive regionalization of small arms control in 
Africa can be summarized in three factors. The first is what liberal institutionalists calls ‘issue 
density’, i.e. the ‘fact’ that the problem of small arms proliferation is greater in Africa than 
elsewhere and embedded in many intertwined policy areas, such as governance, security and 
development. The second factor is the relative weakness of state capacities, for example weak 
border controls, in relation to increased cross-border activity. The third factor is the perceived 
rise of armed non-state actors, causing local and regional conflicts, crime and terrorism. In 
combination, these motivations are arguably large enough to surpass any resistance against 
international cooperation. In other words, given the particular challenges posed by small arms 
it is in states’ material self-interest to find regional solutions to arms proliferation. The fact 
that cooperation is in the interest of states says nothing about how this cooperation works, or 
why it was formed and shaped in a certain way. The institutionalist account neglects to 
explain which actors were driving the process or what impact regional cooperation has had. 
Furthermore, this line of inquiry does not explain how this particular regional security context 
came about.  
 
Although Patrick Morgan argues that there is a ’general’ theory of arms control, arms control 
has been studied from diverse theory families.5 This thesis will consider explanations by 
balance of power theory, regime theory and theories of emerging norms and epistemic 
communities. They are concepts and theories which have previously been used in arms 
control studies and reflect core ideas from all the three mainstream IR paradigms. Critical 
security scholars have pointed out several shortcomings with these theories, and I share much 
of their general critique. Over the past few years, some scholars have begun to problematize 
small arms and small arms control from various critical theoretical perspectives, arguing for 
example that Western norms, practices and experiences are often portrayed as universal, while 
being embedded in structures such as militarism. Critical theorists have however not yet 
developed their own theory of small arms control or explanations of why small arms control 
practices take the forms they do at different times. Influenced by the emerging critical 
literature on small arms and drawing on broader critical IR and sociological theories, I 
propose a theoretical framework to study small arms control called historical-relationalism. 
Historical-relationalism is a theoretical framework that seeks to merge, incorporate and 
expand, rather than contradict, the emerging critical perspectives on small arms control and 
security governance reform. While it builds on existing theories, historical-relationalism 
offers new perspectives when applied to arms control more broadly, and small arms control in 
Africa in particular. 
 
                                                
5 Morgan, Patrick (2012), ’Elements of a general theory of arms control’, in Arms control: history, theory, and 
policy (eds.) Robert E. Williams, Paul R. Viotti (Praeger: Santa Barbara), pp. 15-40. 
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Why study small arms control in Africa? 
 
Issues related to small arms have received plenty of attention in the past two decades, albeit 
within a relatively closed field of inquiry. After the publication of several books, hundreds of 
articles and policy briefs, does the world need another study on small arms? Moreover, are 
small arms not just symptoms and small arms control therefore a measure to address the 
symptoms, and not the root causes of the problem? 
 
Relatively few previous studies have focused on small arms control practices. Academic 
studies on small arms in the past ten years have been primarily focused on developing 
methods to more accurately explain the problem of small arms as they are experienced today. 
Such studies include Karp’s estimate on the number of weapons in global circulation, 
Bourne’s monograph on arms transfers to conflicts, Oxfam’s study on the cost of war and the 
Small Arms Survey’s book series on the impact of armed violence.6 Although these studies 
have quantified and enhanced understandings of problems associated with small arms, much 
fewer studies have focused on the response mechanisms that have been set up to address these 
problems. The small arms control regime is growing and evolving and it deserves attention 
from academic scholars.  
 
Africa frequently appears in the debate on small arms control, but the continent is often 
portrayed as the problem rather than the solution. In relation to arms control, Africa is often 
portrayed as poor, incapable and porous, infested with violent conflict and brutal leadership. 
Similarly, African regionalism is ‘being more or less ignored in the general mainstream 
academic debate. If regionalism in Africa receives any recognition at all, then the standard 
argument is that it is primitive or failed.’7 The steps that African states have taken nationally 
and collectively to disrupt small arms proliferation and misuse are either overlooked, or 
referred to in passing as a success on its own terms, without a need for closer examination. 
This study focuses on small arms control in Africa in an attempt to address these two points: 
while mapping and understanding development of arms control practices over time, I also 
undertake a careful and critical assessment of the shortcomings in existing practices. Africa’s 
sub-regions have led the development in legally binding instruments on small arms. These 
groups of states often do not fit easily into the term ‘regions’ in the classical IR sense of the 
concept (which is typically based on the experience of Western Europe). The thesis will use a 
case study approach to make an in-depth analysis of regional small arms control in Central 
and East Africa.  
 
The view that small arms control is too shallow to be considered a subject of qualitative 
research is presumably an important reason behind the lack of more critical research on 
specific arms control practices. Historical-relational perspectives are more often used in 
abstract and theory-based studies, rather than in empirically-based studies of specific 
phenomena, consequentlt marginalizing the perspective in policy circles and limiting its 
policy impact. As a result, small arms control systems are initiated, formed and implemented 
without much scrutiny from critical perspectives of this kind.  
 
                                                
6 Bourne, Mike (2007) Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms (Palgrave Macmillan: New York);  
IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld (Oct. 2007), Africa’s missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of 
conflict, briefing paper 107. 
7 Soderbaum, Fredrik (2004), The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave), p 1. 
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The phenomenon of small arms control is theoretically backwards from an academic 
perspective, yet arms control practices are highly political. Arms control policy and practice 
are underpinned by problem-solving perspectives of self- and collective interest. Besides the 
empirical contribution, this study aims to contribute to theory development by illuminating 
the significant assumptions and the implications of underlying specific theories (e.g. small 
arms are manageable by applying a set of standards and practices), as well as by creating an 
alternative theoretical framework. Although the study seeks to make a contribution to the 
contemporary arms control literature, the study notes three important parallel trends where 
synergies in the academic literature might be found. The first is the growth of African security 
cooperation at the regional level. Small arms control is an interesting case to follow given its 
relatively widespread adoption in Africa, and its high comparative standard internationally 
from the point of view of regional cooperation. The second is the issue of governance in 
Africa, and especially international interventions in the African security governance 
architecture. Small arms control has not previously been approached as a case of security 
governance in Africa. African states are frequently portrayed as inadequate to provide the 
basic of state functions: to monopolize the means of violence on their territory. This is 
clearest is in DDR activities and SSR processes, which are closely related to small arms 
control. The third synergy is with the field of research called post-colonial studies, which has 
analysed and criticized imperial, colonial and post-colonial relations and practices in-depth, 
but which has not yet applied this research framework to small arms control. This thesis thus 
aims to contribute to the existing literature by a) illuminating assumptions taken for granted in 
the recent literature on small arms; b) using historical-empirical evidence in studying African 
control systems of small arms over time and c) showing how the application of historical-
relationalism can help improve understandings and explanations of arms control and other 
fields of inquiry in security studies. 
 
Research questions 
 
The aim of the thesis is to research the unfolding, motivations, impact and limits to small 
arms control in Africa. Specifically, the thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
 
1.? What is the origin of African small arms control?  
2.? What are the key features of African small arms control, in terms of continuities, 
discontinuities and contingencies? 
3.? Why and with what results has small arms control recently been regionalized in 
Africa? 
Research design and methodology  
 
The thesis is an empirical-historical study of the phenomenon of small arms control in Africa. 
Chapters 3 and 4 use a narrative analysis to construct a sequence of small arms control in 
Africa from the 16th century to the adoption of regional legally binding arms control treaties 
in the 2000s, organized around three themes: arms imports, arms control and arms impact, 
and ‘emplotted’ through changes in colonial relations.  
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Narrative 
 
Narratives are analytic constructs that unify a number of past or contemporaneous actions and 
event, which might otherwise have been viewed as discrete or disparate, into a coherent 
relational whole that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same 
time, constituted by them. The narrative method gives equal weight to the empirical findings 
and the narrator’s organization and interpretation of them. Narratives are made up of the 
empirical data of sequences of social action but are, from beginning to end, defined and 
orchestrated by the narrator to include a particular series of actions in a particular temporal 
order for a particular purpose.8 Because the possible facts that one might argue are relevant to 
a specific object of study are endless, narratives depend on a set of lenses that will move 
closer to or further from certain events on the basis of some logic that is not given by the 
character of events per se.9 For Somers, to make something understandable in the context of a 
narrative is to give it historicity and relationality, by explaining the event through their 
relationship to other events. Such narrative requires ‘emplotment’, an accounting of why a 
narrative has the story line it does. Emplotment is similar to a theory, as it generates ‘plot 
hypotheses’ which can be tested against actual events and then examined how, and under 
what conditions, events intersect with the hypothesized plot.10 The plot must also have a 
theme, which works as an evaluative criterion for selection of events, institutions and 
people.11  
 
Others have also emphasized the importance of chronologically sequential order in narrative 
explanation. For Mahoney, narrative analysis portrays social phenomena as ‘stories’ that 
unfold in a clear chronological order. The chronological ordering of events in narrative is a 
key reason why sequences appear to follow an inherent logic in which one event naturally 
leads to another. Indeed, if the events in a reactive sequence cannot be clearly arranged in a 
precise chronological order, the notion that one event logically follows from another is 
considerably harder to sustain.12 Stone similarly defines a narrative as ‘the organization of 
material in a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single 
coherent story, albeit with sub-plots’.13 Hall also assumes that time flows in one direction and 
therefore subsequent events cannot be taken as causes of prior events. Furthermore, the 
narrator faces certain constraints and possibilities at a given time and place, such as the 
presence or absence of a specific technology and the kind of knowledge available.14 This 
study has taken such constraints seriously. It is structured as a chronological sequence, and 
given that the study is of small arms control in Africa, it has taken the time of the introduction 
of firearms technology in Africa as a starting point of the sequence.  
 
For Hall, analysis emerges not only from events themselves, but also from the posing of 
questions based on value commitments that cannot be derived from the flux of events.  
                                                
8 Griffin, Larry, (1993), ‘Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology’, 
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 98, no. 5, p. 1097. 
9 Hall, John (1992), ‘Where History and Sociology Meet: Forms of Discourse and Sociohistorical Inquiry’, 
Sociological Theory, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 169. 
10 Somers, Margaret (1994), ‘The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach’, 
Theory and Society, vol. 23, no. 5, p. 616. 
11 Somers, (1994), ‘The Narrative Constitution of Identity’, p. 617. 
12 Mahoney, James (Aug. 2000), ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
p. 532. 
13 Stone, Lawrence (1979), ‘The revival of narrative: reflections on a new old history’, Past and Present, vol. 85, 
no. 1, p. 3. 
14 Hall, (1992), ‘Where History and Sociology Meet’, p. 173. 
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Inquiry depends on a value choice to analyze a certain sociohistorical object rather than some 
other. Value commitments further establish the purposes of inquiry in general and structure 
inquiry specifically in the choice of topic.15 This study will draw on the category of historical 
inquiry that Hall refers to as ‘situational history inquiry’. The analysis differs from other 
strategies in its concern with understanding ongoing events on the basis of particular value 
concerns. The narrative discourse focuses on explanation of circumstances and seeks to trace 
the unique course of events, processes, and institutional developments that have given rise to 
the current situation. Theory is directed to explicating the forces at work historically, which 
become important less for their scientific truth value than for their heuristic capacity to inform 
situational analyses and prescriptions, with the aim of providing answers that potentially 
empower individuals and groups. Value concerns thus impel narrative to separate knowledge 
about options and trends from information about other issues, even causally relevant ones.16   
 
Narrative methodology is rather marginal in IR and its scientific rigour has been questioned 
by those who see weaknesses in its descriptive power and argue that it has weak or no 
explanatory power and that it cannot generate predictions or general findings. From a 
positivist perspective, the subjective, value-based and interpretive nature of the selection of 
events and structure of sequence would arguably not meet scientific standards of objectivity 
or distance between the researcher and the object of analysis. Furthermore, chronological 
order does not necessarily suggest historical significance17 and even a study of history to 
reconstruct ‘what actually happened’ would not necessarily make us any wiser.18  
In response, narrative advocates have argued that all science is to some extent interpreted, 
value-based, selective and subjective on the part of the scientist–and that narrative is essential 
in, for example, the sociological analysis of historical events. Narrative is frequently used as 
to complement various other qualitative and quantitative methods precisely for its descriptive 
qualities.19 A larger problem with narrative methodology is that it is seen to generate poor 
causal explanations, by permitting temporal flow and sequence to carry the explanatory 
burden.20 This critique is shared by some narrativists themselves. Larry Griffin, for example, 
argues that narrative analysis must engage counterfactual methods in exploring specific causal 
links in the overall chain of events, and use a scene by scene description of the particular 
causal paths in order to identify ‘breakpoints’ which lead to ‘a final outcome’.21   
Those who are positive to the narrative method tend to see it as a way to generate new 
understandings of phenomena, and that narrative accounts may generate both explanation and 
interpretation. Research findings are always fallible and a periodization will shed light on 
some events and processes while it cannot help but cast a shadow over others; nonetheless it 
is an indispensable tool to understand historical specificity.22 Typically, those positive to the 
explanatory power of narrative analysis are generally critical of the dominant concept of 
causality and of social scientists’ ability to uncover law-like regularities in open social 
systems. Milja Kurki argues that the dominant ‘Humean discourse’ on causation leads to bad 
                                                
15 Hall, (1992), ‘Where History and Sociology Meet’, pp. 167-168. 
16 Hall, (1992), ‘Where History and Sociology Meet’, p. 184. 
17 Griffin, (1993), ‘Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis’, p. 1099. 
18 Hall, (1992), ‘Where History and Sociology Meet’, p. 168. 
19 Griffin, (1993), ‘Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis’, p. 1097. 
20 Griffin, (1993), ‘Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis’, p. 1099. 
21 Griffin, (1993), ‘Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis’, p. 1099. 
22 Rosenberg, Justin (1994) The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International 
Relations (VERSO: London/New York), p. 43. 
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explanations, as it simplifies causation to a set of causal factors in the form of observable 
regularities.23 To Kurki, theorists must provide a narrative account to explain how events or 
processes bring about a given phenomenon; these causes are likely to be both complex and 
multi-fold. Historical and qualitative data are most important in such explanations.24 
Furthermore, taking Eurocentrism in IR seriously means finding universalism to be less 
homogeneous than often portrayed, and require diversity in methodological research 
approaches to world politics.25 
Abbott differentiates between two fundamentally different views of historical processes, the 
causal or ‘stochastic approach’ and the narrative or ‘whole stories’ approach. For causal 
analysis the social world is made up of fixed, given entities with variable properties. It 
favours variable-centered analysis and see causes as being primarily independent and working 
at fixed rates in all cases. Causality flows to some extent from context to detail but generally 
between variables of equal status. By contrast, a whole story approach sees the social world as 
inherently complex and made up of subjects who participate in events. Causality flows in 
different patterns. Most causes work in complex clusters, ‘events’, rather than alone.26 To 
abstract causes from their narrative environments is therefore impossible in principle.27    
Hall distinguishes between scientific laws which take a general form (e.g. gravity) and events 
which are contingent (e.g. falling out the window). Therefore, laws and regularities in and of 
themselves cannot fully explain events. This seems especially to be the case in social life, 
where action may be held to be indeterminate in relation to any ‘law’ and where theories of 
meaning suggest hermeneutic interpretation as well as causal explanations.28 As a form, 
explanation is concerned with unique aspects and contingent circumstances of a particular 
situation, rather than with properties and processes held to have some generic typicality.29  
In sum, narrative methodology is useful in providing detailed description and certain kinds of 
explanations, but will not seek to uncover an explicit and replicable causal framework. Rather 
than apply a general theory to explain history or generate analysis of causal regularities, the 
study will seek to apply concepts to interpret history meaningfully. It will not attempt to 
predict events or arrive at a general, universal, explanation of arms control, but nevertheless 
contends that the findings from narrative method and situational historical reading amount to 
more than storytelling. As one example, narrative methodology has advantages vis-à-vis other 
methodologies in uncovering temporality or particular events which may be invisible or 
considered marginal by other approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Kurki, Milja (2008), Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming causal analysis (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge). 
24 Kurki (2008), Causation in International Relations, p. 139. 
25 Picq, Manuela (2013), ‘Critics at the edge? Decolonizing methodologies in International Relations’, 
International Political Science Review, vol. 34, no. 4, p. 448. 
26 Abbott, Andrew (1990) ‘Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative 
Approaches’, Historical Methods, vol.  23, no. 4, pp. 140-50.  
27 Griffin, (1993), ‘Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis’, p. 1105. 
28 Hall, (1992) , ‘Where History and Sociology Meet’, p. 172. 
29 Hall, (1992), ‘Where History and Sociology Meet’, p. 173. 
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Case study 
 
Chapters 5-7, the second, empirical, part of the thesis, is a case study of contemporary small 
arms control in East and Central Africa. Three chapters make up the case study. The first 
chapter structures and analyses the background, rationale, meaning and content of the Nairobi 
Protocol, using a process-tracing method. The process-tracing method was used in order to 
enable a careful structuring of the timing of various events and decisions, using in particular 
public meeting records and dating official statements. The second chapter assesses its 
implementation at the national and regional levels. The third chapter discusses the limits of 
the Nairobi Protocol from broader perspectives of small arms governance. The combination 
of a historical narrative and a case study research design of a contemporary arms control 
regime aims to provide explanations for the particular development of regional small arms 
control in Africa, including choices in institutional design and the framing of issues. The 
historical developments and experiences are seen not just as background but to constitute a 
context which must be in the foreground to properly understand current practices.  
 
The selection of the Nairobi Protocol as a case study was based on the recognition in previous 
literature of the scale of the security impact of small arms in the region and the lack of 
previous studies on the origins and implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. Previous studies 
have suggested that East Africa is one of the regions most affected by illicit trafficking in 
small arms in the world.30 In general, the initiatives of the West African states are more often 
referred to in the literature of small arms control than is the Nairobi Protocol. The case 
selection only considered existing regional arms control regimes. The negative pole (regions 
without a common arms control instrument) is analytically irrelevant since studying it does 
not tell us anything about why states adopt specific legislation or what impact the legislation 
have. Furthermore, as Beach and Pedersen have argued, the mechanisms leading to 
unregulated arms acquisitions are expected to be very different from the mechanisms that 
contribute to arms control. Therefore, it makes little sense to compare the mechanisms that 
produce an outcome with those that produce its negation. The object of study should therefore 
be cases only where the outcome is present (cases of regional arms control).31 That said, the 
level of arms control within the 15 member states in the selected region is highly diverse, 
enabling analysis on variations. 
 
 
Review of primary and secondary sources 
 
The first empirical chapter takes a long historical perspective: from the time small arms first 
entered the continent in large quantities in the 17th and 18th centuries, to de-colonization and 
the early decades of independence. This period has mostly been overlooked in studies of 
small arms in Africa outside of the realm of military historians and anthropologists. The 
research of the chapter was based on analysis of primary and secondary historical sources.  
 
Although the scale and impact of small arms importation to Africa during the transoceanic 
gun-slave trade centuries has been well documented by scholars, no previous study has 
extended the study to include the colonial period and the early years of independence. In order 
                                                
30 Stoicescu, Ruzandra (2012), ‘Transfers’, in Controlling small arms: Consolidation, innovation and relevance 
in research and policy, (eds.) Peter Batchelor and Kai Michael Kenkel (Routeldge), p. 88. 
31 Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. ’ Case selection techniques in Process-tracing and the implications of taking the 
study of causal mechanisms seriously’, conference paper, Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, <http://dpsa.dk/>, 
pp. 5-6. 
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to complete the study, it was necessary to access primary sources on weapon imports and 
control practices, especially for most parts of the 20th century. The study made 
comprehensive use of the Annual Colonial Reports from the colonial directories from the first 
half of the 20th century, which were accessed from the Library of University of Illinois 
Digital Content Creation Unit. Comprehensive use was also made of the League of Nations’ 
statistical reports on the trade in arms, ammunition and material of war, accessed through the 
North-western University Library’s digital collection of League of Nations documents. The 
original letter exchanges were retrieved from the national archive of Uganda, during my visit 
in 2013. 
 
Chapter 6 relied on primary open source data including national reports to the United Nations 
Programme of Action on Small Arms from 2004-2014, national baseline surveys and national 
action plans of the 15 states part of the protocol. As a complement, the study was informed by 
an impact assessment conducted by the Group for Research and Information on Peace and 
security (GRIP) and Small Arms Survey from 2013 on the level of implementation of 
international and regional small arms and light weapons (SALW) instruments in all of Africa, 
with a special focus on the implementation in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The report, which 
was commissioned by two donors, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), is 
not publicly available and I only found out about it during field work in East Africa. The 
report is built on a survey methodology, creating a type of checklist of net indicators (e.g. 
national legislation, Yes/No), and is thus closely related to the functionalist approach to 
measuring effectiveness. Nevertheless, the report provides a highly useful data source. In 
particular, i fills the gap in the data on some of the countries in the region that I was not able 
to visit, and provides a comparison to other states on the continent. Given the nature of the 
data collected from the survey, it was not necessary for me to repeat the same procedure. The 
GRIP/Small Arms Survey researchers had relatively generous financial and political support 
from the funders as well as the regional secretariat, granting access to states and stakeholders 
that I would not be able to receive. 
 
Both chapter 3 and 7 have made extensive use of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms 
Transfer’s database on Small Arms Trade. Given that many small arms sales go unrecorded, it 
is assumed that the data in the sets are undervalue the actual transfers. It is not possible to 
conduct a systematic analysis over time based solely on the database, which is why qualitative 
sources are used in combination. The database does provide data at the national levels, 
enabling researchers to add multiple countries into regions and while the NISAT dataset is not 
a complete record of all small arms exports and imports, it provides the most comprehensive 
records available.  
 
 
Qualitative in-depth expert interviews 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol at the 
national and regional levels, I carried out a series of semi-structured interviews with experts 
in the region in August and September 2013. A relatively small travel grant from the Nordic 
Africa Institute allowed me to interview the National Commissioners on SALW in Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. I also interviewed a member of the legislative committee in 
Uganda, who is also an implementing agent of the protocol in the Ugandan ministry of 
defence. I further interviewed a representative of the regional civil society network East 
Africa Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA). I also interviewed the Regional Centre on 
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Small Arms (RECSA) and a representative of the main funder, the desk officer for the EU 
budget Instrument of Stability and Peace responsible for projects in the East Africa and Horn 
of Africa regions. I received a disappointing turnout for my interview requests to law 
enforcement and civil society, so the results from the interviews are biased in favour of the 
official and policy views. Nevertheless, the interviews were highly important in terms of 
accessing data on implementation and for understanding institutional structures and ongoing 
programmes, as well as different national experiences of the Nairobi Protocol and its 
implementation. Later, in 2015, I interviewed the Mines Advisory Group, the main non-
governmental technical organization operating in physical small arms programmes in the 
region. The role of the interviews was to provide additional data that are not available in 
documents, regarding contemporary arms control practices, policies and institutional setups. I 
especially sought insights into how well the documents had been translated into actual 
programmes, and what challenges and positive outcomes had been experienced. I also sought 
to use the interviews to uncover the ‘regional link’, i.e. to what extent national actors situated 
their work within in Nairobi Protocol. The interviews contributed to shaping an understanding 
of the content, form and significance of the current era of small arms control in the greater 
East African region. 
 
 
Disposition  
 
The thesis begins with a literature review of the empirical evidence and key debates on small 
arms and its security impact over the past twenty years (Chapter 1.2). Next, the theory chapter 
lays out three theories which could plausibly generate explanations on international small 
arms control. In chapter 2.2. I lay out an alternative theory of small arms control and the 
implications that ‘historical-relationalism’ may have on research design. Chapters 3-7 make 
up the empirical chapters and start with a long historical narrative of small arms control in 
Africa, followed by a discussion of regionalization of arms control in Africa since the 1990s 
from two competing theoretical perspectives. Chapters 5-7 constitute the case study of the 
Nairobi Protocol, a relatively recent attempt by states in Central and East Africa to 
collectively control small arms, light weapons and their ammunition. Chapter 8 provides 
conclusions.  
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Chapter 1.2 Small arms impact on security: evidence 
and debates  
 
This subchapter discusses the distinctiveness of small arms and the challenges to, and 
promises of, small arms control. Small arms are not like other weapons. They exist in the 
interphase between public (collective) and private (individual) violence, and constantly 
challenge this distinction. The technical characteristics of small arms make them fit for use on 
both sides of the divide (whether this divide is real or imagined). Not only are the technical 
specifics of small arms important, but the rules for control are very different from other 
weapon types in that the vast majority of states allow citizens, law enforcement, private 
security companies and defense forces, to own and use small arms. The large demand base for 
small arms has created a substantial global market in these weapons, containing both legal 
and illegal weapons sales. Small arms are deeply embedded in many cultural and everyday 
practices, making them normalized features of many societies. In addition, small arms hold 
diverse symbolic values, such as wealth, power, status, masculinity, violence and self-
autonomy. 
 
Data shows that small arms are not only a theoretical threat to the divide between public and 
private roles and responsibilities, but that they are frequently used to undermine or at least 
diffuse this barrier. This subchapter lays out some of the broad findings from research on the 
various impacts of small arms on security over the past twenty years. It also seeks to identify 
the general direction of contemporary research on small arms. This chapter is a literature 
review and so draws on secondary sources to assemble a general overview of existing 
academic and policy research. It is important to acknowledge the weaknesses of existing data 
and statistics. First, no data set is complete and most are rough estimates: no one knows how 
many small arms exist in the world, or how many people suffer from their use. Second, most 
figures come from international organizations and non-governmental organizations working 
in development or humanitarian assistance, and there is likely to be some bias. Much of the 
research has been focused on uncovering the negative consequences of small arms on security 
in developing states, in order to raise the profile of the issue on political agendas and increase 
the public opposition, rather than for purely academic purposes. In order to acknowledge the 
different views on existing data, some space has been dedicated to the debate on the 
relationship between small arms, peace and security. 
 
Definition of small arms  
 
Small arms is a category of conventional weapons designed for personal use. Although 
definitions of small arms differ, the definition set by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental 
Experts on Small Arms is often considered as a starting point. This category of weapons 
includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns and assault 
rifles, and light machine guns and their ammunition. Small arms are both durable and 
portable, and are long-lived, potentially with numerous users and re-users. They are mobile 
and relatively easy to conceal, making them easy to trade, move, hide or steal. Small arms are 
light, small and easy to use, even by small children. Police forces and private security 
companies use small arms across the world to maintain law and order. Civilians use small 
arms for sport shooting or hunting, or in self-defense of people and property as well as in 
various cultural rituals. Small arms may be used to kill or maim an animal or person. They are 
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also used for causing submission through their intimidating effect, for example in robbery, 
kidnapping and rape. Small arms are the only category of weapons not falling under 
government monopoly of weapons possession and use, and the majority of small arms 
worldwide are in private hands. Light weapons are larger and more military in design than 
small arms, and are carried by one person or a small crew. Light weapons include heavy 
machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft 
guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and 
rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; mortars of calibres of less 
than 100 mm, and light weapon ammunition.32 Small arms and light weapons, abbreviated 
‘SALW’, are often used interchangeably with ‘small arms’, especially in research on the 
effects of these weapons in conflicts. As will be made clear in chapter 3, historical sources do 
not use the term ‘small arms’, but use the term ‘firearms’. All firearms fall under the 
definition ‘small arms’, and the terms are often used synonymously. This thesis uses the terms 
firearms and small arms interchangeably.  
 
Definition of small arms control 
 
There is no agreed definition of what small arms control is or what it is not. In general, small 
arms control involves policies about who can own which arms under what conditions.33 At the 
national level, ‘gun control’ measures are aimed at creating central oversight of weapon 
possession and use, and may include, for example, the prevention of possession of certain 
types of weapons either among the general public or restricted access to individuals who are 
presumed to form a high-risk subset of the population. A record of previous criminal 
behaviour, for example, is a common factor in the classification of such group. Gun control is 
intimately connected with the social contract between citizens and the state, in which citizens 
give up their arms in exchange for the protection from the state–and other benefits resulting 
from political order. This makes arms control a highly political and contested phenomenon, 
with wide diversity in different national and sub-national contexts. Hence, arms control is 
intimately connected with state building in the Weberian sense, in which the state becomes 
the only legitimate user of armed violence. In reality, small arms control is more complicated 
than the banning of civilian arms, as many states allow citizens to own guns for a number of 
reasons, while ruling out others. Arms control therefore has a civilizing mission, with an aim 
to prevent and pacify certain types of violent behavior. 
 
The baseline is the same in international regulations on small arms. Arms embargoes, for 
example, are clear illustrations of international attempts to restrict access of arms to certain 
high-risk actors. The EU Common Position on Arms Export and the UN Arms Trade Treaty 
are based on the same principle; they identify a set of normative criteria related to forms of 
governance, which states need to fulfil in order to be classified as appropriate end-users. At 
the international levels, small arms control has developed through legal and political 
agreements aimed at regulating the production, trade, use, distribution, handling and 
destruction of small arms. Although the ultimate objective of arms control can be violence 
reduction, safety and peace, these objectives are unlikely to be met through arms control 
alone. Rather, arms control reinforces an international system separating legitimate from 
illegitimate holders of the means of violence. Small arms control thus, according to Galtung’s 
definition, at best contributes to negative peace (defined as the absence or reduction of 
                                                
32 Small Arms Survey, ‘Definitions of Small Arms and Light Weapons’ URL 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html (accessed 1 Sep. 2015). 
33 LaFollette, Hugh (2000), ‘Gun Control’, Ethics, vol. 110, no. 2, p. 263. 
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personal violence), but is not likely to contribute towards social justice i.e. ‘positive peace’ or 
‘vertical development’. Arms control, then, has less to do with peace research–which Galtung 
defines as research into the past, present and future conditions of realizing peace–but is more 
connected with conflict research.34  
 
International arms control tends to exclude domestic regulations and deals exclusively with 
the cross-border movement of small arms. There is, arguably, no legitimate superiority or 
social contract between individual states and the supranational order, so arms control 
agreements must be entered into on a case-by-case basis, and horizontally between states. Yet 
participation in international arms control is still deeply connected with state sovereignty and 
regime legitimacy given that international recognition is vital for both concepts. Furthermore, 
since 2001, the United Nations has adopted international regulations of small arms which 
intervene in domestic gun control. In the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol, the internal-external 
barrier was lowered, as the Protocol included provisions for domestic gun control. The basis 
for UN action is that a lack of arms control in one state poses security challenges to 
neighboring states, as well as a threat to life and other human rights at the local level. In the 
past decade, the UN has adopted a number of political measures to prevent diversion of small 
arms. The main initiatives are the ‘Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the 
illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects’ and the ’International instrument to enable states to 
identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit SALW’. In 2014, the UN adopted 
the Arms Trade Treaty, a legally binding convention on trade in conventional weapons, 
including SALW, for the purpose of preventing illicit trafficking and diversion of 
international arms transfers. Slowly but surely, the international community is building a 
structure to distinguish between lawful and unlawful violence and means of violence, similar 
to the ones which exist at national levels. In practice, the vast majority of multilateral small 
arms control takes place at the regional level. States may use UN agreements as a backdrop 
for regional implementation, or use regional forums and institutions to negotiate their position 
on global treaties. In both cases, the implementation and practical application of arms control 
are in states’ immediate environments. 
 
 
Legal and illegal small arms 
 
One practical role for small arms control is to create a legal system which allows for a 
distinction between lawful and unlawful production, use and trade of small arms. The 
distinction between legal and illegal weapons is a dominant feature in the small arms 
discourse.35 Small arms are overwhelmingly problematized in terms of their illegal or illicit 
aspects and the terms ‘legal’, ‘licit’ and ‘legitimate’ are used interchangeably and attributed 
the same meaning. Practitioners, researcher and advocates in small arms policy normally 
make a clear distinction between legal and illegal (‘illicit’) small arms, implying a normative 
or legal distinction. Small arms are ‘particularly susceptible to trafficking’, in that they are 
‘fit’ for theft from government stocks, army and law enforcement units, gun shops, and 
private citizens; as well as for ‘ant trade’—the smuggling of legally bought arms into another 
country in small increments. Krause originally called this the  ‘secondary circuit’ of arms 
proliferation, and it is now commonly referred to as diversion.36 On the other hand, the right 
                                                
34 Galtung, Johan (1969), ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3 
(1969), p. 183. 
35 Bourne, Arming conflict (2007), p. 40. 
36 Ryabikhin, Leonid and Viktorova, Jevgenia (2004), ‘Weapons Transfers as a Soft Security Issue in Eastern 
Europe: Legal and Illicit Aspects’, European Security, vol. 13, no. 1-2, p. 82. 
 19 
of both states and individuals to small arms is deeply rooted in national and international law. 
As an example, in September 2013 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2117, 
dedicated exclusively to the issue of SALW. While noting the security implications caused by 
uncontrolled small arms, the texts also recognized ‘that small arms and light weapons are 
traded, manufactured and retained by States for legitimate security, sporting and commercial 
considerations’.37 Small arms are thus only partially framed as a security challenge based on 
their technical specifications, but more so based on the illicit dimensions of small arms trade 
and use.38  
 
The vast majority of small arms are produced legally; however, small arms are inherently 
prone towards diversion: they may be traded, distributed, owned, used, re-sold, deactivated or 
destroyed in a legal or illegal way. Each step of the life of a small arm outside of the 
regulatory framework of the particular country (or international law) would make the item or 
action of the owner illegal. In spite of the vulnerability associated with the small arms 
lifecycle, the problem is generally described as manageable. The role of arms control, 
according to the discourse, is to make this management more effective and efficient in order 
to counter diversion from the legal market–and so ensure the maintenance and future growth 
of the small arms market. One invention is the licensing system. In many states, citizens may 
legally own and use guns, based on the state giving its authorization to do so, typically 
through a licensing system where an authority grants individual civilians a legal right to own 
specific weapons, sometimes for a specific period of time. Any acquisition of small arms 
without a license is illegal in most states. The term “illicit” rather than “illegal” makes a 
normative rather than legal claim. The normative term is often preferred in international 
dialogues on small arms control: if states, for example, are perceived to lack the will or 
capacity to enact laws against certain aspects of arms diversion or misuse–or if laws exist but 
citizens do not follow them. While the legal (“licit”) or illegal “illicit” dichotomy are 
straightforward to some, other do not see the distinction as fundamental, since violence is 
committed with both illicit weapons and legally held ones.39 Domestic violence, for example, 
is often carried out with legally held weapons.40 A number of attacks on civilians have been 
carried out with licensed weapons in western countries in the recent past. On 22 July 2011, 
Anders Breivik killed 69 civilians at Utoya, Norway, with a legally held semi-automatic rifle. 
He stated on the application form for the permit that he would use the weapon for hunting 
deer.41 On 12 June 2016 Omar Mateen killed 49 people and wounded 53 others in a nightclub 
in Orlando, United States. Mateen had purchased both weapons legally just days before the 
attack.42 Robert Steinhaeuser killed 16 others and himself in his former high school in 
Germany using a legally owned pistol and a pump-action shotgun.43 Whereas there are many 
examples of attacks with legal weapons in Western countries, it is partly explained by the 
                                                
37 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2117, S/RES/2117 (2013), 26 Sep. 2013, p. 1, 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2117.pdf>. 
38 Mutimer, David (2006) ‘”A serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security”: An effective reading of 
the United Nations Programme of Action’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 33. 
39 Bourne, Mike (2011), ’Controlling the Shadow Trade’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 216. 
40 Mutimer, (2006) ‘A serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security’, pp. 29-44. 
41 Skaffet seg våpen på lovlig vis [Obtain Guns Legally], Bergens Tidende (July 24, 2011), URL 
http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Skaffet-seg-vpen-p-lovlig-vis-2542413.html (accessed 1 Sep. 2015). 
42 Spitzer, Robert, ‘What the Orlando shooting shows about the importance of gun laws’, The Washington Post, 
14 June 2016. 
43 ‘Erfurt massacre “planned for months”’, BBC News, 30 April 2002 URL 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1960170.stm (accessed 1 Sep. 2015). 
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expansion of legitimate small arm users in that part of the world and the limited number of 
legitimate/legal users in the global South.  
 
For the above reasons, the national, regional and international ‘level of analysis’ often applied 
in IR is problematic to apply to the concept of small arms and small arms control. In 1971 
Morris Janowitz proposed a sociological research agenda for international arms control, 
which would ‘[deal] with the role of violence in international relations and with the 
institutions and arrangement for reducing the use of violence in world affairs’.44 The focus on 
institutions and practices which were set up to reduce small arms violence supersede the 
national/international and licit/illicit dichotomies so prominent in small arms discourse. It is 
also a reminder that although small arms control focuses on who can own which arms under 
what conditions, its overall goal is doing so in order to reduce violence with such weapons–
and arms control’s success should therefore be evaluated based on how effective it is in 
reaching this goal rather than how carefully the means are laid out. 
 
Global production and trade in small arms 
 
The majority of the small arms produced annually are non-military weapons, including 
hunting and sports shooting weapons. Hall estimates that annual SALW production increased 
15-20 per cent, from about 6.3 million small arms per year 1980-99, to 7.5-8.0 million in 
2012. Greater transparency in production could, however, explain this pattern.45 The value of 
the global ‘military’ SALW (excluding ammunition) is less than one per cent of world’s 
military production.46 Half of the world’s small arms are in the United States, where there is 
almost one gun per person (98 guns per 100 people). United States also produces about half of 
the global output.47 
 
 
Table 1. Global firearms distribution, 2007, in millions 
Armed forces 200 
Civilian owners 650 
Law enforcement 26 
Sources: Small Arms Survey (2010, pp. 101-3, 2011a, p. 116) tabled in Karp, Aaron (2012), ‘Stockpiles’, in 
Controlling small arms: Consolidation, innovation and relevance in research and policy, (eds) Peter Batchelor 
and Kai Michael Kenkel (Routeldge: New York), p. 70.  
 
According to Bourne the legal SALW market constitutes the majority of the supply of SALW, 
including to states in conflict. In terms of black and grey market trade, facilitators are mainly 
visible at the regional levels.48 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) estimates that there are about 875 million small arms in circulation around the 
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world.49 Between one third and one quarter are in the hands of legally constituted security 
forces.50 At least 1,134 companies in 98 countries worldwide are involved in some aspect of 
the production of small arms and/or ammunition. Civilians purchase more than 80 per cent of 
all the firearms that are currently manufactured worldwide each year.51 The largest exporters 
are Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Italy and the United States, which regularly report 
annual exports of small arms, light weapons, their parts and ammunition worth USD 100 
million or more. In addition, China and Russia are also believed to be two of the largest 
exporters of SALW but the data on their exports are particularly incomplete. Between 2001 
and 2010, Small Arms Survey documented 10 other governments that had exported small 
arms for USD 100 million or more at least once. These were: Canada, France, Israel, Japan, 
Norway, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.52 EU member 
states produce close to 2 million civilian firearms per year, worth over 550 million Euro. The 
EU member states export such firearms for about 350 million Euro annually and imports 
firearms worth over 50 million Euro. Internal EU trade in firearms is estimated to about 200 
million Euro per year.53 Looking at these figure it becomes very clear that the ‘paradox of the 
democratic peace is that the world’s major weapons suppliers are countries within the so-
called zone of peace.’54  
 
Contrary to arms exports, the term arms transfer refers not only to the sale of weapons, but 
includes the provision of military aid, military cooperation and security assistance. A broader 
focus on arms transfers has been preferred than the narrower focus on arms trade because it 
recognizes that not all arms transfers take place in a market environment.55 Studies by 
Laurance and others have showed that arms transfers are not only motivated by economic 
gains, but also contain strategic benefits for the exporting state. Even in times of arms 
embargoes, arms-exporting states gain unique political benefits by providing arms to 
embargoed states (caused by their import dependence) that create systemic conditions 
undermining the effectiveness of arms embargoes.56 During the cold war the supply of SALW 
to fighting factions in internal conflicts was a relatively cheap option of engagement for the 
superpowers, in which they did not have to take the risk of committing military personnel yet 
gained influence over a conflict.57 The supply of weapons and non-lethal equipment to Syrian 
rebel groups during the ongoing civil war provides a more recent example.58 
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Trade in SALW has often been contrasted with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
technology and major conventional arms, both which are produced by much fewer 
stakeholders and controlled by governments. In comparison, trade in small arms has been 
seen as operating in a lawless open market, and in enormous quantities. The dominant 
impression has been that small arms are ‘widely available arms open to all who can pay’.59 
Bourne partly challenges this view and distinguishes between ‘proliferation’, ‘diffusion’ and 
‘trade’ with regards to the different dynamics underpinning SALW mobility. He defines 
proliferation as the spread of technologies, production capabilities and weapons from a 
limited group of states to another group of states or non-state actors, trade as the ‘free trade’ 
in weapons, and diffusion as the dispersion of SALW within society. The widespread 
knowhow, production capabilities and low threshold to produce small arms make small arms 
unique among categories of weapons. All arms with a high degree of dual-use application 
tend to be more diffused in societies; the more diffusion, the greater the control challenge.60 
According to Bourne, however, it is ‘the lack of a strong non-state threshold [that] is a central 
facet of SALW spread, particularly since technological structures are absent, and both new 
and surplus arms are available from a large number of stockpiles’.61 One key issue related to 
small arms in the post-cold war era has been identified in existing research as the threat of 
‘latent proliferation’, referring to the large accumulated stockpiles of states and non-state 
actors, which could be used, sold, stolen, trafficked, or provided to allies in the form of covert 
aid.62 Latent proliferation, rather than proliferation from new production, is gaining traction as 
a driver for enhancing small arms control policy. However, the conclusion that illegal 
weapons, black and grey markets are of such scale because they feed off diversion from the 
enormous legal market, is normally not drawn. 
 
‘Small arms’ or ‘armed violence’ as the independent variable? The public policy debate 
 
In the 1990s a common understanding developed which viewed small arms as an independent 
variable on peace and security.63 Some studies which set out to measure the security and 
developmental impact of small arms instead analyzed the impact of armed violence, without 
first proving the causal link between small arms and violence. That armed violence has 
humanitarian, social and economic costs is much less disputed than the linkages between 
small arms accessibility and violence, or other costs to individuals and societies. The small 
arms discourse has distanced itself from simple assumptions such as Opportunity theory, 
which stipulates that more lethal weapons result in more lethal outcomes. 
According to the Small Arms Survey, a forerunner organization in collecting data on small 
arms violence, access to weapons does not, in and of itself, drive armed violence: ‘there is no 
clear link between access to firearms and overall levels of armed violence in a country’.64 
Small arms, however, provide a greater capability for violence for both individuals and 
groups, compared to other means of violence that individuals lawfully have access to. 
Acts of behavioural violence require the capability to cause damage and destruction and rely 
on particular tools, such as weapons or soldiers. The impacts of force also depend on the 
vulnerability of those affected, a combination of defense capabilities and the ability to recover 
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after the use of violence.65 Garcia therefore argues that the abundance of weapons and their 
unrestricted use lead to human insecurity.66 Small Arms Survey has called small arms 
availability a ‘proximate determinant’ of violence and underdevelopment.67 Small arms have 
so repeatedly been established as an independent variable to insecurity that viewing small 
arms–especially those outside of the legal framework–as the cause of ill-doing has become  
taken for granted in many studies: 
The illicit trade in small arms, light weapons and ammunition wreaks havoc 
everywhere. Mobs terrorizing a neighbourhood. Rebels attacking civilians or 
peacekeepers. Drug lords randomly killing law enforcers or anyone else interfering 
with their illegal businesses. Bandits hijacking humanitarian aid convoys. In all 
continents, uncontrolled small arms form a persisting problem. … A build-up of small 
arms alone may not create the conflicts in which they are used, but their excessive 
accumulation and wide availability aggravates the tension. The violence becomes 
more lethal and lasts longer, and a sense of insecurity grows, which in turn leads to a 
greater demand for weapons.68  
Other research shows that poor countries are particularly affected by gun violence. 
Criminological research has for example found literacy to be inversely associated with 
homicide rates, both on a macro-level and on an individual level.69 Chon has for example 
found that access to and the quality of health care are important factors in the level of lethal 
outcomes of gun crimes. Countries with well-developed emergency health care, and good 
health care resources in general, are at lower risk of violent acts in those countries resulting in 
the death of the victim. They tend to have lower homicide mortality rates than what can be 
predicted based on the rates of violent crimes in general. In an international comparative 
study of homicide rates, Chon found a significant and negative correlation between a 
country’s general amount of resources in health care and the risk of a serious violent crime 
having a deadly outcome.70  
 
In political science armed violence is more often thought of as resulting from a lack of legal 
order and political institutions, over educational levels or health services. Nonetheless, it 
strengthens the hypothesis that weapons diffusion in states with poor health care, low levels 
of literacy and underdeveloped institutions and law enforcement is more dangerous than 
weapon diffusion in societies where this is not the case. Illegal ownership, production or trade 
in small arms are assumed to be at least partly enabled by weak governance structures. 
Classical political theory and sociology have argued that variations in social violence across 
countries can be explained by variation in political-institutional arrangements, especially 
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regarding order.71 Seen historically, violence reduction within states has often depended, or at 
least coincided with, the development of social institutions.72 Crime prevention is achieved 
through developing and maintaining peaceful means to arrange social, economic and political 
life.   
 
historically the idea of “security” has been inextricably intertwined with the struggle to 
control the institutions and instruments of organized violence, which in turn has been 
central to the emergence of the modern state, and its conception of representative 
political institutions, civil society and civil–military relations. The relatively successful 
evacuation of violence from the public sphere is in many ways a precondition for 
politics as we understand it.73 
 
Further from this line of thoughts, many states are assumed to be specifically prone to spirals 
of violence: 
 
Particularly prone to the development of spirals of violence are (parts of) societies in 
transition or on the edge of instability, such as fragile and failing states with social 
fragmentation, weak governance structures and inadequate management capacities. 
These states cannot guarantee core functions of government, such as law and public 
order, welfare, participation, a monopoly on the use of force and basic public services 
such as infrastructure, health and education. Consequently, the power vacuum is filled 
by actors such as international troops (for example, United Nations peacekeepers), 
private security companies, terrorist groups, warlords or local militias.74 
 
It is noteworthy from a development perspective on security that one aspect of development –
namely market liberalization–would be part of the problem of small arms proliferation, rather 
than the solution. Other assumptions of liberal development and violence reduction have been 
put into question. Fox and Hoelscher’s study, for example, found that democratic state-
building is not the primary explanatory variable for low rates of violence. Their findings show 
that weakly institutionalized democracies are uniquely prone to social violence. Countries 
with coherent political orders, whether autocratic or democratic, are likely to exhibit lower 
levels of social violence than ‘hybrid’ ones.75 Their findings do not contradict arms control as 
a means to reduce violence. One can assume that states with ‘coherent political orders’ have 
relatively close control of borders and weapon production and import, as well as an interest in 
not arming domestic non-state groups. Furthermore, state-building has in the past often been 
understood as occurring as a response to endemic violence: ‘In other words, high rates of 
violence may in fact serve as an impetus for the institutionalization of political order under 
certain conditions.’76 According to Pinker, ‘the main reason that violence correlates with low 
socioeconomic status today is that the elites and the middle class pursue justice with the legal 
system while the lower classes resort to what scholars of violence call “self-help” … forms of 
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violent retaliation by which people secure justice in the absence of intervention by the state’.77 
Similarly, Jackson and Marsh found that whether or not more small arms will lead to morality 
increases depends on the preexisting patterns of violence.78 
 
In an international comparative study, Konty and Schaefer explain the lack of correlation 
between firearms ownership and armed violence at the international level as due to that small 
arms being overwhelmingly owned by citizens in rich, democratic states, where non-violent 
alternatives for justice, safety and income exists: 
 
firearms are more accessible in societies with higher incomes and in freer societies 
and that it is the effects of poverty and deprivation that produce more violence, not the 
presence or absence of firearms. The wealth to possess firearms and the freedom to 
own them does not produce more death by violence; rather the myriad negative 
consequences of poverty and deprivation do produce more death by violence.79 
 
Hence, ‘the combination of deprivation and access to lethal weaponry may in fact produce 
more death by violence.’80 The different view on the role of small arms in violence and 
security is key in thinking about restricting access to small arms, ranging from pro-gun 
lobbyists to small arms control advocates. Given the evidence that small arms are more likely 
to cause death and violence in the global south, it is remarkable that the debate on whether 
small arms cause violence or disorder is mainly based on recent Western experience. 
 
 
Weapons as deterrents of crime and for self-protection 
 
Although marginalized in small arms control discourse, there are advocates who argue that 
weapons are deterrents of crime and play a fundamental role in self-protection. Deterrence 
theory assumes that people choose to obey or violate the law after calculating the gains and 
consequences of their actions. In order to reduce violence, the consequences of the crime need 
to outweigh the gains of committing the crime. The theory assumes that the offender is 
rational as well as fully informed of both the gains (e.g. how much money is in the wallet) and 
the costs (e.g. the risk of being shot during an attempted robbery).81 In arms control studies, 
only a ‘credible’ threat of retaliation is perceived to have a deterrent effect on crime or 
military intervention. Deterrence is, for example, widely believed to be one of the primary 
reasons as to why states develop or maintain nuclear weapons. Studies have showed that no 
nuclear weapon state has ever been invaded by a foreign power; nuclear weapons possession 
in combination with their possible use is perceived as a ‘credible’ deterrence.82 
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With regards to small arms, some scholars and politicians argue that widespread gun 
ownership is one of the best deterrents to and defenses against opportunistic crime. The 
theory assumes that widespread gun ownership depresses violence by deterring many 
criminals from confrontational crime (such as robbery), for the fear of retaliation by the 
victim. This is for example argued in studies of so-called concealed weapons licensing in the 
United States (i.e. license for civilians to carry a handgun concealed under their clothing in 
public places for self-defense reasons), where dozens of studies have been dedicated to the 
discussion.83 Kates and Mauser argue that strict gun control has no impact on gun violence 
rates, since: ‘individuals who commit violent crimes will either find guns despite severe 
controls or will find other weapons to use’.84 They argue that there are inconsistencies in data 
between violent crime (in particular homicides) and number of weapons in a country, and find 
the opposite correlation to be true: ‘Whether causative or not, the consistent international 
pattern is that more guns equals less murder and other violent crime.’85 In 1986, in light of 
increasing rates of armed robberies in Nigeria and the failure of the police to solve the 
problem, Adinkrah argued in favor of liberalizing Nigeria’s then stringent firearms law to halt 
armed robberies through the arming of civilians.86 Besides deterrence, small arms may be 
used in self-defense if an attack does occur. Pankhurst has, for example, studied the role of 
firearms in the first Italian-Ethiopian war and concluded that Ethiopia’s firearms arsenal–
which was more advanced than any other African state at the time–played a key role in 
preserving Ethiopia’s independence at the time of European colonisation of Africa.87 The 
central role of SALW in national self-defense is evident in, for example, references to article 
51 of the UN Charter.88  
 
The ‘Second Amendment’ approach (named after the American constitutional right of 
civilians to bear arms) views gun control as ‘a social regulatory policy that involves specific 
rules and sanctions that have a direct and concrete impact on individuals’.89 The values 
associated with the gun culture are ideologically related to individualism and opposition to 
governmental intrusion into private citizens’ lives.90 The perspective sees weapon ownership 
and use as a natural human right, and directly links the right to self-defense by firearm to the 
right to life, as firearms are the only proper means to guarantee security in the modern world. 
This view argues, beyond deterrence theory, that citizens must have the right to bear arms 
regardless of whether gun carrying lowers crime or not.91 A study by Wolpert and Gimpel has 
shown that American gun owners’ stand in the small arms debate tend to correlate strongly 
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with their role as gun and ammunition consumers and users.92 Even this ‘pro-gun’ 
perspective, however, believes that ‘governments may impose limitations and restrictions on 
certain applications of this civil right … These limitations may include age-restrictions, 
background checks, and licensing requirements’, only ‘no rational person should be denied 
access to guns’.93 Furthermore, much of the argumentation is based on the assumption that 
criminals will always have access to small arms, which is why ‘good guys’ need them too. 
Although an implicit critique of the role that the small arms market and stockpiles play in 
supplying weapons to criminals, the perspective takes the vastness of small arms access for 
granted without criticising the underlying diffusion of weapons in many societies. 
 
 
Weapons as enablers of crime and violence 
 
Contrary to deterrence theory, crime prevention and public health approaches argue that 
weapons are inherently dangerous. Small arms have the causal power to cause harm, based on 
their own material functions. Guns were invented to cause (and threaten) harm; this is 
precisely why they are in demand for hunting, self-defense, law enforcement, etc. According 
to LaFollette, small arms are not only ‘what we make of them’, but exists outside of our idea 
of their use: ‘We know that some objects—tactical nuclear weapons, biochemical weapons, 
live grenades, and so forth, are much more dangerous than feathers, ice cream, and butter 
knives.’94 Furthermore, LaFollette argues that if small arms were not meant for harm, 
redesigns of weapons over time would have rendered small arms less deadly and more 
effective at their primary purpose, for example accuracy in target shooting. Instead, the 
redesign of small arms over the past few hundred years has made them more efficient at 
causing harm. LaFollette contrasts this with cars: ‘a significant aim of redesigning 
automobiles is to make them less dangerous. To some extent these efforts have succeeded. … 
We have enhanced the auto’s original aim of efficient transportation while lessening harmful 
side effects. That is why we can sensibly say that the automobile is not inherently dangerous 
despite the fact that it causes harm. We cannot say the same for guns’.95 
 
Beyond being inherently dangerous, small arms have ‘assault-intensifying effects’ which 
means that when assaults occur, for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances, the use 
of a gun increases the severity of any resulting injuries and the probability of the victim’s 
death, compared to what would have occurred had a likely substitute weapon, such as a knife 
or fists, been used.96 Small arms possession in itself does not necessary constitute motivation 
to use lethal violence, but if confrontation occurs, it is more likely to be lethal if small arms 
are involved than if they are not. Small arms constitute one capability of violence and may act 
as a ‘threat multiplier’ of violent conflict.97 
 
The public health approach uses the assumptions that small arms are inherently dangerous and 
act as threat multipliers to identify firearms as enablers of crime and violence. From this 
perspective, limiting access to facilitators can reduce both the occurrence and lethality of 
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certain types of violence, such as impulsive acts of aggression.98 According to this logic, arms 
control can turn small arms from enablers to inhibitors. 
 
From a sociological point of view, the material power of small arms needs to be put into 
social contexts in order to fully explain small arm violence. Consider, for example, why small 
arms to such a large extent are used in their capacity to cause harm rather than for their sound 
effects? And why, have small arms been designed and redesigned in ways that allow them to 
be used by, for example, children? And why is it that men overwhelmingly use small arms, 
when they could be used as an ‘equalizer’ for women, overcoming men’s superior physical 
strength? The use of small arms is not explained by the weapon’s material powers, but in 
investigating the agents and structures associated with armed violence. Only then can 
variations over time and space be explained. A study of gangs in the UK, for example, 
showed that gang members sought small arms not only for their instrumental use, but also for 
status enhancement within the group.99 Besides turning small arms from enablers to 
inhibitors, Gartner further argues that stricter controls on small arms both reflect and shape 
values, particularly the ‘culture of violence’, in the same way that legislation has been 
observed to have long-term effects on other behaviors.100 
 
Finally, researchers who see weapons as enablers of crime and violence have devoted a lot of 
resources to gather empirical evidence that small arms cause harm. Based on Sayer’s 
assumption that human ‘suffering’ and ‘flourishing’ provide frameworks for evaluating 
policy, behavior and practices, researchers on small arms have argued that access to small 
arms cannot be considered necessary to one’s flourishing.101 Although free access to small 
arms might be a means for a person to achieve his or her ends or interests, they are not 
constitutive elements of their flourishing.102 Furthermore, small arms use is harmful to society 
in a number of ways. 
 
Evidence of small arms’ impact on peace and security 
 
Small arms and war 
 
Military historians have showed how small arms have played a central part in warfare and 
human rights abuses for hundreds of years (see chapter 3), although the collection of evidence 
has focused overwhelmingly on the period after the Cold War, typically referred to in the 
contexts of ‘globalization’ or ‘new wars’. Small arms are the most widely used weapons in 
conflicts. In 2002, Small Arms Survey estimated that small arms killed approximately 
200,000 people annually in conflict and post-conflict situations.103 The research team has later 
said that the estimate might be too high. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program has identified at 
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least 12,000-37,000 battle-related death in 2002-2008.104 In armed conflict, an estimated 90 
per cent of civilian casualties are killed by small arms. Small arms increase the severity of 
conflicts and extend their duration. They make post-conflict transition more violent and 
hinder the maintenance or establishment of law and order.105  
 
Liberia’s president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has called the proliferation of small arms ‘one of the 
key drivers of armed conflict’.106 According to Small Arms Survey, small arms ‘contribute to 
an increase in the scale and pace of killing, the likelihood of illness, and the possibility of 
violations of international humanitarian law.’107 The uncontrolled flow of small arms into the 
African Great lakes region in the 1990s armed both government and non-government military 
forces, and took the life of 1.5 million over just four years.108 Over 250,000 civilians are 
estimated to have been shot and killed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 
1998 and 2001.109 According to the United Nations, more human rights abuses are committed 
with small arms than with any other weapon.110 
 
Craft and Smaldone have analysed the role of arms transfers on political violence in 
independent Africa and concluded that arms transfers are a significant predictor of war in sub-
Saharan Africa. They explain this outcome by arguing that arms imports may increase the 
perceived military capability of the state, both by domestic leaders and other states. Weapon 
imports may also ‘heighten the prestige and institutional role of the military in society and 
government policy determination, and lead to more aggressive responses to perceived security 
threats’.111  One of the most prominent trends in the small arms literature is the centrality of 
small arms in so-called new wars (see chapter 4). 
 
 
Armed violence 
 
It is estimated that 200,000 people are killed in firearms homicides and suicides every year. 
The vast majority of violent deaths from small arms occur in countries and territories that are 
not considered conflict or post-conflict environments. On average, an estimated 42–60 per 
cent of lethal violence is committed with firearms worldwide.112 Jackson and Marsh suggest 
that the number of deaths by firearms could actually be higher.113 Although the data on 
firearms related deaths in non-conflict states are incomplete, there is clearly a significant 
impact. In the United States, since the 1960s more people have been killed by firearms 
domestically than in inter-state wars.114 The United Nations collects data on firearms 
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casualties from many states around the world on an annual basis. In the EU alone, more than 
5000 murders were committed with firearms (around 20% of all murders) in one year 
according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).115 In annual surveys 
conducted by the UNODC, firearms were the weapons used in the majority of the homicides 
in most reported countries, up to 80 per cent in Colombia, Venezuela, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Guatemala and Honduras. Some of the highest rates of firearms violence, both in terms of 
number of incidents and per capita, are in Latin America and the Caribbean (Jamaica, 
Venezuela). Only ten African states are covered in the data set (out of 54), as most African 
states lack a central database on armed violence. Notably, firearms constitute a relatively 
small part of all homicides in the African states which UNODC reports on.116 
 
Impediment to development 
 
A 2007 study by the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam and 
Saferworld estimated the cost impact of conflict on African development to be approximately 
US$284 billion between 1990 and 2005. The costs to development included for example 
damage caused to infrastructure, investments and other economic activities, and health costs. 
The report mainly used decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of conflict 
costs, and concluded that conflicts weaken the African national economies by 15 per cent 
annually–an average of US$18 billion per year. It also reported that government social 
expenditure fell during conflict years in a number of countries, with a negative effect on 
development and human security.117 
 
 
Health costs of small arm injuries 
 
Studies on health costs associated with small arms imply a big impact on the health sector. As 
showed in the Oxfam et al report, the health sector is severely impacted in countries during 
conflict, both because demand for health services increases and because government social 
spending declines (often as a result of a shift in preference towards spending resources on 
military defense). Armed violence has been identified as a major impediment to the provision 
of basic health care, including by depriving people access to health services.118 For each 
person killed by a small arm, there are many more non-fatal shootings, often leading to 
disabilities, causing suffering and productivity losses.119 The ratio between fatal and non-fatal 
shootings is context dependent, and tends to be lower in situations of underdevelopment and 
armed conflict, the obvious reason being the differences in availability and quality of health 
care.120 Non-fatal gun injuries have substantial health costs. In the United States, gunshot is 
the second largest cause of spinal cord injury, with about 2000 gun victims per year suffering 
such injuries. The direct medical costs of gunshot wounds in the United States during the 
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1990s has been estimated at 6 million USD per day.121 Treating small arms injuries absorbs 
considerable emergency room resources. Medical field personnel have observed that more 
injured victims die during transport than at the treatment facilities, and that gun injuries put 
heavy pressure on medical transportation.122 In South Africa, scarce hospital resources are 
absorbed in dealing with violence and healthcare personnel are increasingly themselves the 
target of violence.123 Other secondary effects include problems related to blood supply. Not 
only are blood availability and transfusion key issues in developing countries, but emergency 
responses to large-scale violence often do not accommodate careful testing for HIV and can 
result in additional problems.124 Violence and the prevalence of weapons also create 
psychological stress that fuels other health problems and creates insecurity. Living in arms-
infested environments often yields observable symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, 
especially among children.125 
 
 
Forced displacement 
 
Asif Efrat has used refugee outflow as an indicator of the wider impact of small arms.126 
Forced displacement may be the cause of armed conflict as armed groups target communities 
living on, for example, resource-rich land, forcing them to move in order to gain control over 
natural resources (Eastern DRC being a striking example).127 According to the Small Arms 
Survey: 
 
Invariably, livelihoods are reshaped by arms-related insecurity: customary institutions 
such as pastoral migration patterns and dowry systems are undermined by threats 
associated with arms availability. For example, in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, the 
Sudan, and Uganda, pastoral and agrarian communities are regularly terrorized by the 
presence of AK-47-wielding bandits and cattle-rustlers.128 
 
Other studies have recorded security threats for refugees and displaced people caused by 
small arms, and noted that even a single weapon can have an impact on the life of vulnerable 
groups such as refugees and displaced people.129 Furthermore, serious crimes are committed 
in refugee camps using small arms, including rape.130  
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Organized crime and the threat against law and order 
 
Small arms are considered ‘organic’ to transnational organized crime. Small arms are linked 
to various forms of organized crime as tools for gaining and maintaining power, as 
instruments for the commission of crime and as commodities to be trafficked.131 Access to, 
and use of, firearms is an intrinsic part of the operations and personnel of transnational 
criminal organisations, for the purposes of intimidation of victims and self-protection from 
competitors or law-enforcement agencies. The dynamic relationship between gangs and small 
arms use has been covered extensively in criminology, and research has for example showed 
the prevalence of firearms in gangs and in gang violence.132 Hales et al differentiate between 
an instrumental criminal gun culture, in which guns are used only for offensive criminal 
purposes such as armed robbery, and a complex criminal gun culture in which the role of 
firearms is more generalized, including offensive, defensive and symbolic functionality.133 
Related to drug markets, ‘instrumental’ use of small arms includes their use in robberies of 
drug dealers, territorial disputes, personal protection and sanctioning of drug market 
participants. In more complex gun cultures, violence may transcend functionality and become 
embedded in social structures, to become generalized in gang structures that serve to escalate 
and perpetuate violence.134  
 
Small arms are frequently used to carry out terrorist attacks. Approximately half of the 
international terrorist attacks documented in the 2003 US Department of State report on 
global terrorism were perpetrated with SALW.135 In the Niger Delta region, insurgent militias 
have used SALW to kidnap oil company personnel, sabotage oil pipelines and engage in the 
transnational trade in stolen crude oil, causing Nigeria to lose almost 30 per cent of its daily 
oil production and expected oil revenues at the peak of the crisis. Oil production only 
recovered after a voluntary disarmament campaign of the Niger Delta insurgents in 2009.136 
In January 2015, gunmen attacking the French satiric newspaper Charlie Hebdo, killing ten 
staff and two policemen, carried out the attack with Kalashnikovs, smuggled into France from 
Belgium. In November 2015, another six synchronized terrorist attacks in Paris were carried 
out by using a mixture of small arms and explosives, with small arms killing the vast majority 
of the 130 victims.137 
 
Besides fueling organized crime, small arms are also considered to pose a significant threat to 
good governance. Armed non-state actors are commonly understood as spoilers for state- and 
peace-building efforts, meaning the strengthening, reform or reconstruction of state structures 
and institutions. They are more likely to challenge than to support any steps that would 
strengthen security governance through government, that is, the (re-)establishment of the 
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state’s monopoly of the use of force.138 According to Ulrich Schneckener, most of armed non-
state actors frequently use violence against unarmed civilians, often in order to provoke 
reactions from the government and to undermine the authority and legitimacy of state 
institutions that are apparently not able to protect the population.139 Abdel-Fatau Musah 
argues that small arms proliferation is a direct threat to democracy and evidence of a 
declining governance structure.140 Easy access to weapons ‘by civilians, criminals, and 
combatants indicates an alarming failure of the state’s theoretical monopoly of violence.’141 
Several studies have found that small arms are impediments to democratic processes, such as 
elections, or legal and peaceful settlement of disputes:  
 
The prevalence of small arms and light weapons in Burundi threatens to undermine 
state authority, despite democratic elections having been held in 2005, ending 12 years 
of civil war in the Central African country.  … the problem of small arms must be 
dealt with before the rule of law can really take hold in this fledgling democracy.142  
 
Similarly, ‘a senior official warned that the southern region of Pool (in DRC) might be 
excluded from legislative elections in 2007 due to the profusion of weapons in circulation.’143 
These empirical examples show that small arms challenge IR conceptualizations of authority, 
power and violence in extraordinary ways, both because of small arms’ technological design 
as weapons of individuals and their wide proliferation and diffusion in societies. What 
explains these developments? 
 
Weapons and masculinity 
 
According to Stroud’s gender analysis of gun ownership in the United States, gun use ‘takes 
on different meanings when analyzed at the intersection of race, class, and gender’.144 Her 
findings are supported in the international literature. It is overwhelmingly men who buy, sell, 
and use small arms around the world. According to Blumstein, gun ownership and use is a 
means to demonstrate manhood, particularly among young men.145 In the United States, men 
are four times more likely to be a gun owner than women are (1 in 10 women owns a gun, 
compared to 4 in 10 men), and data collected from other countries shows a similar pattern, if 
not greater disparities.146 According to the World Health Organisation, 90 per cent of SALW 
homicide victims are men, while young civilian men are dying as a result of small arms 
violence in disproportionate numbers to any other group in the world.147 A recent study using 
data from the World Health Organization showed that out of 60,000 suicides by firearm in 
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Europe over a twelve-year period, 96 per cent of the suicides were men.148 In theory, 
therefore, differences in gender and age-structures can influence homicide rates. In violent 
crime research, young adult men are deemed to be the most violence prone demographic 
group; thus, the larger their share of the population, the higher the potential homicide rates.149 
 
Most gender analysis of small arms, however, emphasizes cultural factors over demographics. 
Numerous studies have argued that guns are symbols of masculinity. The lethality of guns 
infuse their users with traits associated with masculinity–namely control and power.’150 
Firearms contribute to cultural constructions of masculinity and masculinity is implicated in 
violent acts in which firearms are used. ‘Hegemonic masculinity’ is a term for the discursive 
practices and embodied dispositions that legitimize male domination. Connell argues that the 
US gun lobby has been able to defeat opponents of gun control by explicitly appealing to 
discourses of masculinity. By evoking concepts like security, family values, or individual 
freedom, the gun lobby works to make masculinity ‘a principal theme, not taken for granted 
as background’.151  
 
 
Gender-based violence 
 
Comprehensive data on the use of small arms in gender-based violence is lacking. Besides a 
general lack of reporting on gender-based violence (both sexual violence and domestic 
violence), there is rarely derogation in the data between weapons used in the offenses. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies have investigated this phenomenon. Olujic has reported that 
approximately 20,000 women were raped at gunpoint by Bosnian Serb soldiers as part of a 
deliberate pattern of abuse in which sexual violence fulfilled a strategic purpose. Her study 
also found that weapons assumed a symbolic role in the violent repression of women.152 
Muggah and Griffiths found that ‘firearms facilitate sexual violence against women and girls’, 
with ‘one study finding that in some cases up to three-quarters of reported episodes of gender-
based violence involved armed assailants’.153 The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence 
and Development found that around 66,000 women are killed violently each year around the 
world, representing some 17 per cent of all intentional homicides. These ‘femicides’ generally 
occur in the domestic sphere and the perpetrator is usually a current or former partner. About 
one in three of these recorded femicides was committed with a firearm; however, in some 
states firearms were used in over 60 per cent of the killings.154 The highest recorded homicide 
rate among females globally is in Africa (6.2 per 100,000).155 Firearms are also frequently 
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used in patterns of ‘coercive controlling violence’, which is characteristically used by men 
against their female partners.156 According to David Hemenway: 
 
The evidence is overwhelming that a gun in the home is a risk factor for completed 
suicide and that gun accidents are most likely to occur in homes with guns. There is 
compelling evidence that a gun in the home is a risk factor for intimidation and for 
killing women in their homes, and it appears that a gun in the home may more likely 
be used to threaten intimates than to protect against intruders.157 
 
Intimate partner violence involving guns takes place primarily in the home, especially in 
countries where access to guns is relatively easy. It also appears that having a gun in the 
household places women at higher risk of injury or death caused by their partners. 
Furthermore, existing data suggests that women rarely use firearms in intimate personal 
violence.158 Women are killed, injured, and intimidated by firearms disproportionately to men 
in the context of intimate partner violence. The risk of lethal intimate partner violence for 
women, as well as injury and intimidation, is increased by the presence of guns in the home, 
including work-related guns.159 Whereas some men display or brandish weapons to threaten 
their female partners, the reverse is rare.160 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This sub-chapter provides an overview of the main themes and findings in small arms 
literature over the past two decades. In conclusion, the problems with small arms are 
tripartite.  
 
First, they are lethal technology designed for individual use and therefore have the potential to 
be deployed outside of collective action, including as enablers of non-sanctioned violence. By 
design, small arms have the potential to challenge authority and inflict harm by individuals 
not necessarily authorised by society to do so.  
 
Secondly, as a technology, small arms have a low threshold with regards to production, trade 
and distribution. Small arms are enormously diffused in societies and also seem inherently 
prone to divert from any formal attempts to streamline or formalize access.  
 
Thirdly, not only are small arms embedded in individualism and the market economy, they 
also intersect with concepts such as status, control and power from diverse arenas such as 
criminal environments, to law enforcement, to insurgencies and hegemonic masculinities. 
 
The existing literature has also showed that this three-tier problematique plays out very 
differently in different contexts, with the burden of impact falling on marginalised groups 
within countries and communities in the global south more generally.    
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Chapter 2. Theory 
 
The literature review uncovered underlying unevenness, tensions and counterpoints related to 
small arms, such as: uneven patterns and consequences of trade and use, illicit/licit 
dichotomies, correlation between the deadly outcomes of small arms violence and 
underdevelopment, and gendered aspects of violence. A key gap in the current small arms 
literature, as far as this thesis is concerned, is that small arms control practices have been 
much overlooked. The vast majority of existing literature has been on small arms 
problematique, i.e. the role small arms have in conflicts, crimes, violence, and not on arms 
control. This issue will be dealt with in-depth later in this chapter and in subsequent chapters 
of the thesis. There are further shortcomings with the mainstream contemporary small arms 
literature, which are related to the conceptualization of the three-tier problematique of small 
arms laid out in the previous chapter. 
 
Before unpacking these shortcomings, it should be noted that the literature on small arms has 
tended to be highly policy-oriented. It has in general not developed theories to understand or 
explain empirical findings, but primarily performed (limited) empirical analysis. The problem 
has not been a lack of writing. Greene and Marsh found that 655 academic articles on 
firearms and violence and 400 articles on arms and armed violence in fragile states were 
published between 1999 and 2009. A majority of the literature was applied policy research 
published within the existing mainstream policy context. Moreover, only 8 per cent were 
about developing countries and few contained cross-national studies.161 The policy nature of 
the research on small arms caused Laurance to claim that ‘Little of what passed for research 
[on SALW] during the 1990s would earn tenure or promotion in academe’.162 IR scholars 
appear largely uninterested in small arms issues. For example, the 9th Pan-European 
Conference’s programme on International Relations in 2015, titled ‘The Worlds of Violence’, 
did not include a single reference to small arms or weapons.163  
 
In 2011 Cooper and Mutimer argued that academia has fallen behind policy-makers and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in informing the arms control agendas, mainly because 
of the lack of a broader analytical approach: 
 
[G]iven the predominantly problem-solving orientation of academic arms control, 
there has not even been much that can be described as an attempt to critically reflect 
on the relationship between current practice and traditional arms control theory, on the 
security framings underlying current policies or on the functions served by the current 
global architecture of arms control.164 
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Lacking an advanced theory, however, does not mean there are no underlying assumptions or 
concealed perspectives in small arms research or control practices. Arms control is highly 
political, which suggests that theories are at play even if they are disguised in their taken for 
granted quality. The opening statement by Hedley Bull in the first issue of the journal 
International Security in 1976 comes to mind: 
 
Our present theory and practice of arms control rests on a set of assumptions–
sometimes explicit, more often implicit–as to what kind of world order is desirable 
and feasible. It is inevitable that this should be so, for to raise questions about the 
quality and quantity of arms that should exist in international society, about who 
should possess them, where they should be deployed, for what objectives and in what 
ways they should be used, is to raise questions about the political structure of the 
world and the distribution of power within it.165 
 
The international small arms literature, reviewed in chapter 1.2, has been created primarily in 
the interphase between policy and research. Huge emphasis has been placed on mapping the 
humanitarian impact of small arms, and especially on the causal link between small arms and 
violence. This literature has itself generated a set of directions for policy-makers in thinking 
about small arms. Batchelor and Kenkel have examined the relationship between small arms 
policy researchers and policy makers in the post-cold war period and concluded that such 
experts have had a significant influence on policy change, some of which resulted in new 
international or regional regimes to enhance the control of small arms.166 In fairness, the 
inherent danger of the technology, including unsanctioned individual use and diversion, and 
small arms’ widespread global market application and availability, are all findings arrived at 
in previous research. Yet, when translated into arms control advice or practice, these 
categories have been blurred.  Although small arms researchers sometime diverge from the 
mainstream agenda, there are at least three central assumptions which enjoy broad consensus 
across the policy-research spectrum in the small arms literature and practice.  
 
First, with regards to small arms technology and design, the dominant assumption is that it is 
not the technology itself which causes concern (‘guns don’t kill people’), but that different 
states have different capacities to manage lethal technology. Small arms may have a 
‘destabilizing impact’ depending on the local context. Small Arms Survey for example 
recently stated that even small quantities of small arms ‘in the wrong hands …can have 
destabilizing effects’.167 Such assumption neglects the inherent danger of the technology itself 
and assumes that small arms can be managed effectively by the right authority. It further 
assumes an ‘ideal type’ of stable political conditions, and that conditions or contexts which 
diverge from this ideal type are outliners. In other words, the assumption that small arms can 
be managed takes peaceful coexistence and state monopoly of violence as the general state of 
affairs. 
 
Secondly, with regards to the market, the dominant concern is not large-scale production, 
trade or diffusion of small arms in general but on ‘illicit transfers’. Rather than 
problematizing the situation of small arms in a global market context, the discourse has turned 
formal market structures to the solution of the problem of small arms. While grounded in the 
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specific nature of small arms as weapons that facilitate easy concealment, diversion, theft and 
unsanctioned use by individuals, the concentration on ‘illicit’ has gone beyond technological 
distinctions to incorporate a central distinction between legal and illegal space, use and users. 
As Mutimer found in 2006:  
 
The centrality of the term ‘illicit’ to the UN process is difficult to overstate. The 2001 
meeting was called the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, a phraseology echoed in the title of the PoA 
itself. In addition, the word appears 55 times in the document, a text of only 83 
paragraphs.168 
 
A recent Small Arms Survey research note also argued that ‘In particular, the illicit 
proliferation of arms and ammunition is a driver of modern armed conflicts, often prolonging 
their effects’.169 By delegitimizing or criminalizing small arms production, trade, distribution 
and use outside of formal structures, the majority of small arms production, trade and use is 
de facto legitimized.170 This is indicative of liberal trade theory underpinning the framing of 
small arms in the international context. 
 
Thirdly, the ‘misuse’ of small arms is presented as a key concern by the discourse. Although 
small arms are designed to cause harm (chapter 1.2), using small arms to cause certain harm is 
still considered a misuse of the technology–even though the so-called misuse is perfectly 
consistent with its design. The misuse is typically understood to mean the unlawful violent use 
of small arms, including in conflict and crime.171 Again, it is not the general ‘appropriate’ use 
of small arms but the misuse of small arms that is of concern. This assumption fails to 
acknowledge the design of small arms for individual use, which does not require the consent 
or sanction of formal structures or communities, as one of small arms’ characteristics.  
 
Put together, the concepts of destabilizing accumulations, illicit transfers and misuse illustrate 
small arms’ security impact as conditional on the user, the intent, the context, etc. as Bull’s 
quote above alludes to: these assumptions can be used to make arguments about the quality 
and quantity of arms that should exist in international society, who should possess them, 
where they should be deployed, for what objectives and in what ways they should be used. By 
problematizing only parts of small arms trade and use, the framework legitimizes large 
quantities of (small) arms in international society. Neil Cooper has for example shown how 
the discourse of delegitimizing some weapon types (such as anti-personnel landmines) has 
legitimized both post-Cold War liberal interventionism and new generation high-technology 
weapons.172 
 
Moreover, small arms’ security implications formulated along these three assumptions have 
motivated a framing of such implications to mean proliferation and use outside formal 
structures in specific geographical areas where these have destabilizing effects–particularly in 
Africa. As one example, the UN Security Council has repeatedly expressed its concern over 
the threat to peace and security arising from the destabilizing accumulations, illicit transfers 
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and misuse of SALW. In 2014-15 the Security Council adopted 16 country-specific 
resolutions with regards to these three SALW concerns. Of these, 13 were directed to African 
countries.173 Hence, the dominant interpretation of the three-tier problematique not only has 
consequences for thinking about arms control, but also a fundamental impact on arms control 
policy and practice. 
 
In spite of significant empirical research and advocacy work, the lack of deeper theorizing 
and the incorporation of the above underlying assumptions mean that the small arms literature 
does in fact make implicit statements not only about the small arms problematique, but small 
arms control as well: what type of arms trade to control (illicit transfers and diversions), who 
should possess them (responsible actors who would not misuse them) and in what ways small 
arms can be used (lawful, sanctioned, violence or threat of violence). 
 
This small arms discourse made up by a largely consensual policy-research interphase, has 
mainly been dislocated from IR theory. Concepts from IR theory such as norms, regimes, 
security dilemmas, new wars, securitisation, epistemic communities, etc. appear in small arms 
literature without fully being theorized or validated. The next section will look more closely 
at some of the specific IR concepts echoed in small arms literature: balance of power, 
international regimes, emerging norms and epistemic communities. These are concepts and 
theories that have previously been used in arms control studies and reflect ideas from all the 
three mainstream IR paradigms. Rather than simply summarizing the use of these concepts in 
small arms literature, the following section will re-construct these IR theories in their possible 
explanations of international small arms control. 
 
Selected IR concepts and their possible applications to explain small arms control 
 
The following sections will discuss possible explanations to international small arms control, 
including the emergence of regional small arms control regimes in Africa. 
 
 
Balance of power 
 
The first concept and plausible explanation of small arms control is found in the ‘balance of 
power’ theory. The balance of power theory, most closely associated with the paradigm of 
Realism and Neorealism, is one of the oldest and most enduring concepts in international 
relations. One of its meanings refers to state strategy as aiming at an equal distribution of 
military power in the international system (or parts of it).174 Arms control can thus be seen as 
one of the means to achieve balance of power. The theory has been used to explain under 
what conditions states are likely to adopt and implement arms control agreements. Julian 
Schofield has for example argued that only arms control agreements which allow states to 
rearm in the future in order to balance another state’s power are likely to be successful.175 
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With arms control, neorealists refer to to formal or informal agreements between states to, in 
some way, restrict their own defense capability. Hence, neorealists may not understand 
international small arms control measures as arms control. As Morgon summarized: ’arms 
control concerns the military resources of states as those resources apply to relations among 
states’. Constraints dealing with domestic forces and weapons should be dealt with under 
‘gun control’.176  
 
To categorize the small arms control that has developed at the regional and international level 
in the past two decades as ‘arms control’ might be considered a stretch of the concept for 
balance of power theorists. In order to compare the concept’s theoretical explanation of this 
phenomenon with other theoretical perspectives, however, they need to accept that they are 
referring to at least partially the same phenomenon even though this might entail some re-
description of events.177  
 
One important assumption for realists is the distinction between the national hierarchical 
order and the international anarchic order, in for example exercising force. According to 
Waltz, ‘National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International 
politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation.’178 Classical realist Herz 
described national orders as separated from the international order by the ‘hard shells’ of 
borders. After a long period of creating nation states in medieval Europe, ‘There was now 
peace and protection within. War became a regularized military procedure; only the breaking 
of the shell permitted interference with what had now become the internal affairs of another 
country.’179 
 
From the perspective of balance of power, the emergence of regional small arms control 
conventions could be seen as a form of ‘alliance formation’ of states, with respect to either 
arms-producing states outside the region or non-state armed groups. The proposition that 
states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers lies at the heart of 
traditional balance of power theory. According to this hypothesis, states join alliances to 
protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.180 
In relation to small arms, realists could argue that cooperation among military weak states, 
such as those in Africa, may be caused by a need for balance against stronger arms-producing 
powers outside the region, perhaps as a way to reduce dependence on such powers. Balance 
of power theorists have persistently argued that states facing an external threat 
overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than ally with it. As states are 
deeply concerned with maintaining their autonomy as actors, states will choose an alignment 
that preserves most of a state’s freedom of action over accepting subordination under a 
potential hegemon. Because states’ intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable, it is 
safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong states will remain 
benevolent.181  
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The second option for using the balance of power concept is to argue that the states in the 
regional cooperation scheme are not balancing against an external actor outside the region, 
but against non-state armed actors within the region. Given that the African small arms 
control agreements specifically target proliferation to non-state actors, this would seem a 
more plausible use of the concept. Vinci, for example, argues for studying armed non-state 
groups using neorealism and the concept of balance of power.182 This is, however, a stretch of 
the realist conceptualization of balance of power, which is about states and state alliances. 
According to Walt, the decision with whom to form an alliance is dependent on the nature of 
the threat; for example, a weaker power might be considered more dangerous than a more 
powerful one for reasons other than capability, such as knowledge of the actor’s intent. Both 
proximity and offensive intentions are aspects (along with actual capability) that affect the 
level of threat that states (read here, non-state actors) may pose, and states (non-state actors) 
that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them. As a result, ‘even 
states with rather modest capabilities may trigger a balancing response if they are perceived as 
especially aggressive.’183 Terrorist organizations operating in Africa, such as Al-Shabaab, 
Lord’s Resistance Army and Boko Haram, arguably pose a greater immediate security threat 
to the majority of African states than states outside the region, given these organizations’ 
proximity, intent and aggressive behavior. However, balance of power, as conceptualized by 
neorealists–even if it is stretched to include balance against non-state actors–contradicts the 
presumed hostile and distrustful relationships between states as it assumes that the threat of 
non-state armed actors, in spite of significantly less power and capability, constitute a larger 
threat than other state actors also within the region. Due to the threat of war arising from 
international anarchy (i.e. war can occur at any time as there is no central authority which 
prevents them), realists argue that states constantly fear that today’s friend may be 
tomorrow’s enemy in war. Furthermore, international cooperation always produces unequal 
gains for participating partners.184 Actors are therefore concerned with who will gain more 
and how the other will use its increased capabilities.185 As an example, if Tanzania uses part 
of its already limited resources to help Kenya fight Al-Shabaab, how can Tanzania know that 
Kenya is not gaining more than Tanzania from that cooperation? Moreover, Kenya might, as a 
result of pooling resources with its neighboring countries, free up its own resources, and 
invest these in their military defense capability. Besides, if regional cooperation is a result of 
the common national interest of states to protect themselves from armed non-state actors, 
rather than against external powers, why not build an alliance with more powerful actors, such 
as China or the United States?  
 
For realists, weapons have a central role in the military dimension of the international balance 
of power and arms control manipulates the balance of military means.186 One central question, 
however, is whether small arms can indeed influence the balance of power. While firearms 
were cutting-edge technology in the 19th century, technological development is linear to 
realists, which means that as military technology becomes more effective, older military 
technologies become obsolete. Similarly, if one weapon system was banned or dismantled, a 
new military technology would appear. ‘Man’s capability for self-destruction cannot be 
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eradicated – he knows too much!’187 The rapid development in military technologies in the 
20th century, especially the introduction of nuclear weapons, made “low technologies” such as 
small arms fairly uninteresting as a balancer of power. As weapon technologies moved 
forward in the weapon-producing states, small arms are, arguably, no longer considered a 
credible threat to the survival of states as they might have been in the past.188 States’ defense 
forces now have access to far more lethal and effective weapons than firearms. Although 
small arms proliferation and use by criminals and terrorists may have security implications at 
the local level, the scale is manageable for states and primarily an issue for law enforcement. 
 
The balance of power concept is valuable in that it gives prominence to power asymmetries 
which appear to be central to many small arms issues (unevenness in trade, use and 
consequences). The concept is however stuck in what John Agnew calls the ‘territorial trap’, 
based on three problematic assumptions: that states are fixed units of sovereign space, the 
domestic/foreign polarity, and states as ‘containers’ of societies.189 The concept does not offer 
a credible explanation of why states would create international agreements to address the 
issue of small arms–as small arms violence primarily takes place within states and not 
between states.190 The core analytical category, namely the state, is analytically constructed as 
close to a timeless fixed entity, only with variable attributes (in particular different levels of 
military power). Hence, states are described as functionally alike but different in their 
capabilities.191 Waltz for example calls states ‘like units’ and refers to states as similarly 
constituted entities that are alike in the tasks they face.192 State sovereignty is further defined 
as a state’s monopoly of violence within a given territory. While violence within states is not 
ignored, the national structure is assumed to include a government which has the monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force and therefore citizens do not have to fend for themselves.193 
Furthermore, Waltz extends the term sovereignty to mean that states decide for themselves 
how to cope with their internal and external problems; and that states develop their own 
strategies, chart their own courses and make their own decisions. 194 
 
By assuming that states have pre-established territorial integrity and a distinct independent 
domestic order, it fails to acknowledge historical realities such as state formation through de-
colonization or the role of imperial power in domestic orders and decisions. By taking 
conflict, inequality and power asymmetries as fixed structural starting points, the balance of 
power theory could be seen to legitimize these structural factors by making them appear 
‘natural’, rather than explaining the different positioning of states through their interconnected 
historical experiences which could be resisted or altered going forward.195 While the balance 
of power theory might offer explanations of the changes in arms control over time and in 
different geopolitical settings, based on changes in technology development and in the 
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distribution of power between states, it cannot generate any explanation of changes in the 
form of arms control, such as variation in institutional design, preference towards certain 
practices, adoption of legally vs politically binding agreements, etc. Hence, balance of power 
theory might ‘predict the form of international order, but not its content’.196 Furthermore, 
although the balance of power concept does not particularly theorize time, neo-realism’s 
concepts of ‘the state of nature’, state sovereignty and technology development, clearly 
indicate a discourse of time under the paradigm of evolutionism. This discourse 
accommodates a one-way history (of progress, development, civilization, modernity, etc) and 
rests on the assumption that time is spatialized. This leads for example to a separation of the 
modern (sovereign states) from the traditional (state of nature) in time and space.197 
 
 
International regimes 
 
One of the key concepts in IR scholarship is that of international regimes. International 
regimes are commonly thought to harmonize behaviour among states by providing rules, 
norms, principles and procedures.198 Regimes can create a context which extends the time 
horizon of interactions, creating an iterated game rather than a single round, to use game 
theory allegory. Based on Robert Axelrod’s experiments, liberal institutionalists have argued 
that the key to cooperation in an anarchic environment is that actors have a large enough 
chance to meet again, and so their behavior choices have an impact on future interaction.199 
This allows states, for example, to build trust over time, even if the structure of the 
international order remains anarchic.  
 
A liberal institutionalist starting point for explaining the formation, change or lack of regimes 
is the concept of interdependence, the notion that states frequently depend on each other if 
they want to gain from cooperation.200 Explanation of regime formation and change draw on 
the classic economic notions of demand and supply. Keohane for example argues that the 
formation and collapse of regimes largely follow states’ demand for them. State demand for 
regimes is particularly strong if there is a sense of urgency, a lot to gain or low costs 
associated with the regime.201 For the example at hand, it could be that the level of security 
threats facing states within a given region pushes them to take action. Here, states’ interest 
may not be narrowly defined in terms of regime survival or state security, but informed by 
other preferences such as regional stability, which would allow for cross-border trade. 
Keohane underlines that international cooperation is not merely based on common interests, 
but requires adjustment, negotiation and policy coordination. Furthermore, imperfect 
communication and information among states mean that common interests do not always lead 
to cooperation.202 Keohane further argues that regime formation is more likely if there is high 
                                                
196 Ruggie, John (1983), ’International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar 
economic order’, in International Regimes, (ed) S.D. Krasner, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 198. 
197 Fabian, Johannes (1983) Time and the Other: how anthropology makes its object (New York: Columbia 
University Press), p. 16, p. 144. 
198 Keohane, Robert (1982), ‘The demand for international regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, 
p. 354. 
199 Axelrod, Robert, (1984), The Evolution of cooperation (Basic Books: Cambridge), p. 20. 
200 Mutschler, Max (2013) Arms Control in Space: Exploring Conditions for Preventive Arms Control (Palgrave 
Macmillan: New York), p. 39. 
201 Keohane (1982), ‘The demand for international regimes’, in (ed) S.D. Krasner (1983), International Regimes 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 325-355. 
202 Keohane, Robert (1984), After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton), pp. 12-13, p. 51. 
 44 
‘issue density’, a large number of significant issues within the same policy area which are 
connected and therefore reasonable to deal with in the same organizational or political 
framework.203 Hence the formation of international regimes is also motivated by a desire to 
improve efficiency in international relations by reducing transaction costs.204 Institutions may 
reduce uncertainty by improving information and communication and reducing asymmetries. 
For example, the scenario in which Tanzania would refrain from pooling resources with 
Kenya due to concerns over Kenya’s future intentions, could be mitigated by increased 
oversight, such as granting Tanzania enhanced access to Kenya’s defense spending and 
military capability. The key problem associated with regional security cooperation, according 
to institutionalists, is not that one partner may gain more than others, but that the costs of 
cooperation could be too high compared to the overall gains, resulting in absolute gains being 
considered low. Another serious problem is the possibility of cheating. Since all participating 
states would prefer to be ‘free riders’, conventions or treaties are not enough for effective 
arms control, but require independent monitoring and verification. Active participation by 
parties requires both political will and resources.205 According to liberal regime theorists, 
then, arms control can change or come to an end, due to a change in the security threat, high 
costs, low returns, or lack of resources or political will.   
 
A general problem for the liberal conceptualization of regimes according to critical theorists 
is that it assumes, rather than establishes, regimes as benevolent, voluntary, cooperative and 
legitimate. They imply a certain kind of association among actors, based on certain shared 
judgment.206 This is somewhat at odds with empirical studies of arms control regimes. In the 
period 1961-1986, the strategic warhead deployment of the Soviet Union and the USA 
increased sharply, as did investments in new technologies that fell outside the scope of 
existing treaties, making Berkowitz question its validity: ‘Arms control generally has not 
limited arms, has not limited the development of military technology, and has not reduced 
defense spending.’207 Others later went further and argued that strategic arms control was a 
sham designed to protect the military dominance of the two superpowers.208 Another example 
is the four international export control regimes, which were set up by producing countries to 
restricting trade in dual-use technology. They have frequently been referred to as a cartel of 
producers, with the aim of maintaining their own market dominance.209  
Foundational for neorealism’s conceptualization of international regimes is that power is 
unequally distributed within an international system of states and the position of states within 
the system drives their behavior, as there is no overarching authority to dictate their actions. 
Hence the emergence of international cooperation, such as arms control regimes, is mainly a 
reflection of the distribution of power in the world.210 Although agreements are made, it is not 
the rules or institutions themselves that determine why a state acts in a particular way, but 
instead the underlying material interests and power relations. One common explanation for 
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regimes is that their formation or collapse correspond to the interest and strategy of a 
hegemonic power. According to neorealists, a powerful state may enforce certain behavior on 
others through its position as global or regional hegemon–for its own benefit, not for that of a 
collective of states.211 Identifying the hegemon and understanding its security concerns 
becomes key to understanding regional security cooperation. Just as a single superpower in a 
unipolar world has a significant impact on the creation of regimes, a regional hegemon can 
have significant influence within a region, even if that state is not considered a global 
superpower. This is because realists view power as a relative rather than absolute concept. As 
one example, Nigeria is frequently considered a regional hegemon in West Africa and a 
leading actor in ECOWAS, but only has limited influence at the global level. Whereas the 
hegemonic stability theory might look plausible for explaining regional arms control in 
Southern and West Africa (and the lack of arms control agreements in Central and North 
Africa), it immediately runs into problem in East Africa, where identifying a regional 
hegemon is significantly more difficult and both Kenya and Ethiopia have been identified as 
the regional hegemons. Moreover, the smaller states have arguably played more important 
roles in the development of Africa’s regional security regime than the neorealist theory 
assumes. Furthermore, neorealism’s concept of hegemon typically explains the existence and 
form of arms control arrangement as they meet certain needs of powerful actors. Here, the 
difference between neorealism and critical theory becomes blurred. Rogers, who associates 
his writing on small arms with critical theory, argues that the ineffectiveness of international 
small arms control is due to the interests of powerful actors, namely large arms producing 
states and companies, and the assumption that ‘certain international actors willingly impede 
and deliberately undermine the international community’s cooperative efforts to control these 
weapons.’212 Realists therefore have a problem in a) explaining regional cooperation where 
there is no obvious hegemon or cases where smaller states have a strong profile, and b) 
distinguishing from and falsifying critical theory’s concept of hegemony, which involves not 
only material domination but ‘unobservable’ factors such as discourses, ideology and rules, as 
well as actors other than states, such as international corporations. 
 
Whereas the theorizing of international regimes has been dominated by the neo-neo debate, 
the concept of international regimes has been adopted by wider theoretical perspectives to 
analyse dynamic, changeable sets of international arrangements.213 Given the traditional 
narrow definition of arms control, researchers and practitioners may indeed prefer to use the 
concept ‘international regime’ when referring to formal international small arms control 
agreements or systems of practices. Unlike the balance of power concept, the regime concept 
allows for the analysis and explanation of different forms of cooperation, including 
institutional design. Although a useful concept, the liberal institutionalist and neorealist 
conceptualizations of international regimes have a number of shortcomings in generating 
explanations for small arms control. 
 
First, both the liberal institutionalist and the neorealist approaches to international regimes 
tend to view arms control regimes as self-contained and self-generating. This inward focus, 
sometimes referred to as ‘inward gaze’ or ‘ethos of turning inwards’, has been criticised for 
treating regimes as if they operate in closed systems and that they therefore can be analyzed 
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without reference to history or a larger political context.214 States’ attributes (i.e ‘failed states’ 
or ‘lack of capacity’) and local contexts (‘endemic violence’ or ‘an area awash with arms’), 
are taken as background rather than explained in historical terms.215 As a result, the present 
appears to have emerged spontaneously rather than through intertwined historical 
processes.216 As one example, from a liberal regime theory perspective, the problem of small 
arms in Africa might be seen as a result of failures by states to effectively manage the 
transnational smuggling of weapons, in combination with the failure to effectively prevent the 
diversion of small arms from government stocks to non-state groups or civilians. From this 
perspective, small arms control should seek to address this inefficiency and close down any 
‘loopholes’, in regulations and stockpile- or border management. In an inward focus on 
regional regimes, the success or failure of effectiveness can be explained within the region in 
question. The inward focus has especially been the case in analyses of regionalism in sub-
Saharan Africa, where lack of capacity in ‘weak’ states and regional institutions has been 
identified an explanation for the dynamics (and the failures) of integration.217 For Slater, the 
inward gaze generates poor theorization that is divorced from the history of imperial power 
relations, and therefore neglects underlying uneven development, tensions and counter points 
in global politics.218 Barkawi and Laffey also criticise this ‘inward gaze’ for failing to place 
the weak and the strong in a common analytic frame, as together constitutive of events, 
processes and structures.219  
 
Secondly, the mainstream adoption of the regime concept has been criticized for its 
functionalist approach and its under-conceptualization of agency. Functionalism requires 
synchronic analysis (the study of events at a specific point of time), which presuppose a 
freezing of the time frame: ‘‘Functionalism, in its fervor to explore the mechanisms of living 
societies, simply puts on ice the problem of Time … Time is at best ignored, and at worst 
denied its significance.’220 Agency typically refers to the capacity of actors to act 
independently and to make choices. For neorealists, states are the agents and they exercise 
their agency through power. Liberalism allocates agency to individuals, who are typically 
portrayed as rational, autonomous, self-interested or norm-following actors abstracted from 
the social circumstances that influence who they are and how they think and act.221 For both 
neorealist and liberal institutionalists, states and individuals make decisions based on pre-
conceived interests (such as security, regime survival and utility maximization), which tells us 
little about how these preferences have been formed. Furthermore, if all acts are performed 
out of self-interest, even those done for others, the term becomes meaningless since it does 
not identify anything distinctive. According to Sayer, it is an ‘undersocialized view of the 
individual’ which reduces behaviour to overwhelmingly self-interested and ignores our social, 
relational character and our dependence on care.222  
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Robert Cox has also criticized the under-conceptualization of agency in what he refers to as 
‘problem-solving theory’. Falling within the tradition of functionalism, the approach 
stipulates that agency and motives are not the focus of analysis but are taken for granted as 
background.223 The problem solving theories are self-actional: they believe that things act 
under their own powers, and are not constrained or enabled by structural factors. The 
assumption is that actors intentionally create international regimes, such as arms control, to 
solve specific common substantive and political problems.224 Pierson calls this approach 
‘actor-based functionalism’, which ‘typically rests on the claim that institutions take the form 
they do because powerful actors engaged in rational, strategic behavior are seeking to produce 
the outcomes observed’.225 Critical theorists argue that the ‘functionalist’ or ‘problem-
solving’ approach undermine the diversity of agency and the nature of agency-structure 
relations, which leads not only to weak explanations but also has implications for policy. The 
distinction between problem-solving theory and ‘critical theory’, is not that only the first aims 
to solve actual problems, but rather what constitutes problems and how change is realized. 
Ken Booth’s reading of Cox’s distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory 
can be summarized as: problem-solving within the status quo and problematizing (problem-
solving) of the status quo.226 Subsequently, problem-solving theory has an inherent tendency 
toward incrementalism and conservatism in which change is gradual and the core logics does 
not really change at all.227 Problem solving has been linked to the production of technicist 
discourse which evade critical analysis of actions.228 As a result, problem-solving approaches 
tend to lead to pragmatic, technocratic solutions, rather than holistic or radical reform.229 
 
 
Emerging norms and epistemic communities 
 
Like international regimes, international norms have become a key concept in IR. Norms refer 
to the ‘oughtness’ in IR, what states think they ought to be doing based on some common 
understanding of appropriate behaviour.230 Norms are understood as shared expectations 
about appropriate behavior held by a collective of actors, with some form of shared 
identity.231 According to Finnemore and Sikkink ‘shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about 
appropriate behavior are what give the world structure, order and stability’, rather than the 
distribution of power. Hence ‘ideational shifts’ can have powerful transformative effects on 
international relations.232 While liberal institutionalists do recognize a role for norms, it is 
limited: norms may constrain the behavior of states, but do not affect their identities or 
interests. Moreover, the norms themselves are dependent upon underlying power 
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distributions.233 For constructivists, changes in norms, i.e. changes in the broadly acceptable 
standards of international behaviour, are what cause changes in the way states relate to means 
of violence. New international norms often emerge through norm entrepreneurs, which could 
be either individuals or a groups of people (or even states). Such norm entrepreneurs are able 
to influence state behaviour through lobbying, persuasion and shaming. To Florini, however, 
norm promotion by entrepreneurs is not a sufficient condition for norm change: the new norm 
also has to be seen as legitimate. In order to be established as the new leading norm, emerging 
norms must be accepted in the external environment, and ‘internalized’.234   
 
How narrow or encompassing a norm might be is contested. Florini, for example, refers to 
‘slavery’ and ‘colonialism’ as norms, which are much larger systems of practices than ‘small 
arms control’. Identifying the norm that is dominant or leads change becomes an aim of norm 
analysis.235 The international ban on anti-personnel landmines following a global campaign 
by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ is an empirical example often put forward in support of the 
transformative power of norms with regards to weapon technology, which suggests that 
norms are more specific standards of behaviour rather than overarching systems of 
practices.236 
 
A second constructivist concept related to norms is epistemic communities. As previous 
sections showed, both regime theory and balance of power theory are concerned with the lack 
of information and uncertainty of the success of arms control. Although liberal 
institutionalism argues that institutions can collect information and monitor the behaviour of 
states, they do not explain how this knowledge is accumulated or whose 
knowledge/information is considered most trustworthy or accurate. This has been a problem 
for arms control verification, which is typically understood as a highly technical issue where 
few have experience. How could states, for example, decide on a process for nuclear 
disarmament before any state had actual experience of such processes?237 
 
States’ uncertainties give rise to demands for particular sorts of information, which is a 
product of human interpretations of social (e.g. intentions) and physical phenomena (scientific 
or technical expertise). To access such knowledge, decision-makers draw, whether 
intentionally or not, on ‘epistemic communities’. An epistemic community is defined by Haas 
as a relatively small networks of knowledge-based professionals with recognized expertise 
within a particular domain, which allows them to claim possession of policy-relevant 
knowledge. Epistemic communities not only contribute to forming the technical process, for 
example of verification, or the form of cooperation, for example formal or informal, but 
fundamentally contribute also to articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex 
problems, help states identify their interests, frame the issues for collective debate, propose 
specific policies and identify relevant points for negotiation.238  
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The theories of emerging norms and epistemic communities have been used to explain 
changes in arms control in Africa. Denise Garcia has argued that the emergence of regional 
small arms control in Africa is the result of emerging international norms of small arms, 
which have influenced decision-making on the continent. For Garcia, the norm to enhance the 
control of small arms did not originate in Africa but was advanced by an external norm-
building community.239 The argument that epistemic communities are involved in the 
emergence of arms control regimes has been made in empirical studies. Adler has for example 
argued that American national epistemic communities played significant roles in the 
development of international nuclear arms control during the cold war, including by 
successfully influencing Soviet national policy.240 Kwesi Aning has applied the concept of 
epistemic community to West African civil society organizations to argue that the 
securitization of small arms by ECOWAS (advocated by NGOs) led to the adoption of the 
ECOWAS Convention of SALW.241  
 
The concepts of norms and epistemic communities do go some way to address some of the 
empirical evidence related to small arms that balance of power and regime concepts cannot 
address. Notably, these constructivist concepts are less locked into assumptions about a 
division of international and national levels of analysis compared to the neorealist and liberal 
institutionalist frameworks, which is helpful for thinking about small arms control. Norms 
can, for example, emerge from both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’. Furthermore, the concepts of 
norms and epistemic communities suggest that ideas and culture matter in how weapons are 
understood and controlled. However, whereas ideas and cultures are complex social 
phenomena, norms are identified as specific rules or principles influencing behavior on 
specific issues. Garcia’s model of ’norm development’ for example, conceptualizes norms 
and norms-entrepreneurs as causal processes and actors isolated from other causes. In her 
attempt to uncover regularities and test general assumptions (on the relative power of NGOs, 
coalitions of like-minded states and norm-entrepreneurs in advancing norm-building on small 
arms), Garcia leaves out historical inquiry.242 Although Garcia identifies norms as the variable 
that determines forms of arms control and their implementation, and changing norms 
therefore generates new forms of arms control, she does not problematize the validity or 
normativity of such norms.  
 
Although the emerging norm concept has been used to criticise existing practices and to 
propose new and improved forms of organization and regulation, it has not explored or 
analysed the historical development of these principles in past intersocietal systems and in the 
contemporary society of states–which, according to Linklater, is necessary in order to form a 
critical approach to security studies.243 Furthermore, strictly ideational theories of arms 
control seem problematic as they must disregard weapon technologies’ material attributes and 
the assumption that small arms are inherently dangerous regardless of our ideas of them. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of agency verses dependency/control is not explained through the 
norm or epistemic community concepts. Who can become norm entrepreneurs and epistemic 
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communities, and to what extent are they determined by imperial power or represent the 
unevenness, tensions and contradictions in a North-South divide on small arms? One issue 
regards norm conflict, internalization and adoption. When emerging norms are created out of 
a set of conflicting norms, and then imposed on states from the outside, how do we know 
when the norms have been internalized, or accepted as legitimate? To what extent must norms 
have been first internalised for regimes to form? A second related issue regards that of norm 
validity. How do we judge the validity of norms? If norm validity cannot be established and 
norms are imposed from the outside and dictate state behavior, to what degree can we 
separate emerging norms from other forms of coercion or persuasion? Florini argues that 
norms require policy convergence among a large number of states and that norms do not 
merely reflect the interest of the materially powerful. In fact, it is essential for norm survival 
that they are seen as legitimate.244 Legitimacy, according to Florini, is achieved when a new 
norm fits coherently with other prevailing norms. 245 Hence, if a standard of behavior can be 
identified, the norm is automatically taken to be legitimate. This is a problematic view of 
legitimacy, not least because norms are contingent on the environment in which they form. 
The disregard of certain norms or practices could eventually develop into a discourse that 
ultimately perpetuates new forms of domination. 
 
The concept of norms internalisation reduces the extent to which people reflect on norms and 
whether or not to accept or refuse them. To some extent the norm entrepreneur and epistemic 
community are separate from other actors as they evaluate norms from, for example, a 
normative standpoint.246 In spite of the blurring of the national and international levels of 
analysis, the general tendency, however, is to overstate the role of international normative 
influence on state behavior.247 The international ban on anti-personnel landmines is one 
example. Here, the norm argument implicitly assumes that progressive change in the area of 
weapons issues can come from de-legitimating one technology at a time. Yet, as Anna 
Stavrianakis has pointed out, broader systems of war preparation and war fighting will always 
generate new technologies.248 She further criticizes the silence regarding the wider world 
military order and a lack of a common analytical frame encompassing North-South 
relations.249  
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2.2 Towards a theory of small arms control 
 
The past sections highlighted some problems with specific parts of the small arms literature as 
well as with the possible application of mainstream IR theories’ key concepts to small arms 
control. This section seeks to lay the groundwork for theorizing small arms control from a 
critical historical perspective, including by elaborating on the possible epistemological, 
ontological and theoretical foundations of such an approach. If the majority of the research on 
small arms problematique, especially at the turn of the millennium, was policy oriented and 
largely fell within the mainstream IR perspectives and their key concepts, the past few years 
have seen an emergence of a critical paradigm to arms control. Anna Stavrianakis, Ritu 
Mathur, Neil Cooper, Andrew Latham and Keith Krause have criticized some of the core 
assumptions in contemporary arms control policy and practice, especially for its Western bias 
and Eurocentrism. Furthermore, a critical and historical turn in more general IR debates has, 
while not specifically addressing the issue of small arms or arm control, illuminated valuable 
shortcomings embedded in mainstream IR theoretical frameworks–not least with regard to 
discourses on development and intervention. Drawing on these analyses and reflecting on 
some of the shortcomings in applying overarching IR concepts to small arms control which 
were identified in the previous sub-chapter, this section lays out a theory of small arms 
control in a framework of historical-relationalism. The historical-relational theory presented 
in the chapter should be understood as an extension of the emerging critical perspectives of 
arms control, rather than opposed to them. 
 
Epistemology  
 
The starting point for a historical-relational perspective on arms control is that the ways in 
which societies and political systems relate to the means of violence is always specific in time 
and space. Studies of arms control will therefore not generate ‘law-like’ regularities or 
predictions but seek to better explain and understand specific arms control practices, and how 
and why they resemble or differ from arms control practices in other times or locations. 
According to Hobson, IR scholars must acknowledge not just the similarities of systems over 
time, but their particularities and uniqueness in order to see the continuity, discontinuity and 
contingency in the present. Tracing fundamental differences between past and present 
institutions will reveal the unique and essential features of the present.250 Similarly, Hawkins 
argues that historical scholars should ‘explore history as it unfolded and not as it “ended” in 
their own particular temporal location’.251 Although few people would regard history as 
unimportant, engaging with historical evidence or explanations has not been an obvious 
feature of security studies. This approach requires that researchers who want to understand or 
explain contemporary arms control would have to break away from researching only present 
control regimes, to either engage in historical comparative studies or trace the contingencies 
of current practices. This approach is quite different from traditional arms control research, 
which was influenced by economic modelling and scenarios, aimed primarily at generating 
useful advice or predictions for policy-makers about current or future events. It also differs 
from more general IR perspectives that promote or accept the ‘inward gaze’ of regime 
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analysis, or regard historical analysis as studies of the past.252 
 
Suganami has for example criticised Kenneth Waltz’s ‘Man, the State, and War’ for its 
attempt to explain all wars by explaining the circumstances in which wars are likely to occur. 
According to Suganami, this does not tell us much about why particular wars happen.253 
Furthermore, the ‘Humean’ regularity approach to causation is not adequately attuned to the 
possibility that wars (or arms control for that matter), might be caused by different causes in 
different historical periods.254 In line with the realist perception of the causes of war, realist 
scholars have attempted to explain regularities by applying a theoretical construct of a closed 
system in order to find a general theory about why states decide to enter into arms control 
agreements with other states, and under what conditions they comply. Waltz sees international 
politics as a bounded realm or domain, with law-like regularities, which the theorists need to 
explain.255 The general arms control theories developed under the cold war have, however, 
later been understood as mainly interested in explaining certain arms control agreements 
related to nuclear weapons between superpowers and have little value in explaining, for 
example, particular small arms control agreements in Africa. Suganami instead encourages 
researchers to show the ‘sequence of relevant events, leading to the event in question, in such 
a way that a specific puzzle or puzzles we have about the occurrence of the events concerned 
can be solved.’256  
 
Most historians see historical analysis as an incomplete method for recreating the past as it 
really was. The deconstructionist approach asserts that historians’ work is mainly ontological 
since they create historical realities through their use of language in historical narratives. 
However, ‘[p]ractical realists believe that history is not and cannot be an exact representation 
of historical reality, but they assert the possibility of achieving partially truthful knowledge of 
the past based on careful examination of the evidence and acknowledging the limitations 
imposed by language and perspective.’257 This thesis takes the approach of the latter. 
 
Ontology 
 
Intersubjective time and historical contingencies   
 
One part of the historical-relational ontology is what Reynolds refers to as ‘mundane 
historicism’, meaning that things must be considered within their historical contexts to be 
understood properly. This form of historicism is distinctively different from Popper’s 
definition which refers to the uncovering of general laws in history with which the social 
sciences can make predictions about the future: a form of historicism which would be 
incompatible with the epistemology of historical-relationalism.258 Furthermore, the historical-
relational ontology of time leans on Fabian’s concept of ‘intersubjective time’, which sees 
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time as a constitutive dimension–not just a measure or vector–of social relations. In practice, 
intersubjective time is critical of discourses that situate the modern and the traditional as 
separated in time, rather than co-constituting the presence. Neither political space nor political 
time (e.g. ‘modernity’) are natural resources, but ideologically constructed instruments of 
power.259  
 
A historical-relational approach aims to position decisions and practices in their social and 
historical contexts, which constitute them. Although arms control practices always emerge in 
a specific time and place, they emerge under certain conditions and contexts. Identifying the 
historical conditions in which an arms control regime developed, for example, therefore 
becomes important. Practices are not ‘sealed off’, but are historically specific and historically 
contingent. Historical contingency typically means the possibility of multiple outcomes in 
socio-historical processes and assumes that development over time is neither random nor 
deterministic; instead, events or developments are conditional on earlier events or 
developments. Actors’ behaviour is not simply the result of interest maximization or norms, 
but our choices are to a large extent taken based on previous experiences regarding what is 
possible and meaningful, in combination with structural factors. The notion that the present is 
a continued historical transition towards the future, together with the notion of historical 
contingency, mean that actions that we take in the present do indeed have the possibility of 
changing the world.260 Historical contingency therefore opens up for change in present 
institutions and practices through enabling transformative actions, by acknowledging that 
what is often perceived as fixed structure is partly constitutive of our actions and are therefore 
shapeable constructs.261 
 
Although people have the agency to act contrary to what their structural conditions would 
predict, they cannot act outside of history. To Abrams, the past and the present do not simply 
follow one another linearly, but the past constitutes the present. Taking a historical-relational 
approach to arms control is ‘seeing that the past is not just a womb of the present but the only 
raw material out of which the present can be constructed’.262  
 
While strategic arms control has sometimes added a longer time perspective it has been 
mainly in order to add to the potential pool of case studies. Stuart Croft, for example, has 
provided a brief overview of the evolution of arms control over thousands of years, in an 
attempt at ‘widening and deepening’ the definition of arms control.263 In the field of small 
arms control historical case studies and analysis are even less frequent and none of the major 
works on small arms have taken an historical analytical approach to the subject. On the 
contrary, many studies take an explicit stand by framing small arms (control) as an emerging 
or new security issue.264 Rather than being a black sheep in the literature, overlooking 
historical factors is commonplace in IR theory and case studies. This has led Hobson to call 
contemporary IR ‘histrophobic’.265 He argues that the mainstream perspectives are ahistorical 
in the sense that core concepts and assumptions, such as states, security, anarchy and norms, 
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are described as timeless fixed entities, and while having different attributes, work under 
trans-historical dynamics. The historical-relational approach argues that state formation has 
been highly diverse for different states, which has impacted not only on their attributes but the 
entities themselves. As Abrams argues, the Westphalian state is a snapshot in terms of time-
space categories, but is treated as eternal and universal. Understanding historical 
developments becomes essential in explaining current contexts and contemporary practices.266  
 
 
Relationalism 
 
Relationalist ontology was founded by the sociologist Harrison White, although aspects of 
relational thinking informed many classical philosophers, not least George Simmel.267 
Relationalism challenges the state-centric ontology and the distinction between internal and 
external relations which have dominated IR ontology, inter alia by avoiding conflations 
between agency and social structure, and instead making social relations the central unit of 
analysis.268 Relationalism ‘actively rejects explanations of social behavior as the result of 
individuals’ common possession of attributes and norms rather than as the result of their 
involvement in structural social relations’.269 Being in relation includes two or more entities 
between which there is a certain distance that simultaneously distinguishes and connects 
them. Individual or collective actors either reproduce or transform their relations through 
interaction.270 The concept of ‘social relation’ hence has a double meaning as a process and as 
an outcome of that process.271 To understand state behaviour based on a power relationship, 
for example, it is not enough to refer to given interests or attributes as causes of specific 
behavior, it is also necessary to observe how different actors influence each others’ interests, 
identities and behavior.272 
 
Gottlieb conceptualizes relational order as an extended form of interdependence, but distinct 
from the ‘episodic bargains characteristic of free market theory’ in which different parties 
come together for a limited purpose that can be achieved without entering into any 
relationship apart from the exchange transaction itself: ‘In a relational order relations are 
mutual, deeply impacting, and even inextricable. It is an order in which relations are codified 
by the development of a special regime between the participants.’273 He understands relational 
societies in a benevolent light, as a space where ‘[f]actors affecting a relational order are often 
not monetizable or reducible to a simple cost/benefit analysis. They include trust, good faith, 
collaboration, the quality of life of the parties, and other intangible factors’.274 Unlike liberals, 
relational sociologists do not view interdependence as something that is purposely generated 
by political actors for specific gains, but rather that mutually constitutive interdependence 
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makes up political entities. As Prandini argues, ‘social reality does not exist before or outside 
transactions, i.e. outside interdependency. This is basically what the word “social” means’.275 
Like sociologists, IR theorists are interested in human activity only as interactivity. Although 
many scholars might choose to study unilateral policies (e.g. North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme), they make sense only because we are able to contextualize them in specific and 
lasting relationships in which state policy are embedded.276 
 
For Emirbayer, relations are not reducible to interactions between individual and collective 
actors, but also refer to relations between positions that individual and collective actors 
occupy. Relational positions do not causally determine what respective actors do. Instead, 
they both enable and restrict these actors, and how they act, or what kinds of practices they 
are able to participate in.277 
 
For critical realists, relationalism refers to the intertwined and co-constituted nature of 
‘conditioning’ social forces, that is, norms, material resources, discourses and social 
structures, as well as the links between agency and such forces. According to Kurki 
‘Rationalist’ theories are flat in the sense they have problem theorizing the underlying 
structures, relations and processes of the objects that they study. They should be replaced by a 
deeper and more complex-sensitive social ontology involving conditioning social forces.278 
Critical realism also argues against constructivism for downplaying structural and material 
causes in their emphasis on ideational causes. For example, Alexander Wendt’s statement that 
a ‘gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy, and 
enmity is a social, not material, relation’279, rejects the idea that weapons have material 
powers and enabling causes to harm. This does not mean that weapons alone cause violence, 
but rather that ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances.280 At the 
same time, conceptualizations of arms control need to break free from the materialist trap, by 
unpacking the technological trajectory that is intimately linked to its explanations.  
 
Relationalism is not so much a theory as an ontology.281 Relationalism does not tell us which 
relations are the most important, or much about how relational processes evolve. Relational 
sociologists have focused primarily on individuals or networks and have relied to a large 
extent on social network analysis as their analytical method.282 Relationalism in IR would be 
more likely to focus on the relations between, for example, different regimes, discourses and 
material conditions. For small arms control, relationalism as an ontology opens up 
opportunities to explore arms control regimes as processes and outcomes of social relations 
between states and other actors, rather than a ‘rational choice’ based on timeless state interest. 
To understand changes in arms control over time, studying changes in social relations, 
including those normally considered ‘domestic’, ‘local’ or ‘external’, becomes important. 
Given the findings in previous literature (see chapter 1.2) the mutually constitutive relations 
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between technology, culture and conflict seem especially important in a relational theory of 
arms control. 
 
Theory  
 
Although the historical-relational approach’s greatest contributions so far are on the levels of 
epistemology and ontology, there have also been some valuable attempts at theory 
developments. This thesis will in particular draw on themes developed in the critical literature 
(including on small arms), especially the concepts of imperial power and entangled history as 
cornerstones for a critical theory of small arms control. The theories of historical 
institutionalism and uneven and combined development are further explored in order to 
broaden the historical dimensions of the theory. 
 
 
Imperial power 
 
A key concept for the historical-relational theory of small arms control is imperial power. 
Slater defines imperial power as enduring invasiveness, or desire or capacity to penetrate 
other societies and cultures, to impose on the other a set of values, imaginations and practices 
deemed to be superior to those of the recipients, who are seen as in need of progress, reform 
or order. Imperial power is constituted by the lack of respect for the other, belittling the 
complexities, differences, heterogeneities and intrinsic value of the other culture or society.283 
 
Imperial power and civilizing mission are two central concepts that have been adopted in 
critical analysis of development and intervention discourses. Several scholars have linked 
discourses of civilization to contemporary arms control practices in recent studies. Drawing 
on Edward Said’s Orientalism and the work of anthropologist Talal Asad ‘critical security 
studies and postcolonial scholars seek to bring centre-stage the very language, categories, and 
experiences that have produced and reproduced our understanding of arms control and 
disarmament as an exercise in modernity and a civilizing mission.’284 
 
In these, the West and modernity are seen as pacifying forces in the world, in contrast to the 
ungoverned and undeveloped zones of violence. The ultimate objective is perceived as 
preserving Western military superiority.285 Stavrianakis argues that small arms control is 
based on an idealisation of European historical experience and Eurocentric categories, 
including ’the blurring of the distinction between state, non-state, and civilian actors; the 
fuzzy line between conflict and crime; the pacific nature of development; and the desirability 
of a Weberian monopoly on violence.’ Furthermore:  
 
‘the asymmetry of small arms control, and its role in the reproduction of unequal 
power relations through the representation of (certain parts of) the South as unable to 
exercise control over the means of violence, and the resultant requirement for 
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guidance, support, and other forms of intervention by a coalition of actors led by 
Northern agencies, is what makes this an imperial relation.286 
 
Latham and Krause have deconstructed Western approaches to arms control using a 
constructivist model and found similar results. They argue that underlying and conditioning 
Western approaches to arms control is the belief that the West: 
 
is more “responsible”, “mature”, “developed”, “pacific” and “democratic” than all the 
rest, and can therefore be trusted with nuclear weapons, smart landmines, ballistic 
missiles, chemical weapons precursors, bio-technologies, and so forth. The possibility 
that these might be seen as threats by others (and hence their attempt to procure 
similar weapons as simply a response) is not admitted.287 
 
This flattering self-image inclines Western policy-makers to play a lead role in shaping (and 
enforcing) arms control regimes and to believe that non-Western states are less well suited to 
play a lead role in global security issues.288 Furthermore it has come to encompass a belief 
that Western preponderance is the key to international peace and stability ‘and a renewed 
attention to regulating certain “inhumane” and “uncivilized” weapons’.289 Using the Western 
approach to arms control shifts the problem and subsequently the problem-solving from areas 
of production and export, to enforcement and capacity in recipient countries.290 All while the 
West decide the standard of what is considered unacceptable behaviour in international 
society.291  
 
As a result ‘[c]ontemporary violence in Africa is often explained in terms of a lack of those 
institutions and attributes associated with European modernity, such as sovereignty, rather 
than as a consequence of long histories of colonial and postcolonial interaction with the 
West.’292 African conflicts are not seen as social conditions requiring theoretical and 
historical explanation, as the outcomes of distinct historical processes of social change rooted 
in relations extending beyond Africa. Instead they are taken as given, as contingent features 
peculiar to this ‘type’ of society or state.293 
 
An extension of the conceptualization of imperial power among critical theorists is the 
formulation of a critical theory towards development discourses and interventions, especially, 
but not exclusively, neoliberalism. Short has argued that development discourses and 
interventions under neoliberalism are structured by the logic of modernization theories and 
built on prior social hierarchies associated with colonial order, but have been rearticulated to 
address regional post-colonial social hierarchies.294  
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One of the most common illustrations of imperial power in development discourses and 
intervention is the notion of a civilizing mission. Civilizing mission or ‘mission civilisatrice’ 
was a colonial term used especially during European expansion in the 19th and 20th centuries 
to motivate colonization by seeking to spread civilization through the Westernization of 
indigenous peoples. Postcolonial researchers apply the term ‘mission civilisatrice’ to Western 
interventions in the global South that seek to ‘fix’ or ‘reform’ former colonies by enforcing 
Western standards or practices. To many, the West is no longer seen primarily as a 
geographical space but a process of development. It exists both inside and outside the West. 
In the neoliberal discourses, for example, the societies in the global South have been captured 
by a Western imagination that frames and represents their meaning as part of a project of 
rule.295 While development discourses and interventions, especially as an interventionist 
policy in the global South, have been frequently discussed in the literature from critical 
perspectives, none of the previous studies have yet comprehensively applied the concept to 
small arms control, to analyse what, for example, neoliberal governance reform means for 
small arms control. 
 
 
Historical institutionalism 
 
Beyond the directly applicable concept of imperial power, other theory developments may be 
considered for their historical perspectives. One IR theory that takes historical contingency 
seriously is historical institutionalism. The theory assumes that states and other actors are 
more likely to act within exiting institutional structures and to reproduce practices, than create 
something new. Historical institutionalism sees historical contingency as contributing to 
inflexibility in institutions, which tends to increase over time.296 The assumption is that past 
investments and experiences matter when decisions are taken on a course of action. Past 
arrangements may, for example, have developed privileges over time and the cost of losing 
those is considered.297 Historical institutionalism further holds that actors are influenced by 
the persistence of practices in their taken for granted quality and the reproduction in structures 
that are to some extent self-sustaining.298 The theory proposes to use a process-tracing 
methodology to create a sequence of events by which to identify ‘founding moments’ which 
have shaped later developments, institutional legacies and to what degree these affect how 
resources are allocated, as well as how institutions have adapted over time.299 Historical 
institutionalists generally develop their hypotheses inductively, in the course of interpreting 
the empirical material itself, something that mainstream theorists sometimes ‘dismiss as 
storytelling’.300 Very frequently, historical institutionalists begin with empirical puzzles that 
emerge from observed events or comparisons.301 Like sociological institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism acknowledges that ideas and processes of learning, persuasion, and 
socialization may play important roles in shaping preferences over institutional designs. But 
historical institutionalism attributes a smaller role to social collectives, including international 
organizations, in shaping the identities and preferences of groups.302 
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Uneven and combined development 
 
One theory generated within the paradigm of International Historical Sociology is the theory 
of uneven and combined development. Created by Trotsky and initially reworked by 
Rosenberg, the theory of uneven and combined development seeks to generate explanations 
of how societies interact, how they change and the relationship between those processes.303 
According to Rosenberg, all societies coexist and interact with others, and this lateral field of 
causality transcends over and above ‘domestic’ determinations: ‘there are no societies whose 
development has not been fundamentally inflected by relations with others. And there is no 
wider social formation whose developmental trajectory does not include a significant 
dimension composed of the course of interactions among its parts’.304 Hence, uneven and 
combined development is a critique of realism’s explicit abstraction of the international from 
domestic social processes as well as constructivism’s conception of the international in terms 
of a supra-historical, abstract sociality.305 Hence, uneven and combined development share 
much of the same ontology as relationalism. 
 
For Rosenberg ‘combined development’ refers to the coexistence and interactive development 
of all societies throughout history, including the constant generation of new historical 
moments. The ‘external’ relations of states function as a means to transform the socio-
political, cultural and material institutions within society through their institutionalization 
beyond any given state. Specifically, the management of external pressures or relations, such 
as radical transformations in the external environment, drives development in the form of 
‘catch-up’ programmes of rapid state-driven industrialization. Trotsky refers to this 
phenomenon as the ‘whip of external necessity’.306 Domestic crises and centrifugal pressures 
also create conditions for domestic political change such as aiding a new ruling class to 
power.307 
 
In the theory of uneven and combined development, the nature of production relations 
prevailing in a particular region is considered to have a decisive effect on the form taken by 
inter-societal relations, hence specific modes of production at different historical times and in 
different spatial contexts become central in generating analytical categories.308 Uneven and 
combined development theory has been described by its supporters as ‘a theoretical antidote 
to Eurocentrism in IR’ and key to recovering the lost history of international relations as it 
acknowledges that historical development has always been both plural and interactive.309 
According to critics, however, uneven and combined development is too abstract and general 
to concretize an explanatory framework or explain anything specific.310 Importantly for this 
thesis, uneven and combined development theory has been applied primarily to studies of 
spatio-temporal dynamics of capital accumulation, rather than the spread of weapons 
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technology or the collective actions to control them. More problematically, Trotsky saw the 
theory of uneven and combined development as a ‘transhistorical law’, which is contrary to 
the epistemology of the historical-relational framework presented here. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the theory of uneven and combined development is a useful theoretical tool in 
providing a different abstract framework in which to locate small arms control systems by 
linking domestic and regional systems to external relations, especially radical changes in the 
external environment and changes in arms control processes over time as a way to manage 
external relations and changing external pressures.  
 
 
Entangled histories 
 
‘Entangled histories’ is a concept within the uneven and combined development theory that 
extends beyond the theory’s traditional dialectic materialist application. The concept suggests 
that, rather than comparing histories in different locations, one should focus on the processes 
of mutual influence, in reciprocal or asymmetric relations, in the entangled processes of 
constituting one another. The history of both units is taken as one interrelated whole, instead 
of being considered as two units for comparison. Europe and non-European parts of the 
world, the West and non-Western civilizations are the preferred topics for this approach.311 
Like relationalism and historical sociology, the entangled histories concept seeks to provide a 
more universal concept of the international, which contextualizes the European state-system 
within a larger trans-historical framework. It focuses primarily on inter-societal rather than 
interstate relations in order to explain how different societies have emerged in relation to one 
another on the basis of their different levels of development.312 Entangled histories, however, 
is more flexible toward methodological diversity (i.e. beyond dialectics and social network 
analysis), including the use of narratives. Sebastian Conrad, for example, has used historical 
methods to study the effects of global interactions on the Enlightenment, which has typically 
been seen as a European process. He found that: 
 
The production of knowledge in the late eighteenth century was structurally embedded 
in larger global contexts, and much of the debate about Enlightenment in Europe can 
be understood as a response to the challenges of global integration. The non-European 
world was always present in eighteenth-century intellectual discussions. No 
contemporary genre was more popular and more influential than the travelogue.313 
 
Furthermore, Barnett’s study of humanitarianism uses a ‘global-historical’ theoretical 
approach and to a large extent narrative methodology, through which he connects the past and 
the present by treating them as part of an entangled history, rather than disengaged from each 
other. This approach allows the author to illuminate neglected features of the evolution of 
humanitarianism as well as to discover some enduring tensions. The longer time perspective 
allowed for uncovering rich empirical evidence of humanitarianisms in earlier epochs, which 
convinced Barnett that the end of the cold war had a less radical impact on the growth and 
form of humanitarianism than assumed by mainstream literature. For example, the new wars 
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and the humanitarian emergencies that followed after the end of the cold war were not all that 
new and were not unprecedented in history.314 
 
Conclusions: the historical-relational framework’s implications for research design 
 
In spite of extensive research on small arms and their security impact, previous literature has 
mainly sought to contribute to policy recommendations, rather than the academic literature. 
To the extent that small arms have been analysed from more academic perspectives, theory 
development has mainly focused on understanding small arms security impacts, embedded in 
discourses such as new wars, failed states or the security-development nexus. Theorizing 
small arms control is therefore at a very early stage, and researchers do not have much 
specific theory to build on. Given the different nature of small arms compared to other 
military weapons, both in terms of technology, social and cultural diffusion, as well as legal 
framework, small arms control fits uneasily within mainstream IR definitions and theories of 
arms control. For a technology that is designed for individual use, where the majority of users 
are civilians rather than states, it seems reasonable that an explanatory framework on small 
arms control would draw not only on IR theories but also on sociology.  
 
The historical-relational approach presented in this paper proposes a way of framing research 
that seeks to encompass key empirical findings, including the false distinction between the 
peaceful domestic sphere and international violence, the North-South divide and mutually 
constitutive relations. Building on critical literature that problematizes development 
discourses based on concepts such as imperial power and entangled history, combined 
primarily with historical sociological assumptions, the perspective ‘historical-relationalism’ 
was laid out. The historical-relational approach does not deny the value of concepts such as 
power, regimes or norms, and may therefore employ them in analysis, however historical-
relationalism is critical of studies that treat these concepts as operating in closed systems that 
can be analysed without reference to history or a lager political context. 
 
Making use of a historical-relational theoretical framework includes the engagement with 
historical analysis and qualitative empirical data, where researchers may choose to examine 
and deconstruct contemporary arms control practices using a multitude of methods, including 
dialectics, network analysis, process tracing and historical narrative. For many arms control 
researchers this would mean ‘zooming out’ to trace and examine the slow-moving processes, 
sequences and developmental paths in order to see the way that arms control institutions have 
emerged from particular historical conflicts and mutually influencing relations. On the other 
hand, in order to capture the contingencies and discontinuities in arms control practices over 
time, researchers may be required to ‘zoom in’ to the empirical detail of a specific era. A 
historical-relational research design to arms control emphasizes the relation between local and 
external actors, and examines how external environments and actors have influenced local 
arms control institutions and practices. In particular, imperial power relations and external 
interventions merit specific attention in analysis of African arms control.    
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Chapter 3. Historical narrative analysis of the imports, 
impact and control of small arms in Africa315 
 
There has been an overwhelming focus on the post-Cold War period among small arms 
researchers in the past two decades. It is not uncommon to read or hear references to small 
arms as a new or emerging security threat. This affects our understanding and approach in 
tackling small arms. Almost across the board, researchers and practitioners seem to have 
disengaged from historical data and analysis. Sometimes one seems more likely to come 
across a reference to the movie Lord of Wars in a book or article about small arms than a 
reference to the British Royal African Company. According to Stavrianakis and Selby, 
discourses such as ‘New Wars’, ‘failed states’ and security-development nexus have been 
especially hegemonic in security studies of Africa after the end of the cold war.316 
 
Focusing on the present has had it advantages. In the past two decades, civil society 
organizations and academic researchers have been instrumental in gathering data and 
analysing the current scale and impact of small arms on human security. These findings have 
enhanced awareness of conflicts and armed violence across the world (see chapter 1.2). 
Primarily, military historians have researched the topic to various degrees in the different 
periods, sometimes at great depth. In spite of the richness of previous historical studies, their 
findings have never been assessed in terms of meanings for the current small arms regime but 
have largely been treated as historical conditions. 
 
With respect to small arms insecurity and control systems in Africa, however, it is apparent 
that ‘historical absence’ has implications for both theory and policy.317 To disregard any 
region’s or society’s past experiences is to deny them historical explanation. With a lack of 
historical comparison or reference, our understanding of and ability to influence arms control 
in a new direction becomes limited. We may reinforce old structures and past mistakes 
without even knowing it. The chapter seeks to contextualize the challenges of and response 
mechanisms to small arms facing sub-Saharan Africa today by using a historical narrative 
analysis. The text is organized through a sequence of paramount events in sub-Saharan 
African history, with the point of emplotment being colonial relations as they emerged and 
evolved in Africa: the transoceanic gun-slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, and 
decolonization/post-colonial state formation, and so the chapter will end where most current 
researchers start: with the end of the Cold War. The periodization of history based on colonial 
relations is not without shortcomings. The centrality of colonization has been criticized by for 
example, Aijaz Ahmad in that it gives primacy to colonialism as the principle of structuration 
in history so that history before colonialism becomes colonialism’s pre-history, and whatever 
comes after must be understood as its aftermath. The colonized become passive objects, 
whereas the West is seen as the motor, the driving force.318 Young to the contrary, argues that 
the postcolonial research field does not privilege the colonial, but is concerned with its history 
to the extent that it has determined the configuration and power structures of the present.319 
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The concept of colonial relations refers here to encounters between peoples, which includes 
some form of conquest and control or domination. It includes the un-forming or re-forming of 
communities and their practices. Hence, it refers to interactions and relations, rather than one-
sided experience.320  
 
Any analysis of the scale of small arms imports over time is based only on very rough 
estimates, at best. The data on historical arms trade are not very comprehensive, reliable or 
comparable. Factors to consider are lost or false records, large fluctuations in the availability 
of arms trade records and changing levels of transparency. The data are typically provided by 
customs authorities, obviously excluding secret, unrecorded or simply missed transfers.  
Historical sources alternate between using the monetary value and the quantities of arms. 
Population growth and changes in weapons lethality are also factors which potentially affect 
the impact of imports over time. The growth of legislations is also worth mentioning, with 
UN Security Council arms embargoes, the UN Firearms Protocol, regional legal regimes and 
a host of voluntary measures such as the UN Registry of Conventional Arms and the UN 
Programme of Action on small arms, all including provisions to enhance the transparency and 
monitoring of international arms trade. In addition, research resources dedicated to 
monitoring small arms trade are greater today than in the past, including large programmes 
such as the Small Arms Survey and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers 
database. Due to the long time span, the size of the region and the extreme diversity across 
sub-Saharan Africa between states and over time, this chapter can only hope to provide 
illustrations of arms import, impact and control measures. 
 
Transoceanic Gun-Slave Trade Era 
 
The Indian Ocean is arguably the first cosmopolitan maritime arena, with a sophisticated 
infrastructure of commerce and politics, which connected Africa with the Arab peninsula, 
South Asia and South East Asia from as early as the 1st century AD.321 While slavery had 
long been an established practice of the Indian Oceanic trade, the scale of Africa’s inter-
continental slave exports both increased and shifted towards European demands, as it 
integrated with the trade in firearms. The trade in African slaves and ivory in exchange for 
firearms of the Swahili coast and East central Africa were fully integrated into the Indian 
Ocean trade arrangements around 1770s.322 The trade concentrated at Zanzibar, and major 
trade centres later developed in Ilha de Mozambique and Kilwa in Tanzania. Between 1777 
and 1876, an estimated 1.2 million Africans were exported as slaves from East Africa, with 
the vast majority coming from the Nyasa region (current Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique).323   
One change in demand came from the French, whose demand for slaves had increased with 
the French establishment of sugar plantations on Mauritius and Reunion in the 1770s.324  
 
Between the 15th and 19th centuries the transatlantic slave trade pulled Africa into a global 
military and economic context, mainly through the imports of European firearms to Africa in 
exchange for slaves. The triangle trade contributed immensely to the development of the 
international economy of that time. It was also responsible for colossal human suffering. The 
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slave trade which involved Britain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Denmark and the USA on the one hand, and West African states from Angola to Senegal, on 
the other, accounted for the forced trade estimated at 12 million or more Africans.325 
 
 
Firearms Import 
 
Historical secondary sources suggest that large parts of sub-Saharan Africa imported small 
arms on a sizeable scale from the late 16th century and throughout the slave trade centuries, 
and that many were deployed in armies with destabilizing effects on political and economic 
organization. Firearms and gunpowder had originated in China and spread throughout Eurasia 
before reaching Africa.326 Firearms were first used in Africa by the Janissaries of the Ottoman 
army during the 16th century, and later found their way into West Africa across the Sahara  
from North Africa towards the end of that century.327 According to Keith Krause, the modern 
international arms transfer system originated in Europe in 1550–1660 after a period of 
revolutionary technological innovation in firearms. One of the first characteristics of this 
system was the emergence of leading centres of production and innovation.328 China, Japan 
and the Ottoman Empire became proficient at manufacturing or exploiting the new weapons 
technology. It was in Europe that production of firearms succeeded in maintaining 
productivity growth for several centuries, ‘a feat virtually unknown elsewhere in pre-
industrial economies’. 329 
 
The sustained productivity growth meant that the prices for European firearms continuously 
fell while the technology became more lethal. This had important economic implications for 
the role that the military played in European economies.330 As another experience, Japan  
contrarily introduced a ban on firearms in the 17th century, which resulted in the almost total 
disappearance of firearms from Japanese society in the 17th and 18th centuries.331 The 
differences in the development of missile weapons in Africa and Europe have largely been 
explained through the differences in military environments. For example, the use of cavalry 
and armour in Europe but not in Africa is thought to have been an important factor. In much 
of Africa, the penetrating power of missile weapons was less important than, for example, 
accuracy.332 
 
Some evidence exists that Portuguese and Dutch traders brought firearms to coastal West 
Africa in the 15th to 17th centuries, although historians differ in their analysis of what impact 
these weapons had on African political societies at the time. According to Kea, the impact 
was limited due to low quantities of weapons.333 Historical records show that the British, 
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Dutch and Portuguese traded firearms with communities in Southern Africa around the same 
time. The British and Dutch reportedly armed white settlers in Southern Africa from the late 
17th century. 334 The Portuguese had sold firearms to the Zulus and other communities in 
Southern Africa, as well as to the Boer in their war against the British. 335 The Portuguese 
further traded firearms along the East African coast in the 16th century, and from their 
fortified trading bases in Mombasa and Mozambique in the 17th century,336 whereas the 
French traded firearms to local rulers in Mozambique in the second half of the 18th century.337  
 
European traders began to bring large quantities of firearms for sale in exchange for slaves on 
the West African coast during the second half of the 17th century. Most of the weapons 
imported at that time were handguns, typically smoothbore, muzzle-loading, flintlock 
muskets.338 During 1661-63 the British Royal African Company alone shipped 4,038 firearms 
to the West African coast. By the end of the century firearms had become a frequent sight in 
local warfare.339 A major study on the British Royal African Company estimated that between 
1673 and 1704 the Company supplied close to 100,000 firearms and other small arms to the 
West African coastal region.340 
 
From the 18th century on, France, Britain and the USA accounted for at least two-thirds of the 
Atlantic trade with West Africa.341 The growing revenues from the slave exports paid for 
large quantities of firearms. Estimates suggest that in the 1680s the current value of African 
exports of slaves and commodities to the Atlantic World totalled GBP 6.5 million, with 
African imports estimated at GBP 1.7 million. In the 1780s, total exports expanded to around 
GBP 31.7 million, whereas imports increased to GBP 18.5 million.342 The large volume of 
firearms imports into West Africa in the 18th century, if historians are correct, is quite 
remarkable. According to Pilossof, due to the falling prices on firearms in relation to the 
prices of slaves, African firearms imports increased very sharply in the 18th century. In 1682, 
Africans received two guns for every slave; in 1718 they received between 24 and 32 guns for 
every slave.343 
 
Inikori’s study of British official export records puts total West Africa firearms imports from 
England between 283,000 and 394,000 guns per year in the late 18th century. According to 
his estimates, more than 1.6 million guns were imported into West Africa from England alone 
between 1796 and 1805. These firearms were mostly imported by the major slave exporting 
regions of West Africa, especially the Bonny trading area.344 
 
Richards, who backs the findings, further argues that the figures based on exports from 
England at the time are low estimates, since they do not consider weapons first exported 
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elsewhere in Europe and then re-exported to West Africa.345 In comparison, during 1996–
2005, the 15 states making up the Economic Community of West African States together 
imported small arms worth USD134.4 million, according to available data. With an estimated 
average cost of USD305 each for the period (ammunition included), it translates to 
approximately 441,000 small arms over 10 years.346 Here it is worth noting that at the turn of 
the 19th century, Africa’s population was about one tenth what it is today.347  
 
Eltis and Jennings estimate a ten-fold increase in East African imports of guns and gunpowder 
from Europe between 1680 and 1780.348 By 1880, firearms comprised more than one third of 
Zanzibar’s total imports, with 80,000-100,000 firearms estimated to have reached Africa 
through East African ports annually.349  
 
Eltis and Jennings argue that the firearms trade was distinctive of the Europe–Africa trade, 
rather than the transatlantic slave trade: in the 1820s the relatively high armament component 
in Britain’s trade with Africa was the only major difference between British exports to Brazil 
and Cuba on the one hand and Africa on the other.350 At the most intense period of the slave 
trade, it had come to dominate Africa’s foreign relations: ‘at the turn at the 19th century 
Africa’s interaction with Europe was dominated by the slave trade. This was the principle 
means of exchange whereby European imports and technologies entered Africa and firearms 
constituted a large proportion of these imports.’351  
 
 
Impact 
 
Scholars have debated what kind of impact, or to what extent, firearms imports affected 
Africa during the gun-slave trade centuries. The demographic impact of the slave trade over 
these centuries was undisputedly substantial, even though determining the exact scope has 
been subjected to great debates.352 In 1750, Africa had 6–11 per cent of the world’s 
population. By 1900 it had fallen to 5–7 per cent.353 Besides the large demographic impact, 
the trade for slaves had a more socially disruptive impact than the trade for the same value of 
commodities, as slaves were more likely to be acquired by force or theft.354 During the 
transatlantic slave trade, large parts of sub-Saharan African societies experienced a shift in 
state formation towards centralization and militarization. One assumption has been that states 
dependent on firearms more easily formed and maintained standing armies under centralized 
control than did, for example, cavalry states.355  Firearms were easily deployed in the new 
structures–they required little skill to use compared to other missile weapons, which 
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facilitated quick training of a central army.356 Roberts argues that many states in West Africa 
were militarized during the period, and others emerged with a military ruling class, including 
Asante, Gyaman, Segu Bambara, Oyo, Dahomey and the Sokoto Caliphate.357 According to 
Roberts, ‘The growth of a standing army of musketeers composed of slaves was clearly part 
of the asantehene’s (the king’s) bid for power’.358 According to Kea, firearms were central in 
the military reform of the Gold Coast states in the 17th century. In the late 16th or early 17th 
centuries the state of Akwamu (in today’s Ghana) established a politico-military form of 
government in which military commanders replaced the former heads of clans as state 
officials. A similar form of political organization existed in early 17th century Denkyira, 
where the people were divided for political and military reasons into three groups, and each of 
these divisions was under a military commander. Evidence indicates that militarization of the 
political organization of some inland Gold Coast states had already been achieved by the mid 
17th century. On the coast this process also occurred in several states, in Fanti by the 1650s 
and in Assini by the 1690s.359 According to Kea, the Dahomey kingdom, ‘with its highly 
specialized military organization and great variety of guns, might be said to represent the 
climax of the firearms trade’.360 Meanwhile, Asante adopted a military organization in the late 
17th century, and ‘developed a more complex military system than any other Gold Coast 
state’.361  
 
Other studies show similar developments in Central Africa in the 19th century. According to 
Donatien Dibwe and Dia Mwembu, firearms supplied by Portuguese and Arab-Swahili 
traffickers in exchange for slaves and ivory were central to the state of Lumpungu (in today’s 
Democratic Republic of Congo) in conquering surrounding chiefdoms and creating a 
centralized state structure, in the third quarter of the 19th century.362 They call the 
introduction of firearms ‘a decisive turning point in Busongye history’, which led to ‘the 
emergence of a new type of military power that imposed itself on traditional power 
structures’.363 According to Dibwe and Mwembu, ‘The coming of firearms [in the mid-19th 
century] plunged Central Africa into a cycle of unprecedented violence, causing a large 
amount of victims, but also causing some to flee their territory’.364 This suggests that the 
militarization and centralization of political organization–carried out with small arms–enabled 
a new military ruling class which replaced leaders who may have gained their positions in 
more legitimate ways.  
 
David Gordon argues that firearms were crucial to the South Central African regional political 
economy from the mid-19th century, given the role of firearms in the production of slaves and 
ivory.365 Guns were instrumental in slave raids and in the hunting of elephants on a large 
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scale. Ivory was used to buy both slaves and weapons, and was used as tributes to foreign 
traders to create partnerships and alliances. The ivory trade ‘consolidated the economic and 
military power of those who had access to guns–or who worked in alliance with those with 
guns’.366 While India was the main market for East African ivory until the mid-19th century, it 
shifted to Europe as the African traders demand for firearms and ammunitions increased, and 
the Europeans offered these as payment for ivory. After the mid-19th century, three quarters of 
East Africa’s ivory was going to Europe, either directly or via India.367 Firearms increased the 
effectiveness of elephant hunting compared to previous manual hunting methods, and 
firearms came to dominate elephant hunting in South-East Africa, including in 
Mozambique.368 As the price of ivory increased, ivory stockpiles became targets of raids and 
needed armed protection. In spite of relatively small import quantities of firearms in South 
Central Africa in the second half of the 19th century, firearms ‘became a component of 
political survival’ and ‘A system of extraction that relied on warfare drove the demand for 
arms and ammunition’.369 Violence came to dominate political organization, with territorial 
militarized kingdoms, mobile warlords and bandits–all armed with small arms–who sought 
control over the international trade.370 As the weapons became more lethal over the course of 
the second half of the 19th century, the supply of ivory and slaves dwindled. This resulted in 
more aggressive methods for extraction.371 The long-held Arab trading stations along the East 
African coast, for example, became more militarised with the insertion of firearms, with 
which they raided inland communities for ivory and slaves.372 Several obvious parallels can 
be drawn to today’s conflicts, including the prolonged conflict in Eastern DRC. According to 
Gordon et al’s arguments, the integration of small arms and violence into political-economic 
structures had a destabilizing effect on Africa’s development. With the growing importance of 
firearms for economic production and power, African political leaders depended on firearms 
in warfare and state formation. To sustain political power and wealth African actors were to 
an increasing extent dependent on the import of small arms from a handful of countries in 
Western Europe, which reduced some of the earlier dependence on established trade partners 
around the Indian Ocean in favour of fostering relations with the Europeans.373 
 
Besides the exploitation of slaves and ivory, firearms spread in southern Africa in the second 
half of the 19th century was in part linked to the extractive industry of diamonds. The high 
demand for African labour in the diamond fields in the 1870s permitted the labourers to 
purchase guns for self-defence against the Boer and other white settlers, as well as for 
protection against rival local communities.374 
 
The widespread trade in small arms, and their importance in many societies, led to the 
development of domestic maintenance of firearms. As a result of the large number of firearms 
for private use, many societies developed small-scale firearms repair and service industries 
made up of blacksmiths and gunsmiths.375 According to travelogues, French merchants found 
the West African method of repairing locks incomparably better than any they had ever 
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seen.376 Also in Central Africa, skilful blacksmiths quickly adapted to the emergence of a 
firearms market.377 This small-scale industry is still part of Africa’s gun manufacturing today, 
illustrating the societal diffusion of small arms technologies and the historical North-South 
context in which this industry developed. The African firearms industries also challenge the 
dichotomy between allegedly traditional (African) and (modern) European societies as only 
the latter are perceived as being able to support technology development fostered by the 
systematic application of new knowledge.378  
 
While many historians agree that firearms were necessary to generate more slaves, and that 
firearms in themselves therefore greatly destabilized pre-colonial African states, this causality 
has been contested by studies emphasizing internal factors behind political transformations in 
Africa during the slave trade centuries. One prominent critic, John Thornton, argues against 
over-emphasizing the correlation between the changes in military technology and changes in 
political organization. According to Thornton, historical studies of African wars ‘have been 
subject to a great deal of causal determinism. This is particularly true with regard to the role 
of Europeans in promoting African wars and supplying African armies’.379 The slave trade 
makes it appear as if the African adoption of guns in their armies was a result of European-
directed actions. Furthermore, it assumes that forces using firearms were able to defeat equal 
or even larger forces that lacked these weapons.380 The counterargument suggests that the 
import of firearms to Africa during the transatlantic slave trade was driven by personal use of 
these weapons and largely by African demand: ‘the profit margin on such weapons sales was 
very narrow and European suppliers would have preferred to sell better-quality firearms’.381  
Meanwhile, others have found that the Europeans tricked their customers over the sale of poor 
weapons, and African buyers complained about the quality.382 
 
A few military historians have argued that the weapons imported during the gun-slave trade 
were not suitable for military use, including slave raiding.383 Rather, it has been argued that, 
the weapons were used for non-military means, such as guarding crops. This analysis suggests 
that the diffusion of weapons in African societies and their dual-use nature may be more 
complex than is commonly understood. Dibwe and Mwembu, who also have studied the non-
military function of small arms in Songye, draw a different conclusion. According to Dibwe 
and Mwembu, it was precisely because firearms had become important in protection and 
hunting that they were so sought after. Firearms became a symbol of wealth and prestige in 
the Songye village society.384 Guns were used in hunting and in self-defence, but also in 
wedding and funeral ceremonies, and as a means of communication. Firearms were frequently 
used as dowry gifts: 
 
Over time, because of modernization and the influence of other cultures, the gun asked for 
in dowry became less and less important, especially in urban areas, and was crowded out 
by other useful goods such as a radio or a bicycle. Who needs a gun in the city?385 
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Dibwe and Mwembu’s study on the role of firearms in the Songye gives a unique insight to a 
society where the status and frequency of weapon use is understood to have declined over the 
course of the Cold War. The study suggests that demand for arms is not linear, but can rise 
and fall over time and indicates a more nuanced application of firearms in African societies. 
Interestingly, from one central African perspective, small arms were associated with pre-
modern, rural society–reversed from the Western perspective of the centrality of military 
technology in modernization/industrialization and the contemporary role of small arms in 
urban crimes. 
 
For Europe, the transoceanic slave trade generated enormous profits, which were facilitated 
and made secure through the foundation of trading houses, insurance companies and the 
modern banking system in the UK in the late 17th century. Not only was the transatlantic 
slave trade foundational for global capitalism, it also helped to pay for the British industrial 
revolution.386 
 
 
Arms Control  
 
The empirical evidence found suggests that the arms control system during the transatlantic 
slave trade era was partly made up of limited export controls by some of the European 
suppliers and by national controls by African leaders and state authorities. Given the large 
quantities of small arms imported to Africa from the 17th century, and the importance of 
weapons in production and political organization, concerns with supplies of firearms and 
ammunition were important factors in the internal and foreign policies of states.387 Several 
historical analysts describe systems of import controls and domestic stockpile management in 
the importing states, managed by ruling elites. Chew argues, for example, that East African 
leaders sought to monopolize the imports of firearms during the gun-slave trade.388 In the 
second half of the 17th century, the Dahomey king, Wegbaja ‘passed a law prohibiting the 
sale of guns and powder, which suggests that muskets, matchlocks according to tradition, 
were not sold to other inland peoples by Dahomey  traders’.389 According to Roberts, the 
centralization of firearms in Asante depended on the king’s success in controlling the firearms 
trade, which in turn created political tensions between the king and the aristocracy and 
subsequently led to the stockpiling of firearms.390 
 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, firearms spread deeper into the lands 
behind the coast. This gradual dispersion of guns coincided with the rise and consolidation 
of expansionist states like Akwamu, Denkyira, Asante and Dahomey, whose military 
prowess was based on the firearm…. The bulk of the firearms taken into Asante and 
Dahomey was not carried further afield, because both states imposed restrictions on the 
distribution of guns in the lands to their north.391 
 
Some evidence exists of centralized stockpile management in African states. The very 
centralization of firearms was facilitated by secure stockpiling of firearms by the central 
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authority and through the control of import of such weapons. For example, in Dahomey guns, 
powder and iron could legally be sold only to the king. According to Robin Law, firearms 
under the pre-colonial period were capital-intensive due to low labour costs related to their 
maintenance under central authority–however, as Law has pointed out, this was only true 
during the slave trade era. ‘Conversely, the lower cost of firearms, far from facilitating royal 
control, might be argued to have facilitated the development of chiefly power against the 
king’.392 States introduced formal licensing requirements on arms exports as early as the 16th 
century.393 Export controls on firearms were widespread in Europe during the transatlantic 
slave trade centuries to either protect limited national military resources by preserving 
available supplies (as in the case of France and Portugal) or to protect a technological lead (in 
England, Milan and Liège) or because of a general ban on sales to the enemy in times of 
war.394 In the 16th century, Portugal had developed arms controls measures on its own, 
suggesting strategic reasons behind the limited supply to Coastal West Africa at the time: 
 
Officially, the Portuguese were forbidden to sell firearms to non-Christians, ostensibly on 
politico-religious grounds, but more credibly because, during the fifteenth, sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, Portugal was largely dependent on Flemish and German gunsmiths 
for its supply of firearms.395 
 
The Portuguese allegedly seized smuggled weapons off the coast of Benin, and stopped a 
Spanish weapon trading ship. At the same time, however, the Portuguese armed several 
fortified trading stations with firearms in order to protect themselves from attacks from other 
European and African rulers.396 According to Kea, the Dutch supplied ‘firearms, powder, etc. 
only to the rulers with whom they had commercial and military agreements’, whereas the 
English had a more liberal approach.397 In England, France and Germany, firearms were 
largely produced by small firms relatively to the size of their markets.398 The rise of 
mercantilism meant that private arms traders were partly replaced by government arsenals and 
that states took a more restrictive approach to the regulation of arms transfers.399 According to 
Keith Krause: 
 
From the late seventeenth to the early 19th century the arms transfer system was relatively 
quiescent. Arms were traded, but the state by and large controlled (or at least licensed) 
most arms production and exports, keeping production near the level needed to supply only 
domestic needs.400 
 
The European armament industry was during the gun-slave trade centuries confined to exports 
in peace times. In times of war, demand for arms by the governments may have made it 
difficult for the merchants to get sufficient supplies from the manufacturers for exports.401 In 
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the 18th century, it was a regular practice for the government in England to prohibit the 
exportation of firearms and ammunition in wartime, according to Inikori. However, some 
evidence suggests that domestic merchants had some leverage over the issuing of export 
licences. Because small arms formed the backbone of English trade to West Africa at this 
time, the merchants in the trade regularly petitioned the government in times of war to grant 
them special licences which made West Africa an exception to the general law.402 One way to 
circumvent the export controls was by framing the exports as if they would not constitute a 
military threat to the exporting state, while being economically important. As one petition 
argued: ‘the above gunpowder and arms are of an inferior kind and have always been a 
necessary part of the cargoes of ships trading to Africa’.403 Hence, arms control had both 
strategic and normative aspects. European producers had begun to formalize arms exports and 
arms export controls in their foreign policy strategies. However, the significant economic role 
that small arms played in the transatlantic slave trade appears to have inclined towards more 
liberal trading policies, whereas the new African elite depended on their military superiority 
to gain and remain in power, and appear to have used arms control instruments (securing 
stockpiles, centralizing imports and preventing proliferation), primarily as a means to 
centralize political power. 
 
European Imperialism and the Partition of Africa  
 
The end of the transoceanic gun-slave trade became the beginning of European conquest and 
the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the period 1876–1912. The industrialization of Europe 
significantly increased its demand for raw materials, leading to a shift in African exports from 
slaves to commodities in the mid 19th century. During its peak in the 1780s, the slave trade 
constituted 90 per of all transatlantic trade; in the 1860s (following the closing of the 
Brazilian slave trade) this figure had fallen to two per cent. When the slave trade declined in 
the 19th century, Africa partly replaced slave exports with other commodities (e.g. rubber, 
palm oil); however, these never reached the same level of revenue and Africa’s part of the 
international economy effectively decreased. Africa’s trade with transatlantic regions 
continued to be highly dependent on the sale of one or two products. The volume of British 
exports to Africa increased 10 times between 1817–1820 and 1846–1849, and there was a 
fivefold increase in the volume of British import from Africa, to the point where ‘the British  
were in effect exporting their industrial revolution’ to Africa.404 Despite the shift from slave 
trade to trade in legitimate products, firearms still constituted a large proportion of the 
manufactured goods imported by Africa and the peak in arms sales occurred even after the 
slave trade had come to an end.405 By 1907, according to the Birmingham Proof House’s 
estimates, Britain may have produced 20 million firearms for export to Africa.406 An 
important difference in the sub-Saharan African small arms imports was that the weapons had 
become more lethal. Industrialization in Europe had led to rapid advances in firearms 
technology. In the 1860s, the breech-loader revolution brought significant changes in the 
functioning of firearms that made them more suitable for warfare: they were easier to load, 
                                                
402 Inikori, Import of Firearms, p. 339. 
403 P.R.O., C.O. 267/6, Petition of Henry Hardware to Pitt. Quoted in Inikori, Import of Firearms, Ibid., p. 340. 
404 Eltis and Jennings, Trade Western Africa and the Atlantic World, pp. 941–6. 
405 Pilossof, Guns don’t Colonise People, p. 271. 
406 The Birmingham Proof House was established 1813 by an Act of Parliament to guarantee the safety and 
quality control of firearms sold to Africa. Proof houses in Western Europe still functions largely the same, and 
play a key role in e.g. developing common technical standards at EU level. Chew (2012), Arming the Periphery, 
p. 26, p. 30; Birmingham Gun Barrel Proof House, <http://www.gunproof.com/>. 
 73 
fired more quickly and were more accurate. At the same time, the first metal cartridge bullets 
were developed, which protected the gunpowder from rain and humidity and made firing 
swifter.407 Fuelled by the technological improvements, the European armament industry 
experienced dramatic structural changes in the mid to late 19th century, ‘creating the world 
firearms market between 1856 and 1878’, in which Western Europe, Russia and the USA 
were key exporters. In this process, large companies moved from rail and general steel 
production into armament production. Two examples were the German Krupp and British 
Armstrong, both pioneers in breech-loaders.408 The nascent small arms complex in 
industrialized Europe was further strengthened in the imperial period, largely through the 
growth in corporate manufacturing. The creation of DWM in Germany is an illustrative 
example. DWM overtook smaller companies in the late 19th century, including Mauser, and 
invested in new production sites and weapon designers, such as Georg Luger. DWM became 
known for its cutting edge small arms technology and became one of the largest 
manufacturers of small arms. One of DWM’s inventions was the self-loading pistol.409 
 
The gun revolution penetrated Africa in a number of ways. As the Europeans rearmed with 
breech-loaders in the 1860s and 1870s, and with repeating rifles in the 1880s, they discarded 
vast quantities of surplus weapons. Many of these found their way to Africa via the coastal or 
trans-Saharan trade.410 The Indian Ocean trading route appears highly significant in spreading 
breech-loaders in Africa. Breech-loaders reportedly reach East Africa as early as 1886.411  
By 1897, prices on firearms going to Zanzibar, Portuguese and French East Africa were 
higher than prices on firearms imported to West Africa the same year, suggesting that the 
firearms sold to East Africa might have been newer or of higher quality–with one possibility 
being that the imports in East Africa contained more breech-loaders than the West African 
imports.412 A number of studies have shown that Africa received very large quantities  of  
obsolete weapons after the breech-loader revolution.413 In the 1860s, one gun was imported 
per 103 people every year in parts of West Africa.414 Meanwhile, East Africa is estimated to 
have imported over 100,000 firearms annually.415 
 
According to Beachey, firearms were widespread in East Africa in the second half of the 19th 
century.416 His study found that ‘The arms trade in East Africa was linked with the 
development and use of new types of fire-arms in Europe’, referring to how East Africa 
received obsolete weapons from Europe after the breech-loader revolution. However, shortly 
after the introduction of breech-loader weapons in European warfare in the late 1870s, in the 
mid 1880s breech-loader weapons started to be exported to East Africa at large quantities.417 
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Pankhurst has studied the supply of small arms to Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century, and 
found that the initial trade supports the theory of largely obsolete weapons being imported. 
According to primary data, Italy and France made very large profits from supplying weapons 
to different Ethiopian kingdoms through their protectorates. French traders bought obsolete 
rifles in France and Belgium and sold them for up to five or six times more in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia paid for the arms imports partly in cash, and partly in exchange for ivory, gold and 
civet. Towards the end of the 19th century, however, the weapons imported by Ethiopian 
rulers improved in quality.418 
 
In one arms deal, in 1884, Italians committed to supply 50,000 Remington rifles and 10 
million cartridges to Menelik (an Ethiopian regional ruler) in annual instalments over 10 
years. In 1891, a Russian lieutenant in Ethiopia estimated that Ethiopia had received 100,000 
firearms in the previous two decades from Italy, France and Britain, and other estimates also 
range between 80,000 and 120,000. Arms imports were also recorded from Russia, Greece 
and Switzerland during this time. The arms sales often entered Ethiopia from Europe via 
Djibouti. Pankhurst argues that Ethiopia imported weapons of greater quantity and quality 
compared with other African states. Whereas other states had received large quantities of 
obsolete weapons, the Ethiopian army was armed mainly with modern rifles and revolvers. 
The Ethiopian army also had armed soldiers down the ranks, whereas elsewhere in Africa, 
firearms were at times limited to chiefs. By the early 1880s, almost all soldiers in Ethiopia 
carried firearms.419 Ethiopia’s imports of small arms and ammunition only slowed down as a 
result of a specific European arms control agreement targeting Abyssinia between 1906 and 
1935 (see below).420 
 
The literature illustrates how large-scale small arms imports were made available through 
international trade and alliances between foreign representatives and national and regional 
rulers during the early imperial period. Private manufacturing, merchants and transit points 
were also evident phenomena of small arms trade at the time. 
 
 
Impact 
 
In Scramble for Africa, Pakenham argues that small arms were a necessary means for the 
European takeover of sub-Saharan Africa. More than any economic factor, Europe ‘imposed 
its will on Africa at the point of a gun’.421 Headrick has similarly argued that the technology 
improvements in firearms, together with steamboats and quinine prophylaxis, enabled 
colonial takeover of Africa. Notably, the destabilizing effects on Africa during the 
Transatlantic slave trade, following the integration and growing dependence on European 
small arms imports in political and economic development, may have further weakened 
African societies before European imperial expansion. The European technological 
advancements which depended on European corporate investments, were partly developed 
through testing new weapons in battles in Africa: 
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In 1849 Minie rifles were issued to units of the French army and two years later to some 
British troops. Since Europe was then at peace, the new weapons had to be tried out 
elsewhere. The French sent their Chasseurs d’Afrique (formerly Chasseurs d’Orleans)  to  
fight the Algerians with new long-bullet rifles, while the British tested their Minie rifles 
against Africans in the Kaffir War of 1852.422 
 
The French-converted Gras to Gras-Kropatchek repeater and its later replacement–the Lebel 
rifle–were both tested in Sudan. The Lebel rifle was extensively used by French troops during 
the First World War, and millions were produced. In 1884, the German army converted its 
Mausers to magazine loading, while the British did the same to a variety of rifles. In 1897, the 
dum-dum bullet was invented: ‘This particular invention was so vicious, for it tore great holes 
in the flesh, that Europeans thought it too cruel to inflict upon one another, and used it only 
against Asians and Africans’.423 African communities were thus used as testing grounds for 
European military advancement, leading to new knowledge which enabled the development 
of more lethal small arms. 
 
Small arms also played a role in empowering resistance in East Africa against European 
imperial power, including the so-called Abushiri revolt in 1888–1889 against the German 
East Africa Company by the Arab and Swahili population along communities on the central 
East African coast and in Tanganyika. The revolt included resistance against an Anglo-
German and Italian coastal blockade to disrupt arms trade to East Africa.424 German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck intervened and suppressed the Abushiri resistance which 
concluded in the East Africa Company having to hand over Tanganyika’s administration to 
the German government, but the coastal blockade was also lifted.425 Pankhurst further argues 
that the victory by Ethiopian leaders in maintaining their sovereignty in the second half of the 
19th century can be explained by their great access to small arms of high quality, and their 
strategy of playing European states against each other. Emperor Yohannes used his increased 
weapons arsenal to defeat Egypt in 1875–76 in Gundet and Gura. The ruler Menelik was able 
to import substantial quantities of weapons from Europe, partly because of his access to the 
coast, but primarily because he took advantage of Italy’s war against Yohannes in northern 
Ethiopia (in an attempt to expand Italian occupation beyond Eritrea) and the French rivalry 
with England. Menelik’s systematic military imports from a variety of European sources 
enabled him to build such a strong national defence that it overpowered the Italian 
invaders.426  
 
The shift in demand from ‘luxury’ goods from Africa–such as gold, ivory and slaves, to 
public commodity goods such as palm oil and rubber reduced the position of the new military 
elites that had gained power during the Transoceanic gun-slave trade in large parts of Africa, 
and so further weakened the internal power structure on the continent.427 Chew similarly 
argues that the central role of small arms and violence in the economic and political 
development of societies in East Africa made them vulnerable to European expansion in the 
West Indian Ocean.428  
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European colonialists sought to acquire territories in Africa partly to compensate for the 
losses they incurred by giving up the African slave trade.429 In the mid-1880s, Otto von 
Bismarck convened the Conference of Berlin, leading up to the adoption of the Treaty  
dividing Africa between European powers.430 Between 1880 and 1914, European states took 
control over 90 per cent of Africa; the partition of Africa came to an end only with the First 
World War. In pre-colonial Africa, the number of political entities has been estimated 
conservatively at 10,000. These were reduced to a few dozen political territories divided 
between European colonial powers. The partition of Africa was the most permanent feature of 
European imperialism in Africa, as the borders remain today. The inter-colonial boundaries 
had only a limited effect: the colonial rulers failed to enforce the borders, often due to their 
length and the small size of the occupying army. The borderlands gave protection to refugees 
fleeing the jurisdiction of a particular regime. Distinct tariffs, pricing, and monetary regimes 
led to extensive smuggling in the border areas. Migration and trade led to a growth of the 
communities along the borders.431 Political and economic structures along borderlands, away 
from the sovereignty of the capitals, were created. These structures, which are considered 
vital for weapons smuggling, have grown in recent years but are not a new phenomenon. 
 
During imperialism, some of the worst crimes against humanity throughout history were 
committed. Crimes were committed or facilitated with small arms. There are many examples 
from the literature: one such is the mass killings of Congolese from 1885 to 1908, during 
King Leopold II’s reign, through murder, starvation, exhaustion and exposure, disease, and 
plummeting birth rates. Allegedly, soldiers were ordered to cut off and bring back dead 
victims’ right hands as proof that they had not wasted their bullets.432 This anecdotal evidence 
points both to the centrality of small arms in direct violence and oppression, as well as the 
imperial image of military technology (in this case ammunition) as more valued than human 
life. Another example of extreme brutality was the German military genocide of the Herero 
and Nama in present-day Namibia, 1904-08:  
 
In a conscious policy of genocide, German soldiers and settlers sought, shot, beat, hanged, 
starved, and raped Herero men, women, and children. When the war finally ended, no 
fewer than 80 per cent of the Herero had lost their lives.433 
 
These crimes, committed or enabled through small arms, are no less inhuman or brutal than 
war crimes committed using small arms in the past two decades. Yet, as illustrated in chapter 
1.2, the long history of small arms’ violent impact on indigenous populations does not fit the 
mainstream narrative that presents small arms as a problem largely internal to the global 
                                                
429 Fomin, E.S.D. and Ndobegang, M.M. (2006), ‘African Slavery Artifacts and European Colonialism: The 
Cameroon Grassfields from 1600 to 1950’, The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, Vol. 11, No. 6, p. 
633. 
430 Whiteman, Kaye (2012), ‘The Rise and Fall of Eurafrique from the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 to the 
Tripoli EU-Africa Summit of 2010’, in Adekeye Adebajo and Whiteman (eds), The EU and Africa: from 
Eurafrique to Afro-Europa (London: Hurst), p. 27. 
431 Whiteman (2012), ‘The Rise and Fall of Eurafrique’, pp. 158 – 9. 
432 Ewans, Martin (2002), European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State and its 
Aftermath (London: Routledge), quoted in ‘Congo Free State, 1885–1908’, Genocide 
 Studies Programme, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/gsp/colonial/belgian_congo/. 
433 Gewald, Jan-Bart (2004), ‘Imperial Germany and the Herero of Southern Africa: Genocide and the Quest for 
recompensate’, in Adam Jones (ed.), Genocide, War Crimes and the West: History and Complicity (London: 
Zed Books), p. 60. 
 77 
south. Germany’s refusal to adequately acknowledge and compensate Namibia for its crimes 
continues to cause debate in both Namibia and Germany.434 
 
 
Arms Control  
 
In the imperialist era, the decline in African domestic controls and the increase and 
liberalization of much arms supply, not least through the growth in manufacturing 
corporations, posed significant challenges for arms control. During 1858–1888 small arms 
production in Britain, Germany and France: 
 
was centred on private firms, and relatively low levels of direct government support meant 
exports were aggressively pursued. Unlike previous periods, high levels of exports (in the 
range of 50 per cent of production) were accepted by governments as a necessary cost of 
maintaining a strong defence manufacturing base at a low cost to the state.435 
 
The shift in economic ideology from mercantilism to capitalism led to a more laissez-faire 
approach to arms transfer regulations in the late 19th century in key European exporting 
states, including Britain and France. National regulations on arms exports withered and the 
dominant European arms producing states (Prussia, Britain and France) began to encourage 
arms exports to stimulate production.436 In the 19th century, European firms cooperated 
across national lines to produce arms for the African market. In 1892, Belgian gun makers 
told their government that Liège products would not sell in Africa ‘unless they are marked 
with the English proof mark’. This could be arranged quite legally; in 1890 Birmingham 
produced 176,000 Africa barrels of which 100,000 were duly proof-marked and then sold to 
be finished in Belgium with Belgian locks and stocks. In the 1890s, there was a small factory 
in Spain ‘in which they made cheap imitation Winchester rifles’, complete with patent 
numbers, mainly for the African market.437  
 
The idea of controlling arms sales from Europe to Africa in order to avoid ‘blow-back’ effects 
was born in the late 19th century. The technology and quantity of firearms in Africa 
frightened the European rulers in East Africa and were reportedly seen as a threat to Europe’s 
‘development and pacification’ of Africa.438 The Europeans also met European-supplied 
weapons in combat. In a war against the Dervish State in Somalia, the British discovered that 
a majority of the Dervish arms were French made, and had been smuggled into Somalia via 
Italy and Djibouti.439 According to Craft and Smaldone, ‘At a minimum, such suppliers want 
to avoid being labelled “merchants of death” or having to face their own weapons if they or 
international peace-keeping missions should be deployed there.’440 In 1893, the German 
government allegedly refused to allow a German company to supply 100,000 rifles and 10 
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million cartridges to Ethiopia for the same reason.441 Some British opposed the trade in 
weapons to Ethiopia for humanitarian reasons, others opposed the trade on the consideration 
that the arms could be used against British troops, and yet others because Britain could not 
take advantage of the lucrative trade, or because they assumed that the countries supplying 
arms to Ethiopia would gain the most influence in that country.442  
 
It was in this context that 13 European states, as well as the Congo Free State, Persia, the 
USA and Zanzibar adopted the ‘Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and Importation into 
Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and Spirituous Liquors’ (The Brussels Act), in July 1890. 
The Brussels Act was designed to suppress the slave trade and to restrict firearms imports 
from the middle of the Sahara to present-day Namibia and Zimbabwe, especially with regard 
to breech-loader technology, gunpowder and ammunition. The self-declared ‘powers to 
protect’ agreed that their mission to preserve the African population would be impossible 
without restricting the trade in firearms and ammunitions.443  
 
Although the Act was allegedly adopted to prevent slave trade, the timing and content of the 
agreement suggests imperial rather than humanitarian motives. The signatories justified the 
Brussels Act by stating that they sought with it to protect aboriginal people and to bring the 
benefits of peace and civilization to Africa with it.444 However, it is certainly possible that 
advocates for the Act had different motivations, reflecting the different political agendas of 
the actors involved. The antislavery movement in Western Europe at the time, although based 
on compassion and on the view of slavery as an inhuman and immoral practice, also 
contained the necessary elements of the paternalism and sense of obligation to civilize the 
former slave peoples that were instrumental in the colonial period.445  
 
Feelings of sympathy played an important role to articulate the mutual constitution of self 
and other as well as being fundamental to asymmetrical relations of power as it is 
intertwined with sentiments and powers, rights and duties.446 
 
Yet the whites, whether settlers, military men, or missionaries, according to Headrick, feared 
the acquisition of guns by Africans and therefore tried to restrict their sale. Like many 
regulations of the time, the Brussels Act of 1892 made a clear connection between European 
interests and the gun revolution: It restricted the sale of flint-locks to Africans living between 
the twentieth parallel north and the twentieth south and prohibited the sale of breech-loaders 
completely. According to Headrick, these restrictions were more symbolic than real.447 The 
symbolism in seeking to shape a control system centralized on geographical distinctions and 
denial of certain technologies by certain users, should not be neglected–even though evidence 
points towards a lack of implementation at the time. 
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Furthermore, while the Act required effective guarantees for certain exports to sub-Saharan 
Africa, flintlock guns and gunpowder were exempted from the regulation.448 The Brussels Act 
so depended on a distinction in small arms technology: those considered specifically 
dangerous or ‘military’ in design and those of little strategic value to Europe, design for 
example for non-military purposes. The common view among producing states in the decade 
to come was that most firearms and ammunition were not arms and munitions of war, and 
should therefore by granted export licenses also for the prohibited zone.449 
 
In spite of the Brussels Act, the small arms supply to Africa continued. Throughout the 19th 
century ‘numerous Acts and Ordinance were passed to restrict, monitor and control the sale 
and movement of firearms, gunpowder and ammunition’.450 In 1906, Italy, France and Britain 
signed an agreement that required arms destined for the Ethiopian government to have 
documentation indicating the name, the number of arms, and the destination of the sale. 
However, smuggling was common and according to Jonathan Grant’s major study on the 
topic ‘local French officials had no interest in taking action that would incur the displeasure 
of the arms merchants; in some instances arms merchants and French colonial officials were 
one and the same’.451 James Cooke’s study of British and French arms supply to insurgencies 
in North-West Africa in the 1890s further supports the notion that national rivalry prevented 
the leading European arms producers from reaching common agreements on the arms trade to 
Africa in the early imperial period.452 Under the imperial period however, the European 
powers experimented with a series of measures to in different ways embed small arms control 
and trade transparency as one element of the imperial legal-organizational framework, not 
least the Brussels Act.  
 
The Colonial Era 
 
Given the central notion to post-colonial perspectives that ‘We cannot understand the 
development of social forces and social and political relations in post-colonial states without 
taking into consideration earlier interactions between colonisers and colonized’, it is 
surprising that colonial arms control is seldom analysed in relation to current arms control 
practices in former colonies.453 Compared to the pre-colonial and imperial period, few studies 
have been made on small arms trade with sub-Saharan Africa during the colonial period. The 
general understanding is that during colonialism the provision of arms to sub-Saharan Africa 
came exclusively from the colonial power.454 As far as the author knows, there has been no 
comprehensive study of arms trade to the European African colonies for the period 1912–75. 
 
The primary data described in this section are far from comprehensive, but nevertheless have 
given some indication of the changes between the imperial and colonial periods. At the verge 
of the colonial period, in 1911, the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate called the 
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‘arming of the natives’ in border areas of the East Africa Protectorate ‘notorious’ to the extent 
that it ‘is a practical impossibility to prevent the importation of arms’ from France and ‘other 
foreign origin’. Based on a proposal from the Governor of Italian Somaliland, the British 
Governor suggested ‘that we shall arm our natives with old rifles of our own manufactures’, 
while seeking a multilateral agreement among European colonial powers to curb the arms and 
ammunition imports through Djibouti.455 The proposal was rejected by the British Foreign 
Office. While underlining the importance of ‘controlling the supply of arms and ammunition 
to the natives in Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate’, however ‘seriously doubts….  
arming natives with rifles of an old pattern, as it would be possible to exercise but little 
control over the rifles and they would probably be traded away, while ammunition would 
have to be supplied by the Government which might possibly be used against the Protectorate 
troops’.456 The correspondence shows a shift in Europeans’ thinking about small arms control 
during colonialism, as European concerns and spheres of influence were extended from 
export controls to import controls and questions of gun ownership as part of the change in 
political organization and the political economic system from imperialism to colonial rule. 
Existing customs data suggest that the colonial rulers over time streamlined the arms imports, 
reducing the scale of weapons inflow, while limiting the source countries (see below). 
 
According to the Brussels Act, and national legislations, arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa 
were prohibited. The colonial regiments, however, imported weapons themselves in order to 
carry out their law enforcement, military, and border control functions in the colonies. The 
colonial power frequently held a small army readily available in the colonies, to which the 
same power exclusively provided arms.457 According to annual reports of the colonies, the 
East Africa Protectorate imported arms and ammunition for GBP 27,396 in 1912–13 
(approximately GBP 2.8 million in current prices) and for GBP 27,253 in the year 1913–14 
(approximately GBP 2.7 million today), 89 per cent of which was imported from the UK.458 
In 1920–21, arms and ammunition imports decreased to GBP 21,263 (some. 0.96 million 
today), with 74 per cent imported from the UK.459 In the Gold Coast (Ghana), the colonial 
regime imported 6,087 guns and pistols for GBP 24,273 in 1917 (equal to roughly GBP 300 
per weapon in current prices) and 1,745 guns and pistols for GBP 10,461 (approximately GBP 
365 each today) in 1918. The report also noted the import of 200,000 pounds of gunpowder 
over the two years.460 Mozambique imported arms from Portugal and Portuguese territories 
for USD 65,519 in 1926–31 (equal to some USD 0.9 million today). The Italian colonies in 
North Africa and Africa’s horn (including Eritrea and Somalia) imported arms for USD 
226,800 (USD 3.6 million in current prices), in 1926–1931.461 Meanwhile, Belgian Congo, 
Rwanda and Burundi, reported arms imports for USD 531,100 during 1926–31 (USD 7.4 
million in current prices), between 0.5 and 0.7 per cent of global imports.462 In 1931–1936, 
Belgian colonies imported arms for USD 186,000 (USD 3.1 million today).463 Nyasaland’s 
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(Malawi) imports were less, with a total value of GBP 10,523 (GBP 1.05 million in current 
prices), in 1909–1914, the majority imported from the UK. At the time, Nyasaland had a very 
small group of colonial rulers and settlers.464 South Africa, with a much larger white ruling 
class, and moreover not covered by the Brussels Act, imported guns, pistols and revolvers for 
GBP 218,573 (GBP 11.5 million in current prices) between 1920 and 1924.465 In 1926–1931 
South Africa’s imports were 1.2–2.2 per cent of world imports, approximately USD 18 
million in today’s prices.466 In 1931–1936, South Africa’s imports of arms and ammunition 
increased to 4.6–8.5 per cent of the global imports, worth approximately USD 160 million 
today.467  
 
With the demise of the League of Nations and beginning of the Second World War, data on 
arms imports become more difficult to obtain. The annual colonial reports also began to 
exclude military imports to the colonies, but there is little reason to believe that the imports 
stopped here (as an example, several reports note that the trade figures exclude military 
items). A recent baseline study identifying sources of small-calibre ammunition found that 
ammunition exclusively produced by France in 1950–1980s (7.5 × 54 mm, for bolt-action and 
semi-automatic rifles), was still frequently found in Ivory Coast in 2014. Identical 
ammunition was also seized in Niger in 2012 and in Liberia in 2013.468 The study also found 
Soviet Union ammunition produced in 1950–1955.469 At that time, ammunition was often 
specific and weapons could seldom use cartridges from different producers, making importers 
dependent on the same supplier over time. Although the colonial powers were often the main 
source of supply, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers has recorded Angolan 
imports of small arms worth USD 1.7 million in the years 1962–1974 (during the war of 
liberation) from Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Portugal, Spain, the UK and the USA, as well as minor imports from Finland and South 
Africa.470 
 
 
Impact and Arms Control 
 
International agreements sought to control the trade of modern rifles to sub-Saharan Africa 
and colonial governments attempted to regulate the possession of older weapons and 
ammunition through registration and taxation.471 Notably, the colonial period saw an upswing 
in cooperation among producing states, not least in sharing arms trade data under an 
international body. In the short period between the two world wars, the League of Nations 
managed to enhance transparency in international arms trade. In 1925, the League of Nations 
adopted the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and 
Ammunition and Implements of War, and began compiling annual reports of the international 
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arms trade based on reports submitted by member states. By 1938 the statistical yearbook 
covered 60 states and 64 colonies.472 The trade registries during colonialism suggest that 
transparency is not automatically an indicator of legitimacy. Contrary to the imperial period, 
during which national rivalry prevented European powers from upholding common 
agreements on arms trade control in Africa, the colonial period saw more consolidation 
between national colonial policies.473 
 
The Geneva Convention categorized weapons under five different headings based on areas of 
use and design–thus developed from a similar logic as the categorization of weapons in the 
Brussels Act. Most military-style weapons were only to be sold by one government to another 
government. Other weapons could be exported with a license, and proper documentation 
showing the content of the export, the exporter, importer, and the authorizing body. 
Information about the trade was to be made publicly available through bi-monthly reports. All 
exports in all categories of weapons to sub-Saharan Africa required an export license, as well 
as consent by the sovereign state/colonial power.474 
 
Colonial rulers further imposed European gun laws in the colonies.475 In 1920, the UK 
adopted a revised Firearms Act, introducing stricter gun controls on its territory, including a 
right of the Secretary of State to prohibit certain firearms exports.476 The colonial regimes 
furthermore provided new instruments of coercive authority, including juridical systems and 
police forces, and ‘Combating crime frequently meant dealing with threats to colonial 
imposed law, upholding European authority and protecting white owned property’.477 
 
The vital consideration for colonial rulers was to establish a claim to authority and to 
uphold the colonial ‘peace’…. Thus the law imposed over much of British colonial Africa 
was largely designed to underpin the colonial presence…. Indirect rule was not concerned 
with the rule of law but with supporting the colonial structure.478 
 
Crucial to that order was the restriction on the import and sale of firearms and gunpowder. 
Colonial regiments, such as the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in British East Africa, 
controlled the stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in the colonies. They were also in 
charge of licensing and kept close monitoring of purchases by local leaders. A letter 
correspondence from 1933 between the King of Buganda, Daudi Chwa, and KAR shows how 
Daudi Chwa requested to purchase ammunition for his 40 British rifles, by referring to 
previous permissions.479 The colonial regiment refused to approve the sale because the King 
could not show a licence and because they distrusted the stated purpose that the ammunition 
was to be used for hunting buffaloes and not to arm the King’s bodyguard. ‘Furthermore, .303 
ammunition (as used by the Protectorate forces) is a prohibited import and is, therefore, not 
available for the use of the general public.’480 The correspondence shows how the British 
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colonizers had not only completely overtaken the authority of arms control from the 
Kingdom, but also reduced the status of the King to that of the general public. 
 
The colonial police was responsible for patrolling borders, confiscating firearms and breaking 
illegal strikes.481 Local rulers or native authority forces nevertheless continually policed large 
parts of Africa during colonialism, including rural areas and town-ships. Unlike the colonial 
police, the native police was usually unarmed.482 This is likely to have been a consequence of 
the colonial gun laws, which restricted Africans’ access to firearms–themselves a result of 
colonial rule and its representation of Africans. In South Africa, studies on the restrictions 
placed on black gun ownership have been illustrative of rules of citizenship, exclusion, racism 
and a general fear of black uprising as underpinning the colonial arms control regime.483 In 
British East Africa, frontier policing along the Sudan–Kenya– Ethiopia border region north of 
Lake Turkana led to a disarmament campaign of the borderland communities before the 
establishment of colonial legal order.484 Many community leaders lost their power in the 
disarmament campaign, especially in Kenya, which led to a security vacuum in the region. 
When some communities that collaborated with the colonial power were not disarmed, and 
weapons continued to be supplied to groups in neighbouring Sudan and Ethiopia, this 
‘generated an arms race hitherto unprecedented in the framework of pastoral relationships’ in 
the region.485 Nene Mburu’s study provides historical depth to contemporary studies on the 
role of weapons in African rural societies, including the centrality of guns in pastoral conflicts 
in the war-prone Turkana district, known for its extensive accumulation of small arms. 
 
Although most historical studies have underline the instrumental use of firearms to take over, 
and maintain control over, colonial interests and orders, Jones et al have emphasised the 
cultural symbolism of firearms for the colonial project. Their study links access to firearms to 
cultural practices and colonial cultures. One example was hunting as a recreational activity, in 
which colonial cultures forged a sense of belonging through the hunt on the imperial frontier, 
that was deeply connected with the process of colonial land seizure and controls over natural 
resources.486 Whereas the European powers and small arms manufacturers saw certain small 
arms as non-strategic, non-decisive weapons, which could be traded freely, Jones et al saw 
this technology as having great symbolic and cultural value for the creation of empires. 
 
Post-colonial State Formation 
 
Ghana won independence and marked the start of the decolonization process in Africa in 
1957. At no other time in history had such a great number of sovereign states been created in 
such a short time period: 45 sovereign states were created in Africa between 1951 and 1975. 
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The means by which the formation of liberal sovereign states in Africa was achieved–through 
decolonization–has been a great influence on those societies and states.487 
 
 
Arms imports 
 
Colonial independence marked a significant trend in arms imports to Africa. New 
independent regimes sought arms imports as one means to enable them to govern the new 
states–often violently. During the struggle for independence, the small arms trade was very 
limited in transparency and reliable data are hard to obtain. Furthermore, the arms control 
agenda was almost exclusively focused on the super powers, weapons of mass destruction and 
major conventional weapons. The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer (NISAT) 
database collects data on authorized SALW transfers dating back to the 1960s. This database 
is the most comprehensive source of SALW transfers during the Cold War. With the lack of 
records provided by states, together with the comprehensive geographical and historical 
scope, reliable trends over time are difficult to make out but nevertheless point to interesting 
changes from the colonial period. First of all, the data indicate very large differences between 
different African states’ imports. Furthermore, sub-Saharan African imports suggest that 
states were able to diversify arms imports among multiple exporters, and that often the same 
state received weapons from both East and West. In 1977, during the Ethiopian–Somali War, 
Ethiopia imported SALW from the UK (USD 1.5 million) the Soviet Union (USD 1.8 
million), Germany (USD 2 million), the USA (USD 2.3 million), Yugoslavia (USD 3.3 
million) and Italy (USD 3.8 million), according to NISAT. 
 
Figures for Somalia during this time are unfortunately not available. In the mid-1970s, Sudan 
imported SALW from a dozen states, mainly in Europe but also from China, Egypt, the Soviet 
Union and the USA; the largest imports came from China (USD 0.9 million) in 1974–1975 
and the Soviet Union (over USD 3 million), in 1973–1975.488 According to the database, 
however, former colonial powers remained the largest suppliers. The DRC’s recorded small 
arms imports during 1970–1975 came mainly from Belgium, and totalled USD 7.7 million for 
the period. Although Senegal imported small arms (on a small scale) from a dozen other states 
from both East (China, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union) and West (specifically from 
Canada, Germany, Greece, Poland, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, the UK and the USA) and a couple 
of African states (Gabon and Benin), France remained the largest supplier, exporting small 
arms worth USD 21.1 million during 1962–1981. 
 
NISAT data include both military-style weapons and so-called non-military weapons; 
although the majority of weapons are military, at times, non-military items by far exceed 
records on military imports. As an example, Liberia’s imports in the 1970s totalled USD 1.4 
million, of which 1.3 million were listed as non-military or hunting weapons (the military 
weapons supplied by the USA and the non-military from the UK). Data on the Ivory Coast 
indicate the greatest imports of SALW in the region during the mid-1960s to mid-1980s. 
France supplied the great majority of SALW sold to Ivory Coast during 1964–1985. In 1964–
1974 Ivory Coast’s imports totalled USD 7.5 million, and in 1975–1985 authorized imports 
totalled USD 30 million. This can be compared to the imports in 1995–2003, which totalled 
USD 17.2 million. In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted an arms embargo on Ivory 
Coast in reaction to frequent breaches of a ceasefire agreement and a deteriorating 
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humanitarian situation. The resolution allowed supplies of arms and related material and 
technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use in the process of 
restructuring defense and security forces of the Ivorian Government of National 
Reconciliation. Such supplies had to be approved in advance by the relevant Sanctions 
Committee.489 Following the embargo in 2011, France exported SALW worth close to USD 
50 million, Bangladesh sold SALW for USD 8.3 million in 2006, and Pakistan for USD 72.6 
million in 2011, all contributing to security sector reform in Ivory Coast.490  
 
The establishment of national armed forces in the newly independent African states led to a 
growth in major conventional arms imports to Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. The absolute 
amount of imports was still low, partly because the former French colonies remained within 
the French defense system. The arms trade between Europe and Africa was driven by 
economic motivations rather than political restrictions. As an example, in 1969 South Africa, 
which was under a UN arms embargo, imported more major conventional arms than the rest 
of sub-Saharan Africa combined.491 In 1971, former colonial powers were still the largest 
suppliers of major conventional arms to sub-Saharan Africa, whereas the Soviet Union and 
the USA together only accounted for 30 per cent of the supplies to the region. One 
explanatory factor was that European states, including France, Italy and the UK, supplied 
military aid programmes to former colonies and to states with a sizable resident minority of 
the donor’s nationals. Within these programmes, recipient states purchased weapons and the 
supplying state typically provided free training, advice or infrastructure.492 
 
 
Impact 
 
Small arms played a great role in African security, and insecurity, in the post-colonial period. 
In the early decades after African independence, changes in political leadership were seldom 
peaceful or democratic. Often carried out through the sudden, violent overthrow of an existing 
government by a small armed group, coups d’état were frequently carried out with small 
arms.493 Without public support, access to weapons was a necessary means for political elites 
to gain and reproduce political power in the post-colonial period (like it was for military elites 
in previous periods). In exchange for weapons, these ruling classes would transfer either state 
capital or, if funds were lacking, such as in the case of the Horn of Africa, partly give up 
national sovereignty–either in the form of direct transfers of control over territory (military 
bases or over-flight rights for military aircraft) or through the establishment of political 
clientage within alliance systems. One example was the Carter negotiation of an arms-for-
access agreement with Somalia.494  
 
The post-colonial state formation process included many residual legacies of colonial rule, 
often including ruling through violence and social, political and economic exclusion. The full 
complexity of various impacts cannot be covered in this thesis, but the post-colonial state 
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boundary provides an example. The vast literature supports the idea that the artificial makeup 
of nation-states in Africa poses serious problem for state building and peace. ‘Borders are not 
normally drawn by nature but by force, that is, by political power. The special nature of the 
African borders is that they did not enshrine the balance of power a posteriori but determined 
it a priori’. Political units and culturally homogeneous societies were pulled apart.495 
 
The artificial character of African post-colonial boundaries is clearly demonstrated by the fact 
that 44 per cent are made up of astronomical lines (meridian and parallels), 30 per cent of 
mathematical lines, and the remaining 26 per cent of geographical features.496 According to 
Craft and Smaldone, the partition of Africa has had fundamental impact on patterns in African 
conflicts. Because states in Africa were cobbled together or created by colonial powers to 
divide and rule, many domestic problems spill over across borders to irredentist ethnic groups 
in neighbouring countries. This historical condition means that analyses based on a separation 
between ‘interstate’ and ‘civil’ war in Africa are likely to be less revealing than more 
comprehensive and empirically grounded concepts of conflict.497 Another example is the 
problem of territorial control based on a central government. The European colonizers created 
urban centres designed to move power away from the interior towards the ocean. In 1900, as a 
result, 28 of 44 African colonial capitals were on the coast.498 
 
During post-colonial independence, African states maintained problems with extending their 
authority to thinly-spread rural populations over long distances, who in addition often sought 
to keep some authority over themselves.499 According to Daniel Bach, ‘The composition of 
the flows and the patterns of interaction [the informal networks] nurture are witness to the 
integrative legacy of inter-colonial frontiers’.500 After independence, the informal trade 
‘underwent an unchecked and spectacular expansion’, from mainly being a phenomenon in 
the border areas to penetrating states and former colonial blocks of states. This was enabled 
by weak territorial control and financial crises in many African states. The informal trans-
state trade is a hybrid phenomena, although it operates outside of government control, it 
receives support from officials and state bureaucracies, making it ‘grey’ trade.501 For small 
arms dynamics, this hybrid phenomenon is evident in, for example, bribes of customs officials 
or law enforcement, or government’s ‘reuse’ of seized weapons into their law enforcement or 
military stockpiles, or reselling them. 
 
 
Arms control 
 
After independence, arms import control, stockpile security and other forms of domestic arms 
control transferred back from the colonial regimes to the new African leadership. African 
states’ spheres of influence did not, however, extend to export controls on the supplier side. 
Furthermore, the fall of the League of Nations meant that there was no longer any 
international legal requirement for import consent on arms transfers by the sovereign 
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authority, nor any transparency requirement on states to regularly publish information on their 
arms transfers. As the data indicate, the number of suppliers also grew and diversified, 
making arms control more difficult–similar to the situation under the early imperial period.  
 
Decolonization led to the expansion of the UN membership from 51 members in 1945 to 126 
members in 1968, and subsequently the extension of the international right to national self-
defense to the independent Africa states. The sovereignty of the independent African states 
could no longer be questioned the way Ethiopia’s sovereignty was compromised during the 
League of Nations. Compared with the colonial period when African demand for small arms 
was denied by the colonial powers and by international law, Africa’s demand for small arms 
was largely acknowledged as legitimate after independence. 
 
Domestically, African states inherited arms control institutions from the colonial rulers, 
including national weapons registries, licensing systems and legislation. National arms control 
thus kept many of the former structures, institutions and practices from the colonial period, 
while their purpose and meaning changed. To enforce these must have been very challenging, 
given the frequency of civil war and violent regime change, although little information on 
how these were implemented exists. Many African states have only recently have started to 
revisit the colonial systems (see especially chapter 6).  
 
The cold war and its arms races, the shift in Western gravity from Europe to the USA and the 
subsequent rise of modernization theory as the mainstream Western discourse, also played 
favourable roles in liberalizing Africa’s arms imports. Slater distinguishes modernization 
theory from colonialism by the former’s emphasis on a benevolent and universal process of 
economic, political, social development, as well as a new partnership between free societies in 
the north and the south.502 Another distinction between the two systems was the change in 
emphasis from being primarily on values, practices and institutional arrangement during 
colonialism to focusing on political order and institutional control, supporting both 
militarization of the new states as well as violent interventions in the newly independent 
states.503  
 
At international level, the consolidation of key arms producers’ strategies towards arms trade 
and control in Africa, which was visible during the colonial period, again fell apart following 
decolonization, when national rivalry toppled any attempt at agreement. The arms race 
between the Soviet Union and the United States relocated the center of international arms 
production and trade from the former European colonial powers to the East-West divide.  
 
The lack of transparency of international small arms trade also made enforcement of arms 
control difficult. Although multilateral arms control was in short supply, the United Nations 
introduced another arms control measure: the arms embargo. Two arms embargoes were 
adopted, both targeting white minority regimes in Southern Africa. The first mandatory arms 
embargo agreed by the UN Security Council was on Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The 
arms embargo was imposed in response to the unilateral declaration of independence by white 
Rhodesians in 1965. The UN arms embargo on the apartheid regime in South Africa was 
adopted in 1977, building on the existing voluntary arms embargo, which was imposed in 
1963.504 The concept of arms embargoes draws on the denial strategies developed in the pre-
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colonial, imperial and colonial periods. A new feature was that white regimes were the 
subjects of the denial. The basis for denial strategies has partly shifted normative standards 
from supporting European expansion and domination, towards promoting self-determination 
(or, alternatively, to promote Soviet Union and the USA expansion and domination in the 
global south by exposing decolonized states to influence by the superpowers through their 
arms supplies). 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has sought to identify, describe and explain small arms import, security impact 
and control measures from the point of view of historical changes and continuities emplotted 
in Africa’s colonial experiences. From this narrative analysis, four arms control systems of 
practices have been identified.  
 
First was the pre-colonial (transoceanic gun-slave trade) system in which firearms were a 
global commodity central to economic and political development. On the one hand, a new 
form of African political organization and leadership formed, partly enabled by small arms 
imports, which used small arms control was used to centralize power and reduce threats from 
neighbouring polities. One the other hand, the overall economic benefits from the 
transoceanic trade prevailed over enforcing arms trade controls in the producing states, 
although some voices in Europe questioned arms trade from a normative standpoint and were 
concerned with trading with, for example, non-Christian Africans. Liberal trade theory 
emerged as the driving policy underpinning the international small arms trade, but was not the 
only discourse. The representation of Africa in Europe included the de-humanization of 
Africans during the slave trade and the rise of a humanist counter-movement, which also 
contained the necessary elements of paternalism and a sense of obligation to civilize the 
former slave peoples, which would become instrumental in the colonial period.  
 
Second was the imperialist period. When Africa’s influence and proportion of the global 
economy had decreased dramatically, and the position of the new military elites which had 
gained power during the transatlantic slave trade in large parts of Africa was reduced, the 
internal power structures of the continent were weakened. European weapon-producing states 
had incorporated the profits generated during the slave trade centuries, experienced an 
industrial revolution, emerging capitalism and advances in military technology, and could 
conquer and divide Africa. During the imperial period, several European states explored 
different options for a common strategy towards small arms trade and control in Africa. They 
generated a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Brussels Act and 
created several formalized procedures around the arms trade, such as end-use certificates and 
transit consent. Such initiatives were characterized by attempts at formalizing the trade in 
combination with discourses of a civilizing mission and responsibility to protect.  
 
Thirdly, the colonial period meant a harmonization among colonial powers’ arms control. At 
the international level, states adopted the Geneva Convention on the international arms trade 
and introduced annual arms trade registries under the League of Nations. At the national level, 
European colonial rulers introduced standardized procedures, including legislations, licensing 
systems and national firearms registries in the colonies. These developments were 
underpinned by colonial discourse of White supremacy and interest, denying for example 
African weapon ownership.  
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Finally, the de-colonial period was characterized by a return to the liberal arms trade with 
African states and non-state actors as trade partners, motivated by discourses of national self-
determination, state sovereignty ideals, the rise of modernization theory, and an embedding of 
Africa in the Cold War. Domestic colonial arms control practices survived de-colonization in 
national legislations as well as at the structural level, in for example the definitions of state 
borders and the informal economies in borderlands. At the international level, there was a 
collapse of the multilateral transparency regime. Instead, the UN introduced a new arms 
control system, the arms embargo. Building on the trade denial concept formulated in the 
imperial and colonial arms control practices, the arms embargoes encompassed both targeted 
sanctions and conditionality, which could be used to steer state behaviour, or even regime 
change, in importing states. 
 
Reflecting on the historical sequence, it appears as if the historical narrative on small arms in 
Africa is not simply one of change and continuity from one time period to the next, but rather 
a blurred sequence, perhaps most characterized by tidal or repetitive tendencies. Domestic 
arms control has partly been reactive to external pressures such as changes in technology and 
trade strategies in producing states, but also constitutive of the broader purpose of state-
making, whether this has been the centralization and militarization of West African polities 
during the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the creation of colonial regimes, or newly independent 
states. In spite of significant changes in arms control practices over time, many contingencies 
have also been recorded, not least the role of imperial power to shape and construct small 
arms practices. 
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Chapter 4. Small arms control in the period of neoliberal 
governance reform: overview and competing narratives  
 
Chapter 3 showed how small arms control is not a new phenomenon, but has developed over 
time in relation to changes in political organization and international political economy, 
including the international arms trade, while the specific form and significance of arms 
control practices have been shaped by wider political processes, North-South relations and 
colonial experiences in particular. What sets small arms control in Africa in the post-cold 
period apart from previous systems? Empirically, the biggest change between the past and the 
present is the rise of collective arms control, primary at the regional level. The trend of 
regional arms control is visible in four legally binding conventions that have been adopted in 
Africa since the early 2000s. However, the reasons for and meaning of this change are 
contested. Drawing on the mainstream literature, researchers find explanations related to the 
end of the cold war, globalization, the changing nature of conflicts, new emerging norms, and 
an unprecedented upswing in small arms transfers to conflicts. Although several of these 
explanations implicitly touch on changes in North-South relations, they are almost always 
divorced from the history of imperial power relations. As a counter-narrative, from a 
historical-relational approach, this chapter argues that the changes in African arms control is 
better explain not from a cold war/post-cold war categorization, but by a change from de-
colonization/post-colonial state building to neoliberal governance reform. This chapter will 
briefly discuss general developments in small arms imports, impact and control in Africa in 
the neoliberal governance era (the term neoliberal governance is explained on pp. 107-108). 
Although a detailed analysis of all four regional small arms conventions is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, the chapter aims to give an introductory overview of key agreements to 
illustrate that the developments in East and Central Africa, which will be explored in much 
more details in the subsequent chapters, are not isolated examples but rather part of a trend 
across the continent. The final section of the chapter considers two divergent theoretical 
explanations for the rationale and significance of the regionalization of small arms control. 
 
Small arms imports   
 
Whereas historians have provided multiple narratives to explain arms trade and arms impact 
on Africa in different historical periods, with different emphasis on, for example, the role of 
technology, domestic factors, cultural symbolism and European influence (chapter 3), what 
this thesis refers to as ‘small arms discourse’ or ‘mainstream small arms narrative’, has 
largely failed to engage with those historical narratives. In the 1990s and 2000s, a more 
homogenous narrative or discourse on small arms emerged. This narrative has presented two 
main hypotheses with regards to small arms trade: that the quantity and dynamics of the small 
arms trade in the post-cold war period was historically unprecedented; and that the negative 
impact of small arms on security was significantly greater post-cold war than at previous 
times. 
 
The dominant small arms narrative described the post-cold war period as characterized by 
intense proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW): 
 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is essentially a post-Cold War 
problem. While large quantities of small arms and light weapons were transferred into 
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the developing world during the Cold War, it is ironic that the problem of proliferation 
intensified as a result of its termination.505 
 
The intense spread of small arms in the 1990s, especially in Africa, made Michael Klare coin 
the term ‘the Kalashnikov Age’ to refer to the post-cold war period.506 Linda Darkwa argued 
that ‘the proliferation of SALWs in West Africa is traceable to the mid-to-late 1960s’.507 
Given, however, the reduction in governments’ control over small arms immediately 
following the Cold War, in combination with the fact that: 
 
West Africa was not a target for the proxy wars of the superpowers and did not 
witness the large-scale distribution of arms to Cold War satellite states … It can 
therefore be assumed that the majority of arms in circulation in the sub-region are 
relatively new and a product of post-Cold War dynamics.508  
 
According to Mike Bourne, ‘from the mid-1960s until 1989 … the now familiar global arms 
trade was born, supplanting the private trade in surplus arms and small grants by colonial 
powers that had fuelled limited SALW spread’.509 According to Bourne there was a dramatic 
increase in numbers of producers of SALW in the post-Cold War period, which is partially 
explained by the reemergence of private suppliers and a general diffusion of SALW 
technologies and stockpiles. This partly transformed the global SALW market, from a 
supplier-driven market to become more of a buyers’ market.510 
 
Hence the proliferation of small arms really took off after the end of the cold war, partly due 
to globalization and partly due to an upsurge in weapons stockpiles available for export. This 
is in direct contradiction of the historical evidence presented in chapter 3. Although historical 
sources and contemporary interpretations of them are fallible and may even be inflated, the 
notion that Africa’s small arms trade after the cold war is unprecedented simply does not hold 
up to historical comparison. Furthermore, as the mainstream narrative views the end of the 
cold war as the decisive moment for small arms proliferation in Africa, explanations linking 
the small arms problematique to the end of the cold war are close at hand. Several authors 
have emphasized the increase of small arms in Africa as a result of downsizing armed forces 
and changes in patterns of procurement in the north in the early 1990s. The former Soviet 
Union bloc in particular has been accused of dumping their surplus stockpiles of weapons and 
ammunition in states with ongoing conflicts after the end of the cold war, such as the DRC.511 
According to Amnesty International, Russia substantially increased its exports of Kalashnikov 
rifles to African countries in the period 1999-2002. Russian weapons have also reportedly 
found their way to conflict zones in Africa via third countries, commercial intermediaries or 
international brokers.512 One prominent example that the UN documented was how Victor 
Bout’s Air Cess company delivered arms clandestinely to the DRC which were paid for in 
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diamonds. Much of the weaponry allegedly involved originated in the former Soviet Union.513 
Africa as a whole has been reported to import weapons from Ukraine worth close to one 
billion USD annually, a figure which has been on the rise in the 2000s.514 The leading 
purchasers of Ukrainian weaponry in Africa are reportedly Sudan and the DRC, although one 
of the largest known deal in the past couple of decades was with Ethiopia. The weapons 
imported included both major conventional arms and small arms, including 10,000 
Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles. The state owned company, Ukrspetsexport, has not only 
sold products of the Ukrainian arms industry but also excess weaponry of the armed forces of 
Ukraine that it inherited from the Soviet army.515 From a historical perspective, the dumping 
of obsolete small arms resembles the decades after the introduction of the breech-loader 
technology in Europe (see chapter 3). Yet the argument that Africa is simply a dumpsite for 
obsolete weapons downplays the role that Africa initially played in the establishment and 
growth of the international small arms trade, including the European exporters’ dependency 
on African imports in a longer historical perspective. 
 
More generally, small arms proliferation has been connected to the intensification of 
globalization in the post-cold war period. Stemmet has argued that enhanced proliferation of 
small arms was realized through the increased post-cold war global interconnectedness in 
terms of trade, international finance and commerce, and developments in the aviation and 
shipping industries.516 While not in contradiction with the findings in chapter 3 on the growth 
of small arms trade in the transatlantic trade centuries, Stemmet’s ahistorical approach to the 
matter prevents an understanding of enablers to small arms proliferation as continuums. 
Furthermore, globalization is generally presented as an autonomous process ‘out there’ that 
states need to adjust themselves to. 
 
Although we cannot say how many small arms entered Africa since the end of the cold war, 
early estimates have been falsified. The United Nations and the African Union have 
previously estimated 100 million SALW in Africa (about 20 per cent of the world’s total).517 
The prices of Kalashnikovs in Africa were also reported to be the lowest in the world.518 The 
number of small arms in Africa and civilians’ cheap access to them has later been disputed. 
One recent estimate suggested that there are approximately 39 million SALW in all of 
continental Africa or three weapons for every 100 civilians, with an unknown number having 
been imported to Africa prior to the 1990s.519 Although often misquoted, it is likely that the 
majority of SALW currently in Africa entered the continent during, and not after, the Cold 
War. Phillip Killicoat has found that after controlling for other factors, the fall of the Soviet 
Union did not have a great impact on prices of Kalashnikov rifles and that the structural break 
in the global market for small arms as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union has been 
overstated. Killicoat’s explanation is the extraordinary ability of small arms to re-circulate, 
due to their particular technology and market dynamics. Since small arms are both light and 
durable goods they can be repeatedly sold from agent to agent over decades. During the Cold 
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War, even when the superpowers thought they were giving or selling weapons to their 
political allies, these weapons were regularly sold on to secondary markets that had no regard 
for the political stripe of the initial source of the weapon.520 Furthermore, the post-cold war 
narrative fails to acknowledge the continuum of small arms proliferation over time, and does 
not explain earlier upsurges in small arms imports in Africa during, for example, the pre-
colonial and de-colonial periods.  
 
Beyond its rather weak empirical basis, from a post-colonial perspective, the mainstream 
narrative also suggests a certain Western ideological logic that attributes arms proliferation in 
the global south to the former Soviet republics, and later China (see chapter 5 and 7). The role 
of key small arms supplying states to Africa, from liberal Western Europe to illiberal states 
such as the former communist soviet republics and China, is normally not portrayed by 
mainstream theories as carrying equal weight in terms of destabilizing impact. By focusing 
almost exclusively on what are framed as post-cold war transfers and ignoring historical arms 
transfers to the continent, the mainstream narrative successfully disconnects liberal states 
from responsibility for the harm caused by small arms. The separation of liberal states from 
the security problematique caused and associated with illicit small arms, and the framing of 
small arms as a problem located in an ‘illiberal space’ made up by undemocratic states and 
non-state actors, are foundational for arms control in the neoliberal governance period. Small 
arms transfers to countries in conflict become isolated to illiberal arms producers and 
informal markets, hence disassociating the insecurity from the liberal small arms trade and 
markets, while liberal states are free to provide the solution, including appropriate normative 
frameworks. According to Latham and Krause, this flattering self-image inclines Western 
policy-makers to play a lead role in shaping (and enforcing) arms control regimes and to 
believe that non-Western states are less well suited to play a lead role in global security 
issues.521 This narrative does not take previous systems of practices into account, nor can it 
see the underlying drivers or whether contemporary practices are reproductions of the past. 
 
 
Regionalization of small arms supply 
 
The second hypothesis put forward by the post-cold war narrative is that small arms are, to a 
growing extent, sourced regionally. Towards the turn of the millennium, the perception of the 
source of the African small arms problem changed, from producing states to importing states. 
Scholars such as Garcia have emphasised the ‘poor regulation of the intra-regional circulation 
of arms left over from conflicts during the Cold War, conflicts throughout the 1990s and 
afterwards, porous borders, and the unregulated activity of arms brokers’ in generating small 
arms proliferation.522 The regional supply of weapons is considered especially important in 
the illicit supply of small arms, which is the only type of transfer of real concern to, for 
example, the UN Security Council (see chapter 2). Africa’s assumed accumulation of small 
arms imports in the 1990s means that existing stocks can be used in further arms sales, and 
extensive new arms imports are not necessary to create destabilising surpluses or insecure 
stockpiles. To some extent this could be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the dangers 
inherent in small arm technology, but it is more typically avoided by reframing the issue from 
the technology itself to the management of the technology.  
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Several authors have listed the inability of African states to effectively manage their domestic 
stockpiles as one of the causes of illicit small arms proliferation. The risk of diversion from 
African state stockpiles is an issue of concern for the international community.523 Vines has 
argued that African rather than international actors are often the primary sources of arms and 
ammunition supply in Africa. Poor stockpile management, corruption and the recirculation of 
existing stocks of small arms ‘are all major factors, and yet African governments in particular, 
along with their international partners, tend to downplay these’.524 Vines further argues, 
however, that regional small arms transfer are at times strategic decisions, in which Africa’s 
regional geopolitics have caused African states and non-state groups to supply weapons to 
neighbouring states in conflict or to support armed rebellion to overthrow an opponent’s 
regime.525  
 
Bourne is probably the scholar who has conducted the most extensive research on small arms 
supply to conflicts. According to his research, the border areas are often the first territories 
over which governments lose control during conflict, increasing the risk of smuggling and 
arms trafficking across borders: ‘In regions where border zones are largely unmonitored 
actors from conflict-complexes can access arms markets in neighbouring states. Where a 
region is characterized by weak states, or the collusion, incapacity or nonchalance of regional 
governments, actors wishing to acquire arms can travel further to access larger stocks.’526 
Small-scale arms trafficking flourishes in informal cross-border economies, often based on 
transnational ethnic or religious communities.527 Finally, Bourne finds an overlap between 
arms proliferation and migration flows. Small arms have, for example, crossed borders with 
conflict-induced refugee flows.528  
 
Although a report by International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam and 
Saferworld showed that 95 per cent of weapons in Africa were produced elsewhere,529 
regional conflicts are likely to have influenced the flow of small arms, through changing 
demand patterns, demographic shifts, etc., just as African actors traded European-produced 
weapons in the pre-colonial and imperial periods. Part of the explanation is the diversion-
prone character of small arms, and so has little to do with the particular regional context of 
African states in the 2000s. Diversion from legal trade channels and stockpiles to illegal 
markets can thus be seen as a consequence of an oversized, growing legal market in 
combination with the technology itself and demand for small arms technology, rather than the 
inability of African states to manage that same technology. While it is likely that existing 
stocks of small arms recirculate at the sub-national and transnational level, including in border 
areas, this is not unique to Africa–it is, for example, a long standing problem for USA and 
Mexico.530 
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From a post-colonial perspective, the dominant narrative–although empirically not 
insignificant–does not allow the full story to surface. Moreover, explaining small arms 
problematique through the regionalization of arms supply, largely caused by lack of national 
capacities in specific regions, has had great impact on policy. As one example, in its only 
resolution specifically on SALW, the Security Council in 2013 emphasised ‘the importance of 
capacity building to address threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation 
and misuse of small arms and light weapons, especially in Africa’.531 With the change in the 
understanding of the ‘root cause’ of small arms proliferation in Africa came a growing 
expectation on arms control measures: beyond export control in producing states to arms 
control and border management in African states. The narrative then constitutes security 
practice by determining what sort of measures or interventions are necessary, including the 
formulation and enforcement of international small arms control.532 Policy formulations do 
not consider that prior external actions might have caused part of the problem to which 
interventions by the same group are deemed appropriate policy responses. 533 The problem of 
small arms supply, then, is portrayed as the unlawful circulation of small arms within and 
among importing states, rather than extensive legal production and liberal trade centred in the 
Euro-Atlantic region. From here, it is a short step to fault African national governments in 
creating what is perceived as extensive proliferation and destabilizing amounts of small arms 
in their region, while international actors are portrayed as the enforcers of rules and order. It 
further blurs issues of inequality and justice related to the international small arms trade, in 
which weapons are produced in the global North and exported to Africa, at times at 
significant profit, at other times for political gain, military technology development or to 
undermine local or national leaders. The assumption that small arms technology (and other 
military technology) is manageable, while downplaying the gains generated by the producing 
and exporting states and companies, is central for the narrative presented by neoliberal 
governance. 
 
Small arms and contemporary armed conflicts in Africa  
 
The small arms security impacts that were described in chapter 1.2 related mainly to the post-
cold war era, and therefore this section will only provide a brief additional example from 
armed conflicts in Africa. The small arms narrative emerging internationally in the mid-1990s 
coincided with several violent conflicts in Africa, including the genocide in Rwanda, civil 
wars in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, inter-state war between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia and the collapse of government in Somalia. Africa has overwhelmingly 
carried the burden of global conflicts, and while overall armed conflicts have declined 
globally since the mid-1990s, Africa has not followed this trend. In Africa, the number of 
conflicts has fluctuated since the mid-1970s, with 1991, the period between 1997 and 2002, 
and 2011 all having more than 15 conflicts per year.534 The number of armed conflicts in 
Africa increased from 11 conflicts in 1989 to 16 conflicts in 1998.535 Importantly, Africa has 
                                                
531 United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2117, 26 Sep. 2013. 
532 Dalby, Simon (2013), ‘Challenging cartographies of enmity: empire, war and culture in contemporary 
militarization’, in Militarism and international relations in the twenty-first century: Political Economy, Security 
and Theory (New York: Routledge), p. 34. 
533 Dalby (2013), ‘Challenging cartographies of enmity, p. 39. 
534 Brosché, Johan and Höglund, Kristine (2015), ‘The diversity of peace and war in Africa’, in SIPRI Yearbook 
2015 (Oxford University Press: Oxford), pp. 110-121. 
535 Ratsimbaharison, Adrien (2011), ‘Greed and Civil War in Post–Cold War Africa: Revisiting the Greed 
Theory of Civil War’, African Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 269. 
 96 
experienced 75 per cent of the world’s conflicts between non-state groups since 1989. In the 
period 1989-2014, Africa experienced 86 per cent of 250 communal conflicts identified in the 
world. For the same time period, more than 90 per cent of the fatalities in violence 
deliberately targeting civilians have been in Africa.536 Furthermore, African opposition groups 
have grown increasingly successful at the end of conflict. Whereas rebel groups stood as the 
winner in only 15 per cent of the conflicts between 1946 and 1980, between 1981 and 2012, 
the rebels prevailed over the government in 45 per cent of the recorded victories.537  
 
 
The ’new wars’ narrative 
 
One central concept in the small arms discourse regarding impact is that an intensified spread 
of small arms in the post-cold war period has enabled changes in the nature of violence and 
conflict, creating so-called ‘new wars’. The new wars concept is the most influential theme in 
research on conflicts and warfare in the post-cold war period.538 It emphasizes the changing 
dynamics in armed conflict before and after the cold war, from formal large inter-state wars 
fought by armies and financed through taxes, to informal, local, blurred violence financed 
through informal financial markets.539 It is hard to imagine how such conflicts would play out 
without access to individual non-sanctioned weapons such as small arms. Surely, groups do 
use, for example, improvised explosive devices in asymmetric warfare, but these are not 
suitable for every application, lacking accuracy, among other factors. For the leading small 
arms narrative, the conflict pattern of new wars is characterized by the relative increase in 
power of non-state actors vis-à-vis states, partly due to weak or absent state control systems 
and porous state borders, and in combination with the intensified proliferation of small arms 
into the hands of non-state actors and warlords.540  
 
Several scholars have argued that the insertion of small arms into conflicts in the post-cold 
war period has had a fundamental impact on violence, especially those conflicts which are 
fought in the global south. Rogers has for example argued that:  
 
Small arms also help to transform the nature of some contemporary conflicts. When 
bearer of these weapons find themselves yielding power and influence otherwise 
disproportionate to their status, the dynamic and scope of hostilities can be radically 
altered. In the wake of the Cold War especially, small arms function as vehicles not 
only for local violence but also for internationalizing violence.541  
 
According to Hartung, small arms proliferation in the post Cold War era into ‘regions of 
tension’ has been a key contributing factor to the transformation of warfare into a ‘grisly new 
form of mass slaughter’.542 Small Arms Survey further argues: 
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the humanitarian impacts [of small arms] are escalating in magnitude and severity 
chiefly as a result of new wars. In contrast to the past, civilians constitute a 
disproportionate number of both combatants and victims in these conflicts, wars 
whose dynamics are determined primarily by the availability and use of small arms. 
Recognition of the persistence of these new wars has triggered a revitalized rights-
based response from the human rights and humanitarian community.543 [Emphases 
added]  
 
The changing pattern in small arms proliferation has been so dramatic that it is in itself 
considered a constituting force of new wars: 
 
The casualties of today’s new wars are overwhelmingly a consequence not of heavy 
conventional weapons, missiles, or even landmines, but rather of lightweight and 
highly mobile small arms. The virulence of armed conflict and criminal violence is 
increasing as a result of newly introduced technology and the cascading of older 
stockpiled weapons.544[Emphases added] 
 
Again, the narrative’s central assumption lays the basis for international policy. The UN has 
noted that the majority of the armed conflicts in Africa in the post-cold war period have been 
fought primarily with small arms.545 When UN Secretary–General Ban Ki-moon introduced 
the UN Security Council’s first global resolution dedicated exclusively to the issue of SALW 
in September 2013, he noted ‘the significance of small arms and light weapons as the most 
frequently used weapons in the majority of recent armed conflicts’.546 [Emphases added] 
When the new war concept is applied to data on conflict trends, it is a short leap to argue that 
new forms of small arms proliferation and diffusion to non-state actors are causing the 
African conflict pattern. 
 
 
Counter-narrative: ‘the shock of the old’ 
 
Like the claims of arms proliferation in Africa in the post-cold war period, the new wars 
narrative can be challenged on both empirical and ideological terms. The new wars concept 
has been criticised for its inflated claims of novelty. Edward Newman has for example 
criticised its lack of historical comparison: ‘the problem with much of the literature is not in 
its analysis of contemporary conflict; rather, it is in suggesting that this is distinct from the 
past.’547 According to Newton, the nature, causes or impact of wars have not changed much 
over the last 100 years. What have changed are media coverage, public attention and 
contemporary Western society’s understanding of conflict.548 Lack of reliable data, especially 
for earlier periods, and the increased visibility of international issues often downplay the fact 
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that it is not a new security issue.549 Stathis Kalyvas has analysed the distinction between old 
and new civil war in the forms of dichotomies in the leading narrative. He argues that old 
wars are primarily described as political or ideological and new wars are primarily described 
as criminal and predatory.550 Rather than describing actual change in the motivations or 
dynamics of conflict, such dichotomies are examples of securitizing uneven development.551 
The new wars concept neglects that violence and modern development have always been 
interwoven. According to Slater, it is not the absence of modernity that leads to political 
disorder, but the diffusion of modernity throughout the world that has increased the 
prevalence of violence.552 
 
A post-colonial critique of the new wars concept situates its basis in the Western experience, 
and assumes ‘the public–private distinction to be universal and thus to have broken down or 
been weakened in various parts of the South’. Stavrianakis points out that ‘what never existed, 
or developed in a very different fashion, cannot be said to have broken down or been 
weakened.’553. Boas and Bibb characterize the African state as fundamentally different from 
the Westphalian state, building among other things on a lack of differentiation between the 
public and private spheres of governance.554 Historical-Relational perspectives tend to see 
Africa’s conflict pattern as deeply affected by the history of the African state system and 
Africa’s ‘asymmetrical interaction with the North through histories of imperialism rather than 
an intrinsic weakness’.555  
 
The role of colonial powers and, since decolonization, external patrons, has been 
crucial in shaping the institutional and material basis of the state in the South, often 
leading to authoritarian and violent forms of rule. Arms purchases and the privileging 
of the military historically provided a coercive backbone to state apparatuses, 
protecting elites against potentially restive publics and providing the stability and 
predictability necessary for international capital to circulate.556  
 
The ‘new war’ and ‘failed states’ discourses have been fundamental in motivating external 
interventions in African conflicts. Nine out of the current 16 UN peacekeeping missions and 
half of the EU missions are in Africa.557 Since 1992, out of 46 UN Missions, 25 have been in 
Africa.558  Furthermore, the external involvement in African conflict management goes much 
beyond these missions and includes broader measures and programmes for security sector 
reform as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. From this perspective 
security governance relates to broader ‘good governance’ reform programmes, including 
economic and political reform. 
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In spite of the elaborate counter-narratives to new wars, none of its critics have specifically 
concentrated on the claims related to the novelty of small arms centrality in contemporary 
violent conflicts. Simon Dalby, who is otherwise critical of the new wars discourse, has stated 
that: ‘the geography of violence, and the technological means of its application have changed 
very substantially since the Cold War.’559 Just as the continuum of other forms of violence is 
hidden in the new wars discourse560, the assumption of a radical break in small arms dynamics 
before and after the cold war also masks a continuum in small arms violence, arms trade and 
control practices embedded in North-South relations. 
 
 
International small arms control 
 
There have been many developments in small arms control under the United Nations since the 
end of the cold war. It will be argued that these developments constitute and define an era of 
small arms control. Although there is not enough space to fully describe all the developments 
here, a couple of points can be made. First, since the end of the Cold War, 24 more binding 
arms embargos have been adopted by the UN Security Council, half of them targeting actors 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Realists would likely point to the change in the international divisions 
of power to explain the reinvigoration of the UN Security Council after the cold war, as 
enabling the use of international arms embargoes more broadly. Although this is a valid point, 
the Security Council did not invent the arms embargo. It is an old practice, targeting for 
example Ethiopia in the early 20th century and underpinned broader imperial small arms 
control regimes such as the Brussels Act (see chapter 3). The reinvigoration of the Security 
Council does not explain the specific form of trade access denial, why arms imports by certain 
regimes are problematized, or why African regimes are typically targets of such strategies. 
For many African regimes, international arms control clearly has not been in their interest, 
contrary to traditional ‘rational choice’ arms control theories. Besides the use of arms 
embargoes, a growing number of transparency and control measures, voluntary or legally 
binding, have been established. What started with an attempt to restore some of the 
transparency which was lost during the Cold War–through the creation of the United Nations 
Register of Conventional Arms in 1991–has developed beyond that, with several politically 
binding initiatives and two legally binding UN treaties: the Firearms Protocol and the Arms 
Trade Treaty. In spite of these developments, the largest development in African arms control 
has been the rise of small arms control at the regional level. 
 
 
An overview of Africa’s regional arms control conventions561 
 
A framework for international control of small arms in Africa was created over roughly a 
decade. This framework has arguably developed, in part, in regional responses to two main 
United Nations instruments to control small arms: the 2001 UN Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects (POA) and the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol.562 The first steps in the regional 
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framework were made in 2000 when the Organization of African Unity compiled a common 
African position on the trafficking and proliferation of SALW in which African states 
committed themselves to combating the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of 
SALW at the regional and subregional levels.563 The framing of SALW by the African Union 
(AU) indicates a great deal of convergence with the dominant narrative. 
 
Since then, the African Union (AU), which replaced the Organization of African Unity in 
2002, has been unable to adopt any SALW control measures. While the AU–Regions Steering 
Committee on SALW, created in 2008, has been tasked with trying to achieve a common 
African position in advance of UN processes, even this has proven to be difficult. For 
example, the AU was unable to agree on a common position on the arms trade treaty (ATT) 
negotiations in July 2012, largely due to disagreements between North African states and sub-
Saharan African states.564 In the absence of Africa-wide agreements, interesting developments 
have been taking place in regional bodies, and these often surpass global instruments.565  
 
Four arms control agreements have been adopted, mainly under the aegis of regional 
economic communities (see box 1): the 2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, 
Ammunition and other related Materials in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Region; the 2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (involving 
the East African Community); the 2006 Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other 
Related Materials; and the 2010 Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, Parts and Components that can be used for their 
Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, known as the Kinshasa Convention (signed by Rwanda 
and the 10 member states of the Communauté Économiques d’États de l’Afrique Centrale, 
CEEAC, Economic Community of Central African States).566 These African regional 
agreements are broad in terms of content: they cover the criminalization of the unauthorized 
production and possession of SALW, promote the destruction of stocks of surplus weapons, 
and introduce tighter control over weapon stockpiles and arms transfers. In terms of scope, 
they are typically more far-reaching than those made on other continents.567 
 
The regional instruments are closely interlinked with state-building and regional integration in 
Africa. The objective of bringing different parts of government—such as military services, 
police and customs agencies—into closer cooperation directly feeds into both these processes. 
The agreements aim to strengthen the capacities of the state (especially law enforcement 
capacities), while not imposing restrictions on states’ military capabilities. Similarly, as 
regards transparency, the agreements take a common approach to verifying national 
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implementation, including transfer controls and stockpile destruction. However, they do not 
require transparency on defence policy, doctrines or budgets. One consequence of this set-up 
is the lack of common initiatives to impose controls on major conventional arms in Africa. 
 
Implementation is uneven in terms of how far the states parties have advanced in harmonizing 
legislation and developing national action plans, and the extent to which the parties have 
coordinated their national responses and taken responsibility for implementation of the 
agreements. While examples of more far-reaching implementation exist at the national level 
(e.g. in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda), the regional agreements are typically portrayed as facing 
three broad challenges: capacity and resource constraints, fluctuating political momentum 
from domestic leadership and dependency on external financial support. Such challenges have 
been felt in the regional bodies that have been set up to coordinate, facilitate and monitor 
implementation.  
 
The ECOWAS Treaty was signed in 1975, but included no provisions on security. In 1981 the 
member states signed the ‘Protocol on mutual assistance on defence’, which called for 
collective action in times of civil and interstate conflicts.568 In 1998, member states adopted 
the politically binding ECOWAS Moratorium.569 The document states in its preamble that the 
proliferation of SALW constitutes a major destabilizing factor in ECOWAS member states 
and poses a serious threat to the peace and stability of their peoples. The states declared that 
the proliferation of SALW was crucial in prolonging armed conflicts and the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources. In 2007 the ECOWAS Advisory Board on SALW was 
created with a mandate to provide advice to the contracting parties to the Moratorium and 
develop strategic partnerships with donors, governments, intergovernmental organisations and 
specialised agencies. The ECOWAS Convention followed from the moratorium as a legally 
binding commitment of states in the region to control SALW. It entered into force in 2009. 
The convention’s provisions include a consultation mechanism on imports and transfers of 
small arms involving the ECOWAS Commission and regional states.570 Following the 
adoption of the Convention, ECOWAS established a Small Arms Unit in the ECOWAS 
Commission as well as a dedicated programme for implementation jointly with the UN 
Development Programme, the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP). With 
external support, ECOSAP has supported member states in the following ways: (a) by 
supporting national surveys on the distribution of SALW, stockpile management issues and 
knowledge, as well as on attitudes to and perception of SALW issues; (b) by holding 
capacity-building workshops for representatives from member states’ armed forces and police 
on stockpile management, including record keeping and accident prevention; and (c) by 
consulting on the development of a guide for the harmonization of national SALW legislation 
in West Africa.571 In 2011 ECOWAS voted to extend ECOSAP while the donors decided to 
stop supporting it, causing a deadlock in the programme. Furthermore, the overlapping 
mandate of the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit and ECOSAP has triggered disputes between the 
two institutions. 
 
                                                
568 O’brien, David (2000), ‘The search for subsidiarity: The UN, African regional organizations and 
humanitarian action’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 67. 
569 Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa, 
Abuja, 31 Oct. 1998. 
570 Bourne, Mike (2012), ‘Guns don't kill people, cyborgs do: a Latourian provocation for transformatory arms 
control and disarmament’, Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & 
Global Change, Vol.  24, No. 1, p. 153. 
571 United Nations, Programme of Action, Implementation Support System, PoA-ISS, ‘Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS)’, <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/7.aspx>. 
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France, UK and the European Commission were key funders of the ECOWAS moratorium in 
the late 1990s.572 France, for example, contributed close to half a million Euro to the 
ECOWAS moratorium through the Programme for coordination and assistance for security 
and development.573 In 2002 the EU decided to seek consensus on SALW in regional and 
international forum, as well as in ‘affected’ states.574 In 2004, the Council of the EU 
committed 515,000 Euro in support of ECOWAS in order to ‘[set] up the Light Weapons Unit 
within the ECOWAS Technical Secretariat and [convert] the Moratorium into a Convention 
on small arms and light weapons between the ECOWAS Member States.’ Furthermore, ‘The 
European Union considered that a financial contribution and technical assistance would help 
to consolidate the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) initiative 
concerning small arms and light weapons’.575 Later, the Council Decision ‘was considered 
very successful’ by the EU as it led to the signing of the ECOWAS Convention in 2006, 
demonstrating the EU’s intentional involvement in the region with the goal to set up a 
regional, legally binding small arms control regime within ECOWAS. This Council Decision 
was later known for leading to a court case over competences in the EU.576 The court case has 
received far more attention than the role of the EU in shaping and pushing the ECOWAS 
Convention on small arms. 
 
In 2005 the state parties to the Nairobi Protocol established the Regional Centre on Small 
Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) to 
support the implementation of the Protocol. In 2012 RECSA provided assistance to member 
states in a number of areas, including arms destruction, support to develop national action 
plans (in the DRC and Malawi), capacity building related to gender mainstreaming and 
enhanced inter-agency cooperation on SALW, for review of national legislation (in Kenya 
and Tanzania), development of a manual on public awareness on SALW in local counties (in 
Kenya), and establishment of a researchers’ forum to examine causes and possible solutions 
for conflicts in the region.577 RECSA’s activities extended to other regions, where they 
included purchasing arms-marking machines for four West African countries (Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Mali and Togo); organizing arms marking and electronic record keeping in three West 
African countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo); capacity-building on SALW for law 
enforcement agencies, civil society, media and parliamentarians (in East, Southern and West 
Africa); and facilitation of the establishment of joint cross-border task forces on SALW in the 
RECSA and SADC regions.578 RECSA’s activities have almost exclusively been funded by 
external partners. In the past RECSA has been criticized for inadequate sensitivity to national 
needs and for lacking a systematic approach, allegedly demonstrated by its provision of two 
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weapon-marking machines to Southern Sudan in 2010 that were delivered without the 
necessary database software, obviously limiting the usefulness of the machines.579 
 
The Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) Legal 
Subcommittee developed the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and 
Other Related Materials, which was signed in 2001. Its aim echoes that of the declaration (and 
the dominant narrative): to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture, excessive 
and destabilising accumulation, possession and use of firearms, ammunition and other related 
materials. It is a legal instrument containing binding rights and obligations. The SADC 
Protocol was the first legally binding treaty formulated to control and regulate small arms in 
Africa. It came into force in November 2004. Angola, the DRC and Madagascar are countries 
that still have to ratify the Protocol. The legally binding SADC Protocol on the Control of 
Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials of 2001 commits its member states to 
implement legislation to control the activities of arms brokers in their territories. Unlike in 
West and East Africa, SADC mainly developed its firearms protocol for crime prevention 
purposes, following the adoption of the UN Firearms Protocol. SARPCCO is also its 
implementing agency.580 In November 2012 SADC launched its revised five-year 
Harmonised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security 
Cooperation, which is intended to advance cooperation in five broad sectors: politics, defense, 
state security, public security and police.581 The control of SALW could serve as a cross-
cutting issue on these five themes.582  
 
The SADC has historically relied on high levels of donor funding to sustain both the 
organisation and its programme. The SADC secretariat was, for example, staffed by British 
nationals in the early years.583 The 2012 report of donor funding shows that international 
funds continue to account for a large proportion of the SADC budget (72 per cent). The EU 
acts as the lead international cooperating partner (ICP) within the SADC–ICP Joint Task 
Force, an institutional feature introduced within the SADC in 2003, which has embedded 
international donors within the organisation.584 Recent EU grants included €36 million to the 
SADC Secretariat, of which €18 million was earmarked for regional political co-operation. In 
particular, it is aimed at improving the capacity and performance of SADC in terms of 
politics, governance and regional peace and security. There is also a technical cooperation 
facility component of €6 million granted to improve the coordination, harmonisation and 
development of national-regional linkages.585 In 1998, SADC and the EU adopted the 
Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking, providing a framework for 
action on illicit trafficking, strengthening of legal controls of arms transfers, removal of arms 
from society and enhancing transparency. In 1999, an EU-SADC Working Group on small 
arms was established, which met for the first time in June 2000. The aim of the meeting of the 
                                                
579 Bromley, Mark et al. (Jan. 2013), ‘Transfers of small arms and light weapons to fragile states: strengthening 
oversight and control’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no 2013/1, (SIPRI: Stockholm), pp. 13–14. 
580 Stott (2003), ‘Implementing the Southern Africa Firearms Protocol’, p. 2. 
581 Southern African Development Community, Harmonised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation, 5 Aug. 2010, <http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/SADC_SIPO_II__Final.pdf>; and Southern African Development Community, ‘Launch of 
the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) II, Arusha, Tanzania’, 23 Nov. 2012, 
<http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/launch-strategic-indicative-plan-organ-sipo-ii-arusha-tanzan/>. 
582 Motsamai, D., ‘SADC 2012 launch of the revised SIPO II: new hopes, old challenges’, Institute for Security 
Studies, 22 Nov. 2012, <http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1570-2>.  
583 Buzdugan (2013): Regionalism from without, p. 12. 
584 Buzdugan (2013): Regionalism from without, p. 6. 
585 Motsamai, ‘SADC 2012 Launch of the Revised SIPO II’, 22 Nov. 2012. 
 104 
Working Group was areas of ‘concrete co-operation’ and preparations for the UN 2001 
Conference on the Programme of Action.586 
 
The Kinshasa Convention was elaborated by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and 
Disarmament in Africa, hence arguably under less local leadership than the other three 
regional conventions. It was signed in Brazzaville at a Ministerial Meeting of the UN 
Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The Convention will 
come into force once ratified by six signatories, filling a significant gap in the geographical 
coverage of small arms conventions in Africa. Although the Kinshasa Convention has not yet 
entered into force, CEEAC has nonetheless established a unit to provide pre-ratification 
assistance on the convention’s provisions. While heavily financially supported by the EU, 
CEEAC (and its SALW Unit) is considered as struggling to build the necessary confidence, 
stability and capacities in the conflict-ridden Central African region to advance cooperation 
and national implementation. In the mean time, overlapping membership means that at least 
one of the three other agreements already applies to most signatories to the Kinshasa 
Convention.  According to Radil and Flint, increased state-to-state cooperation beginning in 
1998 in Central Africa reflected part of the peace process in the region as states began to 
commit themselves to non-aggression, first through a series of temporary ceasefires, then 
through treaties that strove to permanently end the wars. However, this process of unbundling 
and reterritorializing security obligations beyond the territory of a given state only took place 
once the regional democratic reform process was well established and underway.587 An 
overarching security challenge lies arguably in the internal political instability of Central 
African states. Weak political legitimacy leading to fragile social cohesion threatens the 
stability of political structures and challenges the capabilities of state institutions. This 
strengthens centrifugal tendencies, while reducing the reach of governments essentially to 
capitals and their immediate vicinity. Moreover, in post-conflict settings, the difficulty of 
reaching arrangements and agreements between former conflicting parties impedes the peace 
process, while the limited willingness of political actors to compromise and build consensus 
also challenges the relative stability in other states.588 
 
 
 
Box 1. Subregional arms control agreements in Africa 
Protocol on the Control of  Firearms, Ammunition and other related Materials in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Region  
Signed at Blantyre on 14 August 2001; entered into force on 8 November 2004; depositary SADC Executive 
Secretary  
Parties as of July 2011 (11): Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
Signed but not ratified (1): Congo (Democratic Republic), Seychelles* 
Not signed, not ratified (2): Angola, Madagascar 
* Seychelles signed the protocol in 2001, but had not ratified by the time of its withdrawal from SADC in 
2004. It re-joined SADC in 2008. 
Protocol text: SADC, <http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol_on_the_Control_of_Firearms_Ammunition2001.pdf> 
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Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the 
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 
Signed at Nairobi on 21 April 2004; entered into force on 5 May 2006; depositary Regional Centre on Small 
Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA)  
Parties as of July 2012 (9): Burundi, Congo (Democratic Republic), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Uganda 
Signed but not ratified (6): Central African Republic, Congo (Republic), Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Tanzania  
Protocol text: RECSA, <http://www.recsasec.org/publications/Nairobi_Protocal.pdf>  
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related 
Materials 
Adopted by the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at Abuja, on 14 
June 2006; entered into force on 29 September 2009; depositary President of the ECOWAS Commission 
Parties as of December 2012 (11): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Signed but not ratified (4): Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau 
Convention text: ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme, <http://www.ecosap.ecowas.int/>  
Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and 
All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa 
Convention) 
Adopted at Kinshasa on 30 April 2010; opened for signature at Brazzaville on 19 November 2010; not in force; 
depositary UN Secretary-General 
Ratifications deposited as of December 2012 (4): Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic), Gabon 
Signed but not ratified (7): Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo (Democratic Republic), Equatorial Guinea, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe 
Convention text: United Nations Treaty Collection, <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/CTCTreaties.aspx?id=26>  
 
Regionalization of arms control: a plausible liberal institutionalist explanation 
 
Earlier sections in this chapter and in chapter 2 showed how a dominant narrative links small 
arms to influential themes such as unprecedented illicit small arms proliferation, new wars 
and failed states, which describe small arms as an emerging global threat with an especially 
great negative impact on African security. Given the inflated novelty, historical inaccuracy 
and western bias in such conceptualizations of small arms, this section considers broadening 
the leading narrative on small arms to generate another plausible explanation for the 
development of regional arms control in Africa in the past two decades, provided by the 
theory family of liberal institutionalism. The liberal theories emphasize on trends underlined 
in the small arms narrative, including interdependence, globalization and regionalization. This 
is also the paradigm most closely associated with neo-liberal policy, which this thesis defines 
as the contemporary system of small arms practices (see next section).  
 
According to Hout, regional regimes have emerged in the specific global post-cold war 
context characterized by multi-polarity, increased globalization and superpowers’ reduced 
interest in intervening in local, national or regional security.589 The motivation for regional 
cooperation on small arms, like all security cooperation, is enacted by common security 
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concerns in this specific context.590 The immediate regional environment determines the 
security concerns of states, including the security threats caused by small arms proliferation. 
Accordingly, different regions will have their own specific dynamics of arms control, arising 
both from their global roles and local opportunities and pressures.591 Furthermore, military 
threats, including weapons, travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.592 
Within liberal institutionalism, many have emphasized the comparative advantage of regional 
institutions arising from their interest in, and knowledge of, local conditions.593 States within 
the same region are more likely to suffer the political, economic and social consequences of 
conflict or insecurity in a neighbouring state. Conflicts might spill over and have negative 
effects on foreign investments, increase migration flows (of both civilians and combatants) 
and cut off trade routes.594 Furthermore, regional cooperation may strengthen the 
effectiveness of political action and the credibility and legitimacy of states’ actions by making 
more effective use of resources through pooling, raising national standards and strengthening 
confidence in the region, which may lead to increased cooperation or trade in the future.595  
 
security concerns are seen as causal factors that force countries to cooperate because 
of the risk of the regionalisation of conflict. By this I mean both the outward spread or 
spillover of a local conflict into neighbouring countries, and the inward impact from 
the region in the form of diplomatic interference, military intervention and, preferably, 
conflict resolution carried out by some kind of regional body.596 
 
Gahlaut and Zaborsky argue that smaller regimes of a limited group with shared interests, 
such as the international export control regimes, are more effective compared to regimes with 
expanded membership, since it is easier to reach consensus decisions on any issue.597 They 
further argue that: 
 
If the goal is coordination, then the arrangement should be worked out among states 
with similar political, economic and technological interests. They do not require a 
treaty, because they can work together quite well in an informal setting. … a group of 
like-minded nations … Those nations did not require broad bargains to be struck, nor 
side-payments made, because they had roughly similar interests and objectives.598 
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Regional political platforms may also help states advance their interest in international 
settings.599 The assumption is that states with weak capacities are more likely to cooperate in 
order to punch above their weight. At the same time, lack of capacity in domestic institutions 
is considered a constraint for international cooperation. Inadequate state-building and the 
failure of many states to build proper security systems and accountable democratic political 
systems are recurring factors in African security studies. Hence, a plausible liberal 
institutionalist explanation of the development of regional arms control conventions and 
institutions in Africa instead of international small arms control, disarmament or no arms 
control lies in states’ choices to address certain urgent problem in times of interdependence 
(weak borders, intensified international arms proliferation, increase in terrorism). Thus, the 
regional regimes developed independently of historical processes and mostly without external 
involvement. Primarily, the change from arms control at the national level to the regional 
level was due to the inefficiency of national solutions to a transnational problem. 
Institutionalists using this kind of functional explanation often assume that the initial origins 
of an institution can be explained teleologically by the beneficial effects the institution brings 
to a system after it is created.600  
 
Regionalization of small arms control: the historical-relational perspective 
 
The Historical-Relational perspective’s plausible explanation of the emergence of regional 
arms control practices in Africa is radically different from the liberal institutionalists, both in 
its rationale, meaning and expected outcomes. The historical-relational perspective views the 
rise of regional arms control in Africa not as a direct response to allegedly changing small 
arms dynamics in Africa or assumptions about the future beneficial effects of such regimes, 
but as a result of a shift in political organization and political economy from de-colonial arms 
control practices to an era of neoliberal governance. Neoliberal reform started in the 1980s 
with an emphasis on free trade, open economies, private-sector development and outward 
economic orientation with growing regional integration, and later came to further encompass 
good governance and development of civil society. As a policy it is based on assumptions 
about self-regulating markets, the primacy of private property and possession, a minimal role 
for the state, and the cultural superiority of the West.601   
 
The prefix ‘neo’ before liberalism is contested in the African context as it implies a ‘second 
wave’ of liberalism, while it can be questioned whether there ever was a first wave of 
(classical) liberalism broadly recognized on the continent. Any adequate account of the 
second coming of liberalism must explain what it is that is distinctly ‘neo’ about it, while 
identifying social forces and agents that were involved in its (re)construction and 
development.602 One the other hand, several researchers use the term neo-liberalism to refer 
not to the second wave of liberalism in Africa, but rather to a specific interventionist policy 
for political and economic reform put forward by international organizations and the West, 
which has gained both domestic ownership as well as resistance in Africa. Such approaches 
have defined ‘neoliberalization’ as a reform from (developmental) government to governance 
entailing a new array of qualitatively transformed and geographically distinctive state/market 
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relations. 603 Phillips and Ilcan have analysed the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s 
capacity-building programmes for food security targeting farmers in the global south by using 
the concept of neoliberal governance and concluded that the programmes resulted in the 
promotion of entrepreneurial communities that link people and markets in new ways.604  
 
Phillips and Ilcan relate the concept of neoliberal governance ‘to ways of governing 
populations that make individuals responsible for changes that are occurring in their 
communities’.605 To them, neoliberal governance depends on a diverse array of capacity-
building arrangements that link the production and consumption of goods and services. The 
capacity to be responsible is achieved through the development and circulation of market-
based partnerships.606 As a result, certain relationships previously conceived as unequal are 
re-aligned as ‘partnerships’.607 Neoliberal governance processes are structured by the logic of 
modernization theories and built on prior social hierarchies associated with colonial order, but 
have been rearticulated to regional post-colonial social hierarchies.608 
 
While the neoliberal governance reform programmes, especially as an interventionist policy 
in the global south, have been frequently discussed in the literature, none of the previous 
studies have yet applied the concept to small arms control, to analyse what neoliberal 
governance reform means for small arms control. 
 
One part of the neoliberal governance agenda for Africa has been a general push by the 
international economic community for regional solutions. Gibb found that economic regional 
integration in Africa has been driven by a Western development discourse, especially aimed 
at market integration.609 Since the 1990s, African regional institutions and strategies have 
expanded widely and by 2007 Africa had 130 inter-governmental organizations established to 
‘promote cooperation and unity.’610 The regional push has come not only from the 
international financial institutions but also from national Western governments and civil 
society, and not least the EU: 
 
The appeal of regionalism is, for many policy makers in Africa, geographically 
intuitive. Colonialism created an extremely fragmented state system which, combined 
with economic and political marginality, has encouraged the formation of a large 
number of inter-state organisations and institutions. In addition, multilateral agencies, 
non-governmental organisations, donor communities and national governments are 
united in their calls for some form of regional integration. With a few notable 
exceptions, there is a remarkable degree of consensus that regionalism is not only 
desirable but necessary.611 
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ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC, now in charge of small arms control, started as unions for 
economic cooperation under European colonialism. Although the historical-relational 
perspective has not yet been used to analyse regional arms control in Africa, aspects of the 
perspective have been used in the literature on African regionalism. Stephen Robert 
Buzdugan has for example studied how the EU has shaped SADC.612  
 
international actors such as the EU play a direct role in the definition and activities of 
the region due to its historical relations with dominant international actors and its 
economic and political weaknesses in the world order. Therefore, this article argues 
that interregionalism in this case is not one of the EU and the SADC (or one of ‘core’ 
and ‘periphery’) but rather one of the EU within the SADC.613  
 
Similarly, African small arms control does not necessarily imply African initiative or 
ownership, but refers rather to arms control that in some way limits, restricts or determines 
the management of small arms in Africa. This does not mean that there is no engagement or 
leadership by African stakeholders, but that small arms control in Africa cannot be fully 
understood by applying an inward-focused theoretical framework, assuming a given external 
environment ‘out there’. According to Bach, institution-building in the field of security offers 
new outlets for policy implementation while casting a shroud over the shortfalls of socio-
economic integration. The holistic nature of security agendas has encouraged the redefinition 
of priorities while improving access to international aid.614 The regional organizations often 
previously aimed to deliver ‘the preconditions for development’, such as security of states and 
citizens, based on logics driven by the discourse on security-development nexus. According to 
Bach, such strategies have been offered to institutions which have failed to deliver on their 
economic mandates in order to re-legitimize themselves through new functions.615 In the area 
of small arms control, only RECSA has been established as a new organization, rather than 
placed within the East African Community. The Nairobi Protocol stands out in that it has 
come a long way in building a regional arms control regime, yet has received little attention 
compared to the ECOWAS Convention. 
 
 
Political reform 
 
Political reform is considered central for neoliberal governance.616 Liberal democratic 
discourse has provided an almost universal backdrop to debates on democracy promotion and 
democratization at international level in the post-Cold War era, and is advocated by actors 
such as the EU, UN and USA.617 Participatory politics has long been considered a 
requirement for a modern society, but it was accelerated in the so-called ‘triumphalist’ 
democratization research in the early 1990s. Marc Plattner for example argues that liberal 
democracies are the ‘only true and fully modern societies’, and the only form of political 
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organization compatible with economic growth and a globalized economy.618 Around the 
same time, the democratic peace theory gained a lot of traction in IR. Peaceful international 
relations through regional integration can be seen as an extension of the push for domestic 
political reform and the quest for outward-orientated states. Bachmann and Sidaway argue 
that regional integration in Southern and Eastern Africa has reinforced state-centrism through 
the intergovernmental nature of the cooperation.619 Gibb has similarly found African regional 
economic integration to be a state-driven process which supports the neo-patrimonial African 
state system.620 Orfeo Fioretos’ research points to a number of factors in historical legacies 
which affect closing governance gaps. Especially, he argues that national regulatory histories 
are essential in explaining whether governance gaps will narrow over time.621 
 
In terms of political change, the single largest transformation in the neoliberal governance 
period in Africa has been the shift from single-party to multi-party systems. In the early 
decades after African independence, changes in political leadership were seldom peaceful or 
democratic. Often carried out through the sudden, violent overthrow of an existing 
government by an armed small group, coups d'état were frequently carried out with small 
arms. According to data collected by the Center for Systemic Peace, in the period 1946-1990 
there were 153 attempted, successful or alleged coups d'état in sub-Sahara Africa. In the 
period 1991-2004 there were 53 attempted and alleged coups d'état in total, of which 19 were 
successful.622 Since 1990, violent regime change gradually gave way to attempts by existing 
regimes to create polities capable of returning them to power through elections.623  
 
In 29 out of 47 states in the region, the first multi-party elections in over a generation 
were convened between 1990 and 1994. In a smaller set of countries, elections were 
fully free and fair and resulted in the defeat and exit from power of the erstwhile 
authoritarian head of state. By the end of the decade, only a small minority of states 
were not officially multi-party electoral democracies, even if the practice of 
democratic politics was often far from exemplary.624 
 
According to the critics of neoliberal governance, the rapid changes were motivated by 
external donor states and their associated financial institutions, such as the World Bank, 
which threatened to cut off development aid in the absence of political reforms.625 In this 
light, opening up political participation was often framed as necessary for regime survival in 
the face of growing internal and external demands for multiparty electoral politics.626  
 
The introduction of multi-party systems has challenged the modernists’ assumption about 
development. The change to multi-party systems did not lead to the expected reduction in 
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violence: 60 per cent of African elections between 1990 and 2008 saw some levels of 
election-related intimidation and violence.627 Between 2005 and 2013 Africa showed a trend 
towards decreasing quality of democracy, something that the international community has 
increasingly come to accept, especially in countries that are perceived to simultaneously have 
become more stable.628 As one example, after the genocide in Rwanda some external donors 
shifted in their country strategies, from democracy to stability.629 This can be interpreted as 
illustrative of the tension between democracy and stability within neoliberal governance.  
 
Harrison has argued that the post-cold war period has seen a shift in the ‘sovereign frontier’ in 
Africa. The ‘sovereign frontier’ is the discourse, construction and interplay between actors 
around African sovereignty rather than sets of physical boundaries to be violated or 
defended.630 According to Adetula, the neoliberal global order generated significant pressures 
on Africa’s authoritarian governments, which set the latter on the path of reform that 
culminated in different forms of liberal democratic transition. Many donor states and 
international organizations made liberal democratic governance–called ‘good governance’ (in 
contrast to ‘poor governance’ associated with African leaders) a condition for loans, aid or 
trade concessions. The donor approach to democracy reform gave preference to a state-centric 
legal-bureaucratic basis of authority, based on European experiences. It was ‘concerned 
essentially with regime type rather than the nature of the state and its relationship to the 
processes and outcomes of democratisation’ and ‘fail[ed] to appreciate structural 
contradictions as major constraints inhibiting the actualisation of democracy in Africa.’ One 
limit to democracy development in Africa was the simultaneous process of structural 
adjustment, which rendered the states unable to intervene effectively in the development 
process, in distributional conflicts and in providing public goods.631  
 
 
Economic reform  
 
Parts of the neoliberal governance reforms in Africa involve economic reform and are 
constructed through the expansion of market discipline, administrative reform and structural 
adjustment programmes.632 The de-colonial/post-colonial state building period was heavily 
influenced by national-development policy. The national-development programmes in the 
1960s and 1970s led to an expansion of state interventions and high government spending. 
According to Slater, the early coordinated external intervention programmes in African 
economic policy were motivated partly by reversing national development programmes (often 
influenced by Marxism and funded through Western loans), and partly by facilitating the full 
integration of African markets and their national resources into the global economy.633  
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These programmes gave way to structural adjustment policies after the economic crisis in the 
1970s. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), introduced by the international 
financial institutions in the 1980s as conditions for loans, demanded cutbacks in state 
spending. This impacted the services and ultimately the level of security that the state could 
provide to its citizens, and undermined legitimacy and trust in governments among citizens. 
The SAP also led to a sharp increase in dependency on external financial support in national 
budgets. 634 The SAP however did not enhance economic development or improve security. 
Africa’s population doubled between the years 1982 and 2009.635 Its economic performance 
has not kept up with the population growth in the neoliberal period, resulting in that Africans 
on average being 22 per cent poorer in 2011 compared to the mid-1970s.636 The continent has 
experienced the highest urban growth since 1990 in the developing world.637 Like 
democracy’s failure to enhance security on the continent, Africa’s urbanization pattern 
challenges modernists’ assumptions of development and progress. Unlike urbanization 
elsewhere, rapid urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa has not been caused by industrialization 
but largely by rural-urban migration, sometimes due to conflict.638  
 
The failure of the SAP to enhance economic growth and security led to another wave of 
reform. Under SAPs, the aim was to limit the state; in the second reform process, the focus 
has been to strengthen the state’s institutional stability or ‘capacity’.639 Harrison calls the new 
generation of reforms, commencing in the 1990s, for the ‘governance’ era. Donors rewarded 
states that adjusted and ‘external financing became the way to reproduce the state’. For 
example, in the 1990s, aid constituted 30 per cent of GDP in Tanzania. In 2002-2003, 55 per 
cent of Uganda’s national budget relied on external funding.640  
 
governance … has produced a set of governance states out of the varied terrain of the 
continent. These states have “internalized” core features of governance discourse and 
practices and have won the plaudits of the World Bank and other international 
organisations as a result.641  
 
According to Harrison, the era of ‘post-conditionality’ is both more interventionist and less 
outspokenly coercive, relying on key terms such as participation and partnerships.642 Donor 
engagement (unevenly applied across African states) is characterized through the promotion 
of administrative reform, public sector reform, technical assistance and capacity building 
programmes.643 Both the language and concepts in economic governance reform in Africa 
echo in the framing of security problems, including small arms, as well as in their proposed 
solutions. 
 
                                                
634 Harrision, World Bank in Africa, p. 19. 
635 World Population Review, ‘Africa Population 2015’, URL 
www.worldpopulationreview.com/continents/africa-population (accessed 27 Aug. 2015). 
636 UNFPA, sub-Saharan Africa, 2011. 
637 African Development Bank, ’Urbanization in Africa’, 13 Dec. 2012, URL http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-
championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/urbanization-in-africa-10143/ (accessed 28 Aug. 2015). 
638 African development bank, ’urbanization in Africa’, 13 Dec. 2012. 
639 Harrision (2004), World Bank and Africa, p. 19. 
640 Harrision (2004), World Bank and Africa, pp. 35-37. 
641 Harrision (2004), World Bank and Africa, p. 5. 
642 Harrision (2004), World Bank and Africa, p. 71. 
643 Harrision (2004), World Bank and Africa, p. 71. 
 113 
Concluding remarks 
 
The emergence of regional small arms control in Africa is evident in the adoption of legally 
binding conventions, strategies and implementation programmes, as well as in the creation of 
new dedicated institutions and the expansion of the mandate of old institutions to encompass 
small arms control. The mainstream narrative explains these developments as reactions to the 
changing security environment in the post-cold war period, in which cross-border 
proliferation of small arms has greatly intensified and armed non-state actors have gained 
traction vis-à-vis states, primarily through supply and diversion from regional stockpiles and 
the weakening of state structures, including territorial borders. According to theis perspective, 
the insertion of small arms made local conflicts more violent and is one explanatory factor to 
the problem many countries in Africa have had in reversing the trend of armed conflict. The 
counter-narrative, drawing on assumptions by the Historical-Relational theoretical approach, 
notes that small arms proliferation and small arms’ central role in armed conflict in Africa are 
not a new phenomena and so cannot explain the timing of the regionalization of arms control. 
Instead, the Historical-Relational narrative explains the regionalization of small arms control 
as one defining character of a shift in small arms control practices from nationalistic, self-
determination policies of militarization and state-building during decolonization and the early 
decades of independence, to neoliberal governance reform in small arms control practices.  
 
The shift from national to regional arms control regimes is embedded in external demand for 
regional integration, open trade and changing roles of state institutions. Together these 
reforms reduce controls on cross border movements, including of weapons, and create 
demand for and access to small arms by reducing the protection offered by the government, 
while opening up African societies to small arms imports. However, the reform also pushes 
African governments towards finding supranational solutions in order to increase oversight 
and transparency, as well as pool and share resources. Compared to the de-
colonial/modernization period, small arms control practices under neoliberal governance 
promote effective or ‘good’ governance domestically, and multilateral, cooperative arms 
control externally. The aim is to target the proliferation of small arms to non-state actors and 
certain states engaged in inappropriate (illiberal) behaviour, to prevent diversion of weapons 
to informal or illegal markets and to ensure minimal intervention in the legal arms trade.
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Chapter 5. Neoliberal governance and small arms 
control reform in East and Central Africa: rationale, 
content and actors behind the Nairobi Protocol 
 
 
Chapter 4 identified the African regional governance of small arms as a case of neoliberal 
governance reform. The regionalization of small arms control practices was explained as a 
consequence of a shift from the de-colonial/early post-colonial state-building processes 
influenced by developmental and modernization theory, oriented towards national self-
determination and development, to a system of neoliberal governance of small arms control 
practices, focused on an outward orientation of states, formalization of security practices, 
enhanced trade and enabling stability, through regional integration, reduced state spending, 
administrative reform and capacity building. This classification is different from the dominant 
cold war/post-cold war typology, but it does not necessarily mean that the latter would 
disagree with the identification of the regionalization of small arms control as a case of 
neoliberal governance reform. Although the regional distinction is essential for understanding 
the change and continuity of small arms practices in Africa over time, it does not explain what 
significance neoliberal governance reform has for arms control practices. What does 
neoliberal governance actually mean for African small arms control? The following three 
chapters constitute a case study of neoliberal small arms governance practices in Africa, as 
they have evolved around the adoption and implementation of one of the regional legally 
binding conventions, the Nairobi Protocol. 
 
In April 2000 ten states–Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Tanzania, and Uganda–adopted a politically binding Declaration to enhance cooperation and 
institutional capacity to address a multitude of security challenges through enhanced small 
arms control. Four years later the same group of states, joined by Seychelles, decided to 
expand their commitments through adopting a legally binding convention: the Nairobi 
Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and light weapons in the 
Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states (Nairobi Protocol). Over a decade 
has passed and four more states have joined the Nairobi Protocol: the Central African 
Republic, Republic of Congo, Somalia and South Sudan. Although multi-regional, the 
Nairobi Protocol, along with similar conventions in Southern and Western Africa, is referred 
to as ‘sub-regional’ (Africa being considered the region). Together the fifteen states (from 
now on the Region) make up a highly diverse and sizable part of the African continent with a 
large proportion of the continent’s security challenges.  
 
Surprisingly little research has been dedicated to the Nairobi Protocol and its impact on the 
region. How have states in the region nationally and collectively framed and addressed the 
threat of small arms? What has the Nairobi Protocol achieved in terms of implementation, and 
what are the limits to this regional arms control regime? This chapter will start with 
descriptions of small arms availability, imports and security impact before tracing the decisive 
events and actors behind the creation of the Protocol and lastly laying out its content and 
scope. 
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The problem of small arms in East and Central Africa 
 
There is no comprehensive data on small arms availability in the region. As shown in Chapter 
3, small arms have been entering the Horn of Africa, East Africa and Central Africa for 
centuries and from a large number of sources. After African states’ independence from the 
European colonial rulers, the emphasis on self-determination and building of strong and stable 
states generated demand for small arms at central, and subnational, levels. While global small 
arms control broke down in the Cold War, domestic arms control in Africa was retained as a 
legacy of the colonial regimes, which continued to exist in very different contexts. Even if the 
ideology is set aside, the colonial rulers were both producers, importers and end-users of 
small arms, and trade was more limited. Such systems cannot be assumed to have the same 
outcome in importing states during conflicts and with rapid changes in governments. 
However, the question remains whether there is evidence to suggest that this situation 
prevailed into the 2000s or if changes can be detected. There is uncertainty in the empirical 
evidence related to small arms availability in the region. Earlier policy literature on small 
arms in Africa simply assumes that the continent is awash with small arms, which has 
generated sweeping statements: 
 
Although the total number of SALW circulating around the globe is not known, 
estimates in The Small Arms Survey 2001 put the figure at close to 100 million in 
Africa alone. Given that the Greater Horn of Africa region is one of the most 
politically volatile in Africa, it may be safe to assume that the bulk of that number has 
found its way there.644 
 
The Horn of Africa has been called one of the most armed regions in the world. In Somalia, 
some estimates place the number of SALW in the millions.645 According to local news, there 
were five million small arms in Nairobi alone in 2000 (more than two weapons per capita).646 
More modestly, according to Thokozani Thusi, ’It is estimated that there are five million 
small arms circulating among 189 million inhabitants of the pastoral areas of eastern Africa 
and the Horn’, which constitutes low gun ownership per capita in international comparative 
terms.647 According to a recent national report by South Sudan, there were between 1.9 and 
3.2 million SALW circulating in South Sudan in 2014.648 Various sources describe vastly 
different situations in different countries in the region. In September 2003, national 
authorities’ SALW stockpiles in the Central African Republic were put at 11,381 whereas 
non-state armed groups were estimated to hold 10,940 SALW.649 In Ethiopia, the defence 
forces are reported to have more than one million firearms and the police in Ethiopia are 
reported to have one tenth of that, according to Gunpolicy.org, a Web source for published 
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evidence on arms and armed violence, managed by the University of Sydney.650 Another 
study found that civilians had more weapons than the police in Ethiopia, although state 
authorities have not confirmed these findings.651 The diversity of weapon access and 
concentration of weapons in specific geographical areas do not suggest any radical change in 
the diffusion of weapons in the region compared to previous periods. It is plausible that the 
diffusion partly took place under the early decades of independence, although individual 
events certainly have had some effects (see chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Counting the small arms in circulation may, however, indicate a change in practices. A major 
undertaking in arms control in the region has been to gather more information about arms 
availability through national surveys. In 2006 in Burundi, household surveys conducted by 
Small Arms Survey estimated that 100,000 households were in possession of firearms or 
grenades, which meant that there were at least 100,000 arms in circulation among the civilian 
population, given that a single household may own several weapons (in 2008 there were 
approximately 1.5 million households in Burundi, with an average of 5 people in each 
household). Yet in August 2008, a total of only 4,139 gun licences had been issued in 
Burundi.652 A Ugandan national estimate in 2012 put the number of illicit small arms owned 
by civilians to 200,000, while the number of legally-registered civilian weapons was 2,270.653 
A national mapping exercise in Kenya in 2003 concluded that there were approximately 
110,000 illicit weapons in the country. In the second National survey in Kenya, conducted in 
2012, the results showed that 530,000-680,000 households owned at least one firearm. 
According to one Kenyan official, the difference in result is likely to have been caused by 
different methodological approaches rather than an actual significant increase in weapons.654 
State-owned small arms constitute a large part of small arms in Kenya; however, ‘exact 
figures are not known’.655 Studies have found that concentration of small arms varies greatly 
within countries. Research in northeastern Kenya found that every second household had a 
gun and that 60 per cent of the patients in field hospitals were being treated for gunshot 
wounds.656 In 2002, Uganda estimated that there were over 40,000 firearms in unlawful 
possession in the Karamoja region alone.657  
 
Counting the numbers of small arms is not only a daunting task, but feeds into a neoliberal 
governance approach to measuring and quantifying small arms problematique. Many counting 
exercises have focused on measuring the scale of only illicit weapons in circulation, drawing 
on the assumptions of illicit/illiberal nature or proliferation and use as the problem to be 
solved. A more nuanced and decentralised approach to mapping the issue of small arms 
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availability in recent years suggests that there are fewer weapons in the region than previously 
thought, with great differences between states and within countries. Most weapons are not 
used for criminal or military purposes, and there are large stockpiles of old and obsolete 
weapons. Ironically then, neoliberal governance reform in small arms control practices has 
generated new knowledge about small arms societal diffusion which partly challenges the 
assumptions on which the reform was founded in the first place: that small arms proliferation 
is mainly a trans-national problem, evenly experienced at the regional level and that the 
greater East Africa region, along with the rest of Africa, is ‘awash’ with arms. Instead, the 
region has a comparatively low number of civilian arms per capita. As one example, 
Ethiopia’s private gun ownership ranks number 174 out of 179 countries.658 The 
comparatively small scale of the small arms availability in the region challenges neoliberal 
governance accounts that prefer tangible numerical measurements of scale over more 
complex social or historical inquiry. Whether in conflict, post-conflict or more peaceful 
settings, most small arms are overwhelmingly possessed by households for private use rather 
than by militaries, police forces or even armed groups. Although Muggah goes someway to 
depart from the simplified neoliberal governance narrative, in arguing that it is not necessarily 
the sheer number of weapons that trigger or sustain violence, but rather the inability of 
governments to ensure legitimate public security or assert authority and control over their 
territories, he does not challenge leading discourses on an historical account.659  
 
Small arms imports 
 
The vast majority of small arms in the region were produced outside of it. There is still 
limited domestic small arms production in the region, although Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and 
Sudan are considered to have domestic manufacturing for national defence purposes. A 2003 
Small Arms Survey report claimed that Kenya and Uganda had utilized this production to 
amass a national stockpile of up to one million weapons each.660 Locally manufactured 
ammunition is reported to represent almost 50 per cent of overall small-calibre 
consumption.661 While difficult to verify, such developments could indeed constitute a new 
trend in African small arms supply compared to previous periods. Other states in the region 
have small-scale manufacturing and maintenance work shops that serve old imported 
weapons, an industry that began to flourish under the transatlantic slave trade (see chapter 
3).662  
 
For centuries France, Italy and the United Kingdom have been key suppliers of small arms to 
the region (see chapter 3). After colonial independence, the roles of China, Russia, the United 
States and Ukraine as weapon exporters have grown. China is currently the largest supplier of 
small arms to the region (see chapter 7). Although small arms transfers to Africa have a 
limited financial value for China, Cordano argues that weapon exports are a component of a 
Chinese foreign policy of consolidating political ties and economic relations. The sale of 
small arms could, for example, facilitate China’s attempt at gaining access to important 
natural resources. In the last five to six years, China seems to have adopted a more selective 
approach to arms sales, at least partially motivated by criticism of the presence of a great 
amount of Chinese arms on the continent, but arguably also for the risk of ‘blowback’ effects 
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on Chinese investments and Chinese citizens in Africa. In general, China still considers the 
transfer of arms as a way to reinforce the stability of African states, an important aspect for 
China especially where it maintains relevant economic interests, for example in Sudan.663 
While the shift in major supply of small arms from former colonial powers to China does 
indicate a change in supply patterns, the extent of the meaning of the change is uncertain. 
China, for example, seems to be driven by largely the same motives as European suppliers: 
natural resource extraction, protection of their national citizens and other strategic interests. 
Chinese small arms supply is also indicative of the tension of neoliberal governance as 
applied to small arms: on the one hand not to support ‘destabilising’ accumulation or use of 
small arms, and on the other hand to promote the social and political stability that is 
fundamental for capital accumulation. 
 
States in the region have frequently been accused of breaching arms embargoes targeting 
states or non-state actors in the region. Both Uganda and Rwanda have been accused of 
breaching the embargo on non-state armed groups in the DRC since 2003.664 Reports by the 
monitoring group established by the UN Security Council to observe the enforcement of the 
arms embargo in Somalia have consistently indicated violations of the embargo. Significant 
quantities of weapons and military-related equipment have been transferred to Somali groups. 
Neighboring states such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea as well as individual arms brokers 
have been accused of ignoring the embargo.665 The Panel of Experts’ report on Sudan 
published in 2005 indicated that the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and 
Equality Movement had received arms, ammunition, equipment, military training and 
logistical support from Eritrea.666 A UN small arms fact-finding mission to Kenya in 2001 
concluded that small arms flows from neighbouring Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia had 
increased the availability of arms in Kenya and greatly contributed to a deterioration of 
security in the country.667 In Kenya, the types of ammunition used by different state and non-
state forces in the Turkana region suggest that ammunition is circulated, leaked or shared 
among different local armed groups.668 Hence the contemporary problem of arms embargo 
compliance in a fragmented market-leading arms control system under neoliberal governance 
appears similar to compliance gaps in implementing, for example, the Brussels Act. 
 
Neighbouring states have also acted as safe havens for insurgency groups in the region, where 
rear bases are set up in refugee camps for training, arming, launching attacks or storing 
weapon caches. Rwandan government forces fled to DRC in 1994, where the Ugandan West 
Nile Bank Front also had rear bases, from which they received weapons from South Sudan. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army had a base in Southern Sudan where they were armed by the 
regional government to fight the north.669 Even today, states’ military forces keep weapons in 
other countries in the region for different purposes. South Sudan, for example, has weapon 
depots in Kenya in the event of an attack by Sudan.670 The Rwandan army, which is 
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participating in the African Union/UN mission in Darfur, is deployed there with weapons 
belonging to the Rwandan national army.671  
 
Besides the deliberate arming of non-state groups and governments under arms embargo, at 
least three other forms of supply are worth mentioning here. The first is the overtaking of 
state stockpiles in the event of the overturn of state regimes. The collapse of the Idi Amin 
Dada regime in Uganda in 1979, when weapons were looted in Moroto and Soroti barracks,672 
and the collapse of the Somali government have had a powerful effect on small arms 
proliferation to the rest of the region.673 The second is the role of border communities. The 
multi-territorial nature of the ethnic groups living in the frontier areas, such as the Daasenach 
(in Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia), facilitates movement of weapons as they occupy a position 
that pushes on them the status of ‘frontier gate-keepers’.674 The situation not only resembles 
that in the imperial and colonial periods, it is also partly explained by those practices that 
created the borders, encouraging trans-border activities. The migration of people, especially 
refugees from conflict zones, is believed to sometimes carry small arms across borders for 
sale to habitual criminals.675 The latter is frequently referred to as a modus operandi in 
national reports to UNPoA. However, it could also be part of attempts to securitize refugee 
flows, which are burning political issues in the region. Although there is historical evidence 
that border communities have played important roles in the informal economy and smuggling 
since the creation of the imperial African borders in the early 20th century (see chapter 3), 
other regional developments seem more particular to the current time. One such example is 
that part of the ‘core’ region (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), which appears to be moving 
towards a greater local production base of small arms and ammunition. Other interesting 
phenomena are the rise of regional and international peacekeeping activities and how they 
possibly relate to weapon spread at the regional level. 
 
Small arms security impact 
 
The security situation in the region during the period of neoliberal governance might have 
been the most volatile in the world. Each of the fifteen states in the region has faced at least 
one major regional military security threat, whether it has been genocide, civil war, brutal and 
powerful non-state armed groups, inter-state war, cattle rustling, state collapse or a new state 
formation, terrorism, or piracy or other forms of transnational organized crime. All fifteen 
states have experienced state-based armed conflicts since independence. Seven of the ten 
African countries with the most fatalities in state-based armed conflicts during the period 
1992‒2013, reside in the region. Moreover, the region is heavily affected by intra-community 
conflicts and violence deliberately targeting civilians.676 In 2013, when 80 per cent of Africa 
was not experiencing a state-based armed conflict, seven states in the region were either at 
war (DRC; South Sudan) or experiencing a minor armed conflict (CAR; Ethiopia; Somalia; 
Sudan; Uganda).677 In 2012 the United States National Intelligence Council estimated that of 
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‘15 states most at risk to become failed states’, six were located in the East Africa and Horn 
of Africa region (Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda).678 
 
Small arms are widely used in conflicts in the region. Media reports have claimed that small 
arms had killed millions of civilians in the region by the early 2000s.679 A study of 16 armed 
conflicts showed that conflicts in the Republic of Congo (ROC) and Somalia had an 
internationally comparative high proportion of war-related injuries caused by small arms, with 
ROC exceeding all other conflicts in the survey, where 97 per cent of war-related injuries 
were caused by firearms. In the genocide in Rwanda, machetes (owned by most Rwandan 
households) injured most victims (55 %), yet small arms may still have killed 100,000 
civilians.680 Similar data for other conflicts is lacking. 
 
Small arms are reportedly heavily involved in pastoral conflicts over scarce water and pasture. 
In the pastoral communities bordering Kenya and Sudan, as well as those on the border 
between Kenya and Somalia, there are often deadly clashes between communities from either 
side of the border. Conflict and incidents of cattle-rustling date back at least a century but 
were not previously characterised by today’s high mortality rates, according to recent studies. 
The availability of small arms among pastoralist communities has turned these conflicts into 
low intensity wars.681 According to the Small Arms Survey: 
 
Invariably, livelihoods are reshaped by arms-related insecurity: customary institutions 
such as pastoral migration patterns and dowry systems are undermined by threats 
associated with arms availability. For example, in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, the 
Sudan, and Uganda, pastoral and agrarian communities are regularly terrorized by the 
presence of AK-47-wielding bandits and cattle-rustlers.682  
 
Small arms are also frequently used in organized crime and terrorism throughout the region, 
including in the al-Shabab attack on Kenya’s Westgate mall in September 2013. In the attack, 
four men killed 67 people, allegedly using weapons smuggled into Kenya from Somalia. In 
the early 2000s, military-style rifles—mostly AK-47s, G-3s, and the Fusil Automatique 
Léger—were among the most common weapons used by armed criminals in Kenya and 
within the Greater Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region.683 On 2 April 2015, al-Shabab 
attacked Garissa University Collage and shot 148 civilians, most of them students. The 
terrorist organization has killed 400 people in Kenya between April 2013 and April 2015 and 
the attack in Garissa was the second largest terrorist attack in Kenya since independence. The 
infamous Lord’s Resistance Army has been terrorizing the region for decades and is known to 
operate in Uganda, the DRC, CAR and South Sudan. In 2013 a report was released showing 
that the group has been selling ivory to Arab traders in exchange for weapons, like warlords 
did in Central Africa in the 19th century.684  
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Besides this evidence, there is still a shortage of national and regional data on violence and 
crimes committed with small arms in the region, especially in non-conflict settings. In the 
region, only DRC and Uganda are listed in the UNODC data on homicides by firearms. Small 
arms were used in 10.5-12.7 per cent of the reported homicides in Uganda and in 17.1-33.2 
per cent of the homicides in DRC, in 2008 and 2010.685 A baseline survey on armed violence 
in Burundi found that 60 per cent of armed violent acts recorded in Burundi in 2008 were 
committed with a firearm, including 14 per cent of rapes, which were committed under the 
threat of a firearm.686 Crimes involving small arms were more likely to have lethal outcomes 
compared to crimes involving other weapons. In the violent acts when firearms were used, 
they resulted in one or more deaths 70 per cent of the time.687 A household survey in the Gulu 
province in Uganda in 2006 found that gunshots were the most frequent cause of injury, and 
that victims of gunshots had higher rates of death as opposed to disability and recovery, when 
compared to other causes of injury.688 Small arms injuries place high costs on an already 
under-staffed and under-funded health sector in the region. Studies carried out in districts in 
Uganda, Sudan and Kenya have noted disproportionately high levels of firearm-related 
injuries in comparison with national averages. In 2002 an International Committee of the Red 
Cross field hospital in Kenya and a public hospital in Uganda registered between 40 per cent 
and 65 per cent of all monthly in-patients with firearm injuries from automatic weapons.689 
Hospital data is a reminder of the ‘double burden’ of small arms injustice: not only is the 
violence concentrated in the region while the weapons are produced and profits are made in 
the global North, the region also suffers from a lack of adequate health care, making firearms 
deaths more frequent and injury recovery more difficult compared to most other parts of the 
world. There should be no doubt that small arms are integrated into social conflicts and that 
small arms are killing civilians in the region; however, the integration of small arms in 
African conflicts is a historical continuum, seen not least in the centrality of small arms in the 
European imperial wars in Africa in the early 20th century. This not only points to a certain 
continuity of small arms violence, but also that some of the causes of the violence and the 
deadly outcomes of small arms use can be traced to historical conditions.  
 
Regional small arms control: the Nairobi Protocol 
 
Actors and drivers 
 
The governments in the region were well aware of the problem of small arms by the mid-
1990s and had started to take multilateral action at the regional level. Following a military 
coup in Burundi in 1996, which exacerbated the civil war in the country, and a failure in the 
UN Security Council to agree on an arms embargo on Burundi, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, agreed to place regional sanctions and an 
arms embargo on Burundi. In 1999, in light of peace talks aiming to end the civil war, the 
seven states agreed to suspend both the sanctions and the arms embargo, against the advice of 
human rights organizations.690 The regional embargo failed to achieve the sought result–
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stopping weapons inflows to Burundi–partly because the regional states could not in 
themselves control weapons imported to Burundi from outside of the region, and partly 
because regional actors themselves violated the embargo.691 This allegedly included the 
Burundian rebels’ alliance with rebels from Rwanda, and smuggling of weapons from South 
Africa through DRC and Zambia.692 The transnational nature of the SALW danger, and the 
shared threat of armed non-state actors threatening state sovereignty and prosperity, were the 
primary motivations of the commitment to binding regional arms control, according to 
National Focal Points on SALW in Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda.693 This motivation 
fits well with the liberal institutionalist hypothesis. That theory does still not explain why the 
regional scheme took the form of an embargo. Arms embargoes, whether regional or global, 
had historically not produced the desired results. An embargo targeting a state would never 
get the necessary buy-in from the targeted state, nor its close allies. Furthermore, arms 
embargoes as an arms control tool were designed elsewhere and fit badly with the regional 
political context of dual sovereignty. The decision to adopt a regional arms embargo was 
therefore not chosen primarily because it was seen as likely to address the actual problem, but 
because arms embargoes were the only known multilateral small arms control instruments 
(supporting the hypothesis of historical institutionalism), and by adopting one the states in the 
region could send an important message to the international community that they were acting 
appropriately (and not become targets of embargoes themselves). 
 
The roles of externally imposed arms embargoes and other export control policies are often 
neglected when drivers of the creation of regional arms control are considered. States in the 
region had retrieved diverging capacities during reform programmes to access the global legal 
market in SALW and major conventional arms and at the same time they were (and remain) 
common targets of UN arms embargoes. The arms embargoes were adopted by the UN 
Security Council–a body whose permanent members are the superpowers and former colonial 
powers–and exclusively imposed on developing states. States suffering from the influx on 
small arms were not invited to negotiations. The combination of limited domestic production 
capacities, while often providing only weak strategic partnerships to exporting states (small 
scale imports, a general trade deficit and a dependency on foreign aid), and the (perceived) 
form of African governments as unstable, violent or undemocratic, place African end-users 
under particular scrutiny for arms exports. Arms embargoes make a lot of sense in liberal 
governance of small arms. Arms exporters suffer limited financial losses in denying exports to 
Africa, given the small share of African imports on the world market, and yet risk relatively 
large repercussions should their weapons be diverted to child soldiers, dictators or terrorists. 
Beyond securing future arms imports, African political elites have a general interest in being 
portrayed in a positive manner by international partners, as ineffectiveness can cause 
reductions in development budgets.694 While this argument largely resonates with the balance 
of power theory, like the institutionalist theory, it does not fully explain the need to adopt a 
regional measure, or the choice of design.  
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A historical-relational perspective suggests that the need for regional control measures arose 
from the breakdown in international small arms control, the re-expansion of the small arms 
market, the geographical and political separation of production and export from import, the 
acknowledgment of the European form and meaning of arms control and the acceptance of the 
dominant assumption about causes of insecurity related to small arms (i.e. its illicit 
dimension).  
 
The case of Burundi was not unique, but the reactions were. While the embargo on Burundi 
was breached, states in the region continued attempts to address small arms at a more 
operational level. In 1998, the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization 
(EAPCCO) was created. EAPCCO was established as a platform for regional law 
enforcement cooperation on transnational organized crime, including the spread of illegal 
small arms. EAPCCO consists of 11 member countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. It is the original 
institutional home of the Nairobi Protocol. The creation of EAPCCO is likely to have been 
encouraged by the 1995 decision by Interpol’s General Assembly on regionalization, in which 
the organization adopted guidelines for the establishment and operation of Regional Bureaus, 
subsequently leading to the establishment of seven regional Interpol offices–of which four are 
in sub-Saharan Africa.695 The Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau in Nairobi even acts as the 
Secretariat of EAPCCO. Alice Hills, who has studied African policing extensively (albeit not 
its arms control function) argues however that ‘it would be misleading to see this as evidence 
of a Western bias favoring regional cooperation … It would be similarly misleading to see 
Interpol as attempting to impose a European-style configuration onto African policing 
structures.’696 Instead, Hills argues, regional security cooperation based on African police 
chiefs has developed through their unique political roles and close relations to their 
presidency as well as their ability to assess whether threats at the regional level are real or 
rhetorical. According to Hills, chief police officers are ‘the critical variable shaping the 
interface between the national, regional, and international levels of security’.697 At first 
glance, there are merits to Hills argument. The EU’s Police Chief Task Force and the Police 
Chiefs Committee were not set up until the year after, in 1999, although the often lengthy 
nature of EU negotiations suggest that the decision is likely to have been in preparation for 
some time before that.698 In light of African arms control practices, the involvement of foreign 
actors in political elites’ projects is not necessarily a question of either/or. A police-run 
programme based on government interest does not prelude foreign encouragement or 
involvement in that cooperation. The Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization is not only the 
founding organization of the Nairobi Protocol but also to the other three regional small arms 
control conventions on the continent.699 The role of EAPCCO and other regional police 
cooperation bodies in establishing and managing the regional arms control instruments is 
usually neglected, if not completely overlooked.  
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By that time, a number of NGOs were active in drawing attention to the issue of small arms in 
conflicts in the region. Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
the Institute for Security Studies and Saferworld are especially worth mentioning in this 
regard. Their engagement in small arms-related security issues was greatly encouraged by the 
success in banning anti-personnel landmines based on those weapons’ humanitarian impact. 
Garcia argues that civil society organizations built a norm around human security based on 
their findings in field research and by working on the ground in affected states. In aid donor 
countries in particular, these advocates succeeded in broadening the understanding of 
development to the notion of a ‘security-development nexus’. Garcia’s line of argument 
closely follows the concept of norm entrepreneurs in the process of norm proposal and 
promotion.700 A historical-relational account would instead reconstruct claims of norm 
validity by, for example, investigating the resources used in norm development. According to 
Stephan Ellis, the dialogue between African elites (the main beneficiaries of foreign aid) and 
donor states has had a fundamental impact on national development. A change in the policy in 
certain donor states may have a direct impact on the policies of African states, which they are 
then required to implement.701 Others have further argued that interventionist policies, such as 
security sector reform, also work to transmit norms and values.702 
 
During the period of the regional arms embargo on Burundi, 1996-1999, the UN initiated two 
processes to enhance multilateral controls on small arms: one targeted civilian weapons and 
one targeted military and law enforcement weapons. The UN Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the treatment of Offenders, in 1995, adopted a resolution entitled ‘Firearm 
regulation for purposes of crime prevention and public safety’, which commenced the process 
towards international measures to regulate firearms, through criminal justice reform and 
strengthening of legal institutions.703 In November 1997 the UN held a regional workshop on 
firearm regulation for crime prevention and public safety in Arusha, Tanzania. The purpose of 
the workshop was to gather views on the subject of international firearm regulation. Regional 
governments and several international NGOs in the campaign to control small arms attended 
the meeting. The process eventually led to the adoption of resolution 53/111in the UN and 
later the adoption of the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol), negotiated 
under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council and its Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice as a supplement to the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.704 Between 1995 and 1997 a Panel of Governmental Experts, 
commissioned by the UN Secretary General on the request of the UN General Assembly, 
authored a report addressing ‘The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used 
in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations’. One assumption by the group of experts 
was that regions had different characteristics and common concerns related to the 
accumulation, proliferation and use of small arms and that a regional approach was therefore 
a reasonable way to address the issue–completely in line with the neoliberal governance 
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narrative. It can be noted that Africa at the time was regarded as one region, which explains 
the many UN references to the Nairobi Protocol as a ‘subregional’ convention.705 The report 
was a milestone in the UN’s work on small arms control and firmly established SALW as a 
means that exacerbates and increases the lethality of conflicts. Although East Africa is not 
addressed in the report, Central African states were described as being: 
 
dominated by recent internal and ethnic violence and violations of the Security 
Council arms embargo. The major factor impeding the development of ways and 
means of dealing with accumulations of weapons in this subregion is the collapse of 
the State’s ability to govern and provide for its national security and the security of its 
citizens. This is compounded by the extreme levels of poverty in the subregion.706   
 
The report recommended that ‘The United Nations should encourage the adoption and 
implementation of regional or subregional moratoriums’ and that Interpol should engage in 
countering SALW trafficking.707 In resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999, the General 
Assembly decided to convene the UN Conference on the illicit trade in SALW in all its 
aspects in 2001. The subsequent conference adopted the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
(UN POA), negotiated under the auspices of the First Committee of the General Assembly as 
a stand-alone international, politically binding, instrument.708 The outcome of these two 
processes, the UN PoA and the UN Firearms Protocol, both adopted in 2001, were clearly 
influential for the regional initiatives. Not only did they lay out the criteria and language on 
which the Nairobi Protocol was built, but they encouraged regional regulations. This was in 
line with Erickson’s finding on the national behaviour of developed democratic states in 
weapons exports: ‘social reputation’ and the need to create or uphold an image ‘as good 
international citizens’ first require internationally agreed baselines of good behaviour.709 The 
Firearms Protocol and the UNPoA set those standards for responsible states at the global 
level. For this thesis, it is important to assess whether these standards depart from previous 
conventions. The Firearms Protocol obliges state parties to enact legislative and other 
measures to establish illicit manufacturing and trade as criminal offences. States must keep 
records of all firearms and mark each weapon, both at the point of manufacturing and before 
import. Marking weapons at manufacturing has probably been done since the transoceanic 
gun-slave trade (chapter 3) and the obligation to mark all new imported weapons was in place 
during the imperial arms control system, as discovery of marked rifles in the possession of 
raiders was considered to form solid grounds for complaints.710 In 1925 the British called for 
the establishment of a weapons transit permit system on arms sales to Ethiopia, which 
allowed prevention of delivery.711 A similar idea is presented in article 10 of the 2001 UN 
Firearms Protocol.712 The UNPoA is a politically binding document that firmly establishes 
illicit aspects of small arms as the issue of concern, reaffirming the ‘inherent right to 
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individual or collective self-defence’ (see chapter 1.2 and 2), in support of liberal trade 
theory. 
 
In January 2000, the Security Research and Information Centre (a Nairobi think tank), the UN 
African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, the Institute for 
Security Studies and Saferworld held a meeting in association with the Interpol Subregional 
Bureau in Kampala. The purpose of the meeting was to draft a subregional action programme 
on SALW and to engage Interpol as it was the only structure which was operational across the 
whole ‘sub’region.713 Participants in the Kampala meeting were unanimous in wanting to 
develop what they called a comprehensive practical approach to the issue of SALW and 
identify the key components of a potential subregional action programme.714 Following on 
from the preparatory meeting in Kampala, the Kenyan government decided to convene an 
inter-ministerial regional conference in Nairobi. Kenya’s reason for engagement was that 
existing initiatives to tackle the proliferation of small arms did not cover the Great Lakes 
region and the Horn of Africa. Kenya also realized the importance of developing a common 
regional approach in advance of the UN 2001 conference on small arms. All ten countries in 
the region attended the Nairobi conference. The only country not represented was Somalia, 
because it did not have a central government at the time of the conference. At the conference 
the ten states adopted the Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the proliferation of illicit 
SALW in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The declaration reaffirmed the right 
of states to self-defense while identifying problems such as illicit trade, cattle-rustling, 
conflict, refugee movements, and ineffective customs and border controls. The declaration 
further called for measures to address the demand for weapons by promoting democracy and 
good governance, observing human rights and the rule of law, eradicating poverty, and 
promoting economic recovery and growth.715 In other words, the Declaration was a near 
perfect internalization of the neoliberal governance agenda translated into a small arms 
control agreement. The Nairobi Declaration was called ‘groundbreaking’, in that it provided 
‘an opportunity … to develop a long-term comprehensive package, not just an emergency 
measure.’716 In his keynote address, Mr Omari Iddi Mahita, Inspector General of Police in 
Tanzania said: 
?
The problem is pan-territorial and no single country can solve it alone. There is clearly 
a need for countries to collaborate in the fight against the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons. Meetings like this one are ideal forums to address the problem. The 
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problem is complex, but something can be done to control it.717 
 
The Nairobi Declaration established regular Ministerial Review Meetings and made 
provisions for an Agenda for Action and Implementation Plan. The latter two were put in 
place in November 2000 and were revised at the Ministerial meeting in August 2002. The 
Implementation Plan provided for a partnership between governments, civil society groups 
and interregional organisations, such as EAPCCO, to work together to realize the 
implementation of the Declaration.718 To explain the institutional design choices as either 
random or simply the result of rational preferences to maximize effectiveness is 
unsatisfactory. A more careful sequencing of the events by process tracing shows that design 
choices were influenced by the particular meanings and forms arms control had taken 
historically, carried forward by particular actors in specific events unfolding in close 
proximity to the process. Not least, a process tracing method firmly establishes the Nairobi 
Protocol as a neoliberal governance small arms control practice. It determined inter alia that 
the security problem of small arms is not to be addressed at the local level (where the impact 
is) or in North-South dialogues (where the problem is caused), but at the regional level. The 
institutionalization of social practices in ministerial and summit meetings is commonly found 
in African regional governance, and is, according to Söderbaum, a matter for the political 
leaders of constructing an image of state building and of promoting important values.719 
 
Although the UN may be seen as instrumental in the creation of regional small arms control, 
regionalization in other policy areas is typically neglected. Though EAPCCO was directly 
relevant, other processes of regional governance are worth mentioning. As Back argues, many 
intergovernmental organizations that were set up for meeting development objectives under 
structural adjustments shifted to security building in the ‘good governance’ period. In the 
Horn of Africa, the successful transformation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought 
and Development (IGADD) into a regional security agency exemplifies this trend. After 
failing to meet its food security and environmental protection objectives, member states 
decided to transform IGADD into Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
with a mandate to work on conflict prevention, management and resolution. Since then, IGAD 
has carved a niche for itself as a forum and an interface for UN-, EU- and US-sponsored 
initiatives over Somalia, the Sudan and the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.720  
 
The key regional organization in the forefront of regional security governance is the East 
African Community (EAC). The EAC was originally a regional cooperation unit among 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania during 1967-77. It collapsed mainly due to the deteriorating 
policies of Ugandan dictator Idin Amin, a former soldier in the King’s African Riffles and 
also an alleged weapons smuggler who took power in Uganda though a coup d’etat in 1971.721 
In 1979, John Ravenhill called the EAC ‘arguably the most sophisticated regional cooperative 
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arrangement undertaken in the Third World’.722 The EAC built loosely on the customs union 
set up among three British colonies in 1923. In addition to this arrangement Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda inherited at independence a common currency and common communications 
services (rail, air, harbours, posts and telecommunications).723  
 
In 1999 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda signed a treaty to re-establish the Community, which 
entered into force in July 2000 (a few months after the adoption of the Nairobi Declaration). 
Since the re-establishment of the EAC the member states have undertaken ambitious steps on 
their way to forming a common market. The ultimate goal of the EAC is the launching of a 
common currency and the formation of a political foundation (following the experience of 
former colonial powers). In 2007 Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC. A number of 
neighbouring states have voiced their interest in joining the EAC in the near future. In 2013, 
the five EAC member states ratified the Security Protocol, which provided a common 
approach on how to tackle security threats in the region. With the protocol, the five states 
decided to collaborate to address common security problems and outlined joint cooperation in 
developing policies, measures, mechanisms, strategies and programmes to control the 
proliferation of illicit SALW.724 The security protocol holds some promises in terms of being 
a platform more likely to effectively internalize neoliberal governance, but an assessment of it 
is too early given its short existence. Unlike three other regional economic communities in 
Africa, which are the institutional home of small arms control conventions at the regional 
level (see chapter 4) the EAC has so far played a limited role in small arms control. One 
reason for this is the timing: the Nairobi Declaration was adopted before the EAC had 
formally been re-established. A second reason, quoted by SALW focal points and police 
commissioners in the EAC region, is that the scope and source of the SALW problem to a 
large extent lie outside of the three founding members, primarily in the conflict-ridden 
countries in the region. Interesting, the conceptualization of extending international small 
arms control beyond neighbouring states to encompass the source of the problem does not 
extend to producing states. A third potential reason is that the EAC in general has been more 
reluctant to engage in matters of security and defence compared to ECOWAS (similar to the 
different national positions of the UK and France toward the EU). The role of EAC and its 
member states in small arms control in the greater region, which now encompasses the five 
states most visibly active in neoliberal small arms governance, is likely to be more important 
in the future. 
 
Content and scope of the Nairobi Protocol 
 
The Nairobi Protocol was signed by 11 states in April 2004 at the Second Ministerial Review 
Conference of the Nairobi Declaration. It entered into force in May 2006. The Protocol is a 
comparatively comprehensive and far-reaching legally binding arms control regulation, 
covering 15 states from ROC to Somalia. The Nairobi Protocol has five objectives, which are 
to:  
 
(a) prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of 
small arms and light weapons in the sub-region (through legal and institutional reform, and cross-
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border cooperation) 
(b) prevent the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the 
sub-region (through weapons destruction programmes, disarmament campaigns, awareness 
raising and enhancing law enforcement) 
(c) promote and facilitate information sharing and cooperation between the governments in the 
sub-region, as well as between governments, inter-governmental organisations and civil society, 
in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 
(d) promote cooperation at the sub-regional level as well as in international fora to effectively 
combat the small arms and light weapons problem, in collaboration with relevant partners. 
(e) encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient control and management of small 
arms and light weapons held by States Parties and civilians. 
 
The obligations on states are laid out in 14 articles (articles 3 to 17) in the Protocol, which 
includes provisions on legal and institutional reforms, marking and transfers controls, 
handling of recovered weapons, mutual legal assistance, enhanced transparency, anti-
corruption measures, and institutional arrangement at the regional level.725 On arms in civilian 
ownership, the Nairobi Protocol is the most evolved regional instrument adopted after 2001. 
The provisions include a ban on automatic and semi-automatic weapons in civilian 
ownership, which is far more restrictive than in most developed countries, including all states 
in the European Union. From an institutionalist perspective the Nairobi Protocol is more 
progressive compared to other regional conventions, due to its legally binding form and 
because it is more specific in prescribing actions to be undertaken by member states.726 
Implementation is therefore likely to be very costly. In combination with a general lack of 
institutional capacity, implementation is likely to also be weak.  From a neorealist 
perspective, the involvement of authoritarian states usually correlates with high standards on 
formal commitments. Since they lack public monitoring or accountability of national 
implementation, high standards do not correspond with high costs. The Protocol furthermore 
lacks a sanctions mechanism or any provision on how to handle non-compliance. From an 
emerging norm perspective, however, the main weakness of the Protocol is that it removed 
the Declaration’s provision on good governance, human rights and poverty alleviation. In the 
preamble of the Nairobi Protocol states in the region acknowledge ‘that a comprehensive 
strategy to arrest and deal with the problem must include putting in place structures and 
processes to promote democracy, the observance of human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance, as well as economic recovery and growth’, however no legal provisions 
regarding good governance, military spending or human rights were included in the Protocol. 
Finally, for a historical-relational perspective, the Nairobi Protocol not only fits exceptionally 
well as an outcome and a constitutive feature of a neoliberal governance of arms control 
practices in Africa. Like the Declaration, the Protocol protects state security through military 
means, and provides no obligations on transparency or reduction in defence spending or arms 
imports, or improved conduct of military forces. It problematizes illicit small arms transfers, 
while safeguarding trade, manufacturing and consumption of small arms in formal spheres. 
More generally, it is an illustrative example of what Galtung in the 1960s referred to as the 
legalist approach to arms control, with its emphasis on applications of standards to classify 
behaviour as right/conforming or wrong/not conforming and focus on drafting laws and 
treaties.727 The legalist approach to arms control has been deconstructed by Latham and 
Krause as Western arms control culture, which is characterized inter alia by rational, 
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technocratic, and managerial negotiating strategies and evaluations of security, and an 
emphasis on formal negotiated arms control agreements and standards.728 More specifically, 
the content and scope of the Nairobi Protocol suggest that neoliberal governance, when 
applied to small arms control practices, has kept several of the modernization tendencies 
visible in previous systems of arms control practices, such as marking, record-keeping and 
licensing procedures.   
 
Map 1. The Nairobi Protocol, ratifying and acceding states  
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
A more nuanced and decentralised approach to mapping the issue of small arms availability 
suggests that there are fewer weapons in the region than previously anticipated, with great 
differences between states and within countries. Most weapons are not used for criminal or 
military purposes, and large stockpiles are old and obsolete. Yet, more weapons are 
unaccounted for in comparison to other regions, and small arms continue to have a negative 
security impact. Small arms proliferation is concentrated in specific regional areas at the sub-
national level, resulting in comparatively very high levels of gun related crimes and casualties 
in specific locations. Furthermore, it appears that the scale of ammunition production in the 
region is possibly greater than previously anticipated. A more nuanced description of the 
problem of small arms in the region can avoid the pitfall presented by mainstream post-cold 
war narrative, in which the Greater East African region or even all of Africa is treated as a 
homogenous space filled with conflicts and a large amount of uncontrolled weapons supplied 
by criminals, often from within the region. When associated with small arms insecurities, the 
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political and social world are, from a neoliberal governance agenda, divided up into liberal 
(formal, peaceful) and illiberal (criminal, chaotic) spaces. A historical-relational perspective 
would instead see this space as relational, with inbuilt contradictions, including inequalities. It 
is necessary to acknowledge that external, normative actors do not simply represent the 
solution to small arms violence but also that part of the problem is inherent in development, 
and the diffusion of modernization from the global north to the global south, rather than 
external from it. 
 
The actors behind the arms control regime in the region are a mosaic of stakeholders, 
including local governments, especially the police, Interpol, United Nations, civil society and 
Western states. The combination of regional government awareness, data collection and 
advocacy by NGOs, a push from two fronts in the UN, and an acute security situation in the 
Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, which was undermining development in the 
relatively peaceful EAC states located in the middle of the two zones of conflict and working 
as a revolving door for weapons smugglers, created momentum in the region to take 
multilateral action to address small arms. These events do not explain the form or content of 
the measures that were adopted. Without acknowledging contextual factors which have 
developed historically and over time, such as the breakdown in international small arms 
control, the growth and liberalization of small arms manufacturing, trade and consumption, 
and the broader neoliberal governance reform agenda in Africa, the framing, content and 
meaning of the Protocol become hard to explain. The replication of content and of historical 
small arms practices further supports the theoretical notion that institutional design choices 
are not simply a matter of rational preferences for maximizing effectiveness, but shaped by 
previous experiences, knowledge and investments in certain institutional practices.  
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Chapter 6. Neoliberal governance reform and small 
arms practices: Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 focused on why and how the regional small arms control regulations have 
been adopted in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the greater East African region, and argued 
that regionalization of small arms control practices is one part of a neoliberal governance 
reform of African national small arms control practices, internalized yet heavily influenced by 
external actors and shaped by dominant Western institutional practices. This chapter will 
assess the effects of the regionalization of small arms control, in particular by investigating 
what type of arms control the shift to neoliberal governance in small arms control means in 
practice: hence whether neoliberal governance reform exists mainly on paper or has caused 
actual reform in practices. The chapter discusses the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol 
in the region in the first ten years since its adoption, based on national reports, national action 
plans, legislation and interviews with national and regional institutions, donors and civil 
society. The chapter also uses the implementation record of the first ten years to uncover 
contingencies, continuities and discontinuities compared to previous arms control practices.  
 
Arms control and weapons destruction 
 
At the time of the signing of the Nairobi Protocol, most countries in the region did not know, 
or even have estimates for, the quantities of small arms and ammunition on their national 
territory. Weapons belonging to police and military forces were unaccounted for in national 
registries. Licenses for ownership and use by private security companies were not always 
covered in old national legislation. Most weapons were unmarked, with no possibility to trace 
weapons if recovered at, for example, a crime scene or by border control officers. Large 
quantities of obsolete weapons were stored in poor facilities. In countries like Rwanda, large 
but unknown quantities of small arms were held hidden in private homes since the time of the 
1994 genocide, in case another war were to erupt. One of the major undertakings in the 
neoliberal governance small arms control reform in the past decade has been for member 
states to map, mark and register weapons, as well as to destroy surplus and seized weapons.729 
 
 
Weapons destruction 
 
Records from multiple sources show that the fifteen states in the region together have 
destroyed hundreds of thousands of weapons and thousands of tonnes of ammunition since 
the entry into force of the Nairobi Protocol. According to the EAC Secretary-General, 
Richard Sezibera, the five member states of the EAC alone destroyed more than 200,000 
weapons and 400,000 tonnes of explosives between 2007 and 2013.730 As of 2013, the 
Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering 
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States (RECSA) has supported the destruction of nearly 100,000 small arms and 1,400 tonnes 
of unexploded ordinances in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.731  
 
Annual national reports to UNPoA have included information about destruction of small arms 
and ammunition, either confiscated, old military ordinances, or surplus police stocks, in six 
states in the region after the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol.  
 
Table 2. Reported SALW destruction 
State SALW Ammunition 
DRC732 242,567 814 tonnes 
Ethiopia733 20,000 - 
Eritrea734  - 700 tonnes of explosives, 
unexploded ordnances, 
SALW and ammunition 
Kenya735 38,179 (+ 3,500 were 
awaiting destruction in 
2014) 
505,848 
Rwanda736 46,266 266 tonnes 
Tanzania737 31,155 + 1,225 confiscated 10,079 (confiscated) 
Uganda738 140,637 403 tonnes + 3,900 
 
 
In the DRC, national authorities have entrusted the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a UK-
based demining NGO to carry out destruction of stockpiles and surplus weapons and 
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ammunition since 2007.739 For the project, MAG has established a weapons cutting base in 
Kinshasa. The facility is reportedly self-run and self-maintained by national authorities, 
managed and operated by local staff trained by MAG. The project is funded by Germany, 
Netherlands, UK and the United States.740 A US company, Fonderie 47’s, has teamed up with 
MAG to recycle old AK47s from Central Africa into exclusive watches and jewellery. The 
profit from the sales provides funding for the destruction of those guns.741 MAG was carrying 
out ammunition destruction in Somalia in 2015, and reported that their previous weapon 
destruction programmes in Burundi came to an end due to lack of funding.742 
 
In spite of significant progress and increased destruction activities in many member states, 
weapons destruction programmes have been uneven across the region, with no data on 
destruction activities reported in Somalia, Djibouti, Seychelles, Sudan or South Sudan. A lot 
of the data is self-reported by the national authorities and not directly verifiable by outsiders. 
The weapons have largely been obsolete weapons, with little financial or military value. The 
cost of marking and securely stockpiling the weapons may very well exceed the cost of 
destruction. That said, some progress has also been made in destroying recovered and seized 
illicit weapons and weapons from voluntary disarmament programmes, through for example 
weapons for development in Rwanda. In the programme, civilians could anonymously hand in 
their weapons and the community would benefit through receiving solar panels, etc.743 All 
weapons destruction programmes are not necessarily disarmament programmes: rather they 
are clean-up programmes, targeting unlicensed weapons and old, obsolete weapons. The 
balance of small arms destruction, while not reducing functional state owned weapons, can be 
used by political leaders to bolster their regimes and governments, by constructing an image 
of state building and of promoting important values–a method seen in other areas of 
neoliberal regional governance in Africa.744  
 
A recent phenomenon is the contracting of weapons destruction to an NGO, the MAG, and 
the involvement of a private company with funding from private consumers in the global 
North. Weapon destruction programmes have been made ‘confidence building events’, in 
which the host country burns weapons publicly and invites regional stakeholders to participate 
in the event. At times these public destruction events have constituted one part of regional 
meetings. Others have been less impressed by these events as confidence building, arguing 
that they are mainly a show for funders. State-run weapon destruction programmes show a 
distinction between the engaged ‘governance’ states of East Africa, and less participation by 
states considered to be off the neoliberal governance reform track. Ethiopia and Eritrea have 
participated but have destroyed smaller quantities and have not reported any destruction since 
2007 and 2009, respectively. This does not necessarily mean that the two countries have not 
destroyed more weapons than have been reported, but if they have they are less inclined to 
publicly share the information. DRC and Somalia might be considered the exceptions, yet 
destruction programmes have mainly been carried out by an international non-state actor 
(MAG) rather than the state authorities, a bilateral donor or an intergovernmental 
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organization. The findings are indicative of a relation between transparency in weapon 
destruction programmes and other forms of neoliberal governance reforms.  
 
 
Stockpile management 
 
Improved stockpile management has been a core commitment for many states in the region 
under the Nairobi Protocol. Police and military weapons storage facilities often date back to 
the colonial regiments. They were built at the outskirts of major towns, but due to population 
growth and urbanization, weapon stockpiles are now frequently located in city centers, posing 
significant explosion risks.745 Securing weapon stockpiles often means building new secure 
armories, introducing brackets to place the weapons in (rather than in a pile on the floor) and 
keeping a guard outside the building at all times. Stockpile management also includes training 
personnel in how to handle weapons safely and linking weapons to individual holders. 
Although theft or loss of police or military stockpiles is the main concern, poor facilities also 
represent a risk in terms of unexpected explosions. An explosion of weapons and ammunition 
stockpiles in Brazzaville in 2012 killed over 200 and injured over 2000.746  
 
RECSA has supported a number of projects on stockpile management, including the building 
of a new armory held by the national police in Rwanda. The construction of one more facility 
was in the pipeline in mid-2013, targeting weapons held by the police training school.747 
According to the National Focal Point of SALW in Uganda, stockpile management has 
attracted most of the support, and therefore makes up as much as 30 per cent of the 
implementation of the national action plan on SALW. As a result, the national small arms 
programme looks skewed.748 In an interview with the National Focal Point for SALW in 
Burundi, the national point of contact named stockpile management as the key remaining 
challenge, where little work had been done. With support from Germany, one storage facility 
had been built for police weapons outside Bujumbura.749 MAG has previously worked in 
Burundi to assist the National Commission in a project on comprehensive Physical Security 
and Stockpile Management with the National Police of Burundi with funding from the Swiss 
Government.750 The NGO has also constructed or rehabilitated armouries in South Sudan and 
Tanzania and carried out weapons storage facilities risk assessments in Kenya, ROC, Rwanda 
and Uganda. Besides the RECSA funded projects, and funds from bilateral donors, MAG 
carried out stockpile management projects in Somalia and DRC in 2015.751 MAG works with 
the Police, Somali Coast Guard and Correctional Corps to build armouries for the safe storage 
of weapons and ammunition. They support the development of inventory and logging systems 
to ensure that appropriate accountability measures are in place, keeping track of where 
weapons go once they are dispensed to security forces. In Somalia, MAG has also constructed 
armouries to safely store civilian weapons. In one community, Kalabayr, at the border with 
Ethiopia, most households have firearms, for self-defense while herding their animals. After 
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several accidents involving civilian firearms, MAG built an armoury for civilian weapons 
where community members can store their weapons when not in use.752  
 
Although significant modernization has been made, the vast majority of the weapons are still 
held in old facilities. From a functionalist perspective, incremental progress is to be expected 
and the results from the first decade are still impressive based on the starting point and 
resource constraints of member states. From a broader relational perspective, however, 
securing weapon stockpiles is not only a technical process but a political one. Although the 
risks of accidents are reduced with technical solutions, the approach is based on the 
assumption that there is no intentional misconduct by security forces. Placing a guard in front 
of an armory has limited impact if social factors such as corruption or alcohol consumption 
are added to the equation. Moreover, the term ‘secure stockpile management’ implies that 
small arms can indeed be managed if the appropriate conduct and standards are met. In 
practice, stockpile management is portrayed as an alternative to weapons disarmament, but 
only if African states adopt Western standards. The handbook on best practices in stockpile 
management was for instance produced by the OSCE.753 From a historical-relational 
perspective, stockpile management is not an isolated process but part of a broader push for 
security sector reform in Africa, embedded in neoliberal governance reform programmes that 
seek to modernize Africa by applying Western institutional practices. In doing so it portrays 
African states as the West’s Imperfect Other,754 while hiding the fact that neoliberal 
governance of small arms includes few strategies for violence prevention beyond proper 
brackets in the armouries.  
 
 
Marking 
 
At the time of the entry into force of the Nairobi Protocol, the majority of weapons held by 
national authorities and civilians in the region were unmarked. Historically, the lack of 
marking has been seen to undermine accountability, as single weapons could not be traced or 
their owners identified. When arms of unknown origin were used by insurgencies or rebel 
groups without any proof of who was responsible for supplying the weapons, confidence 
among regional stakeholders were undermined. The marking of firearms in the imperial 
period was seen as solid evidence in tracing the source of supply.755 
 
The marking of weapons is intimately linked to tracing and registering weapons, and so is an 
essential part of the existing small arms control system. Unique marks on weapons require a 
searchable database in order to be helpful. Without markings, or registration, weapons 
become free floating commodities, and most licensing systems become impossible to 
implement. Since marking generates a very ‘tangible’ outcome and requires basically 
technical solutions, marking has, together with stockpile management and weapons 
destruction, been among the most popular programmes in the region in attracting external 
support. As a result, member states have made significant progress in weapons marking and 
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registration since 2004. A lot of the progress has been due to the involvement and 
coordination of efforts by RECSA, and external financial support. To speed up the marking, 
which previously was made by hand in countries in the region, RECSA has provided forty-
three marking machines to Nairobi Protocol member states since 2006. Each machine can 
mark 500 weapons per day. RECSA has conducted training in marking exercises in fourteen 
countries and developed software designed to manage databases containing the information 
related to each weapon over the marking process. The project was initially funded by the US 
and later received financial support from the EU and Japan.756  
 
In 2013, Rwanda had completed marking the weapons belonging to the police, private 
security companies and civilians. They had also marked 80 per cent of firearms belonging to 
the army. In the case of the army, the weapons yet to be marked were those outside of 
Rwanda, for example with the Rwandan army in Darfur. These are being sent back to Rwanda 
in stages, in exchange for marked weapons.757 In Uganda, a national firearms marking 
exercise is ongoing. In mid-2013, the coverage of marked guns stood at about 98 per cent of 
Uganda police guns, 99 per cent of those held up the Uganda prisons service, 100 per cent of 
those of the Uganda wildlife authority, 70 per cent of external and internal security 
organizations, 40 per cent of private security organizations and civilian owned weapons and 
30 per cent of Uganda People’s Defense Force. The exercise is being conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol–the markings on the gun include RECSA code, 
country and institution codes and firearm serial number.758 In Somalia, the authorities are 
working with the UN Mine Action Service to begin marking Somali security forces’ weapons, 
beginning with Somalia national army weapons in Mogadishu.759 Sudan has begun the 
process of marking weapons and as of 2012 they had marked over 25,000 civilian-owned 
weapons and 26,000 weapons held by police forces.760 At the same time, the authorities in 
Sudan had registered more than 6,000 weapons in the Darfur region.761 In South Sudan, 
RECSA supplied the focal point with seven marking machines in 2011 and 2012, but the 
marking of weapons stopped after the marking of newly imported weapons had been 
achieved.762 
 
States in the region have made various degreed of progress in weapons marking in the past 
decade. Part of the reason is that not all states received marking machines at the same time, 
others received machines but not the software or training. These rather harmless teething 
problems are overshadowed by a bigger problem, namely the lack of national commitment. 
Member states seemingly want to implement the Protocol’s provisions with zero financial 
investment. This has caused serious obstacles for operational and technical programmes, even 
when there is no political disagreement. An illustrative example is that of Uganda. Ugandan 
authorities received four marking machines and training of personnel. However, the team and 
the machines are based in Kampala and there is no budget to move the team and the 
equipment to Uganda’s 120 districts. The National Focal Point does not believe that it would 
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be difficult to attract interest in marking civilian firearms in the districts. In fact, the office 
frequently receives calls from individuals who want to get their weapons marked. According 
to the Nairobi Protocol, all weapons must be marked with the national country code. Weapons 
without the marking do not receive a license. Keeping a weapon without a license can lead to 
life imprisonment according to existing legislation (however, in practice, a good justification 
may be enough to allow the holder to be let go, and the new legislation will be more clearer 
on this point).763 Implementation of the marking requirement in the Nairobi Protocol has 
fundamentally depended on states in the region being given the technical instruments and 
training from outside the region. It is hard to see how such programmes contribute to the 
empowerment of marginalized groups or to allocating the power to decide over the 
distribution of (military) resources more evenly.764 Member states appear to agree that they 
have a good enough cause not to implement a legally binding international arms control 
agreement that they arguably designed and entered into voluntarily, in case funding, training 
and technical assistance are not provided by someone outside of the agreement. Rather than 
an odd exception, the experience is similar to reports from other sectors of neoliberal 
governance reform in Africa (see chapter 4). 
 
The so-called National Firearms Registries were set up by colonial rulers and in general no 
national inventories were made after independence and prior to the adoption of the Nairobi 
Protocol. The registries were severely incomplete and outdated, recorded on paper and 
maintained by hand (paper archives are fairly common overall). Burundi is one of the 
countries that have created a new national firearms registry. The old registry only covered 
weapons held by the army. The new registry includes weapons held by civilians and the 
national police force. Three departments feed data into the registry: defence, police and 
intelligence. The National Commission on SALW coordinates the activities.765 Several states, 
including Tanzania and Rwanda, have shifted from a manual filing system to an electronic 
database at the Central Firearms Registry during the implementation period, a process that has 
required the training of personnel and computerization of existing files.766 In the process, 
Tanzania re-registered more than 87,000 civilian-owned firearms, as well as arms owned by 
various financial and government institutions (the Bank of Tanzania, the Wildlife department, 
the Tanzania National Park and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area). Weapons belonging to 
the private security companies, the forestry department, fisheries and local governments 
remained to be registered, according to reports in 2008.767  
 
The re-invention and modernization of the colonial national firearms registries are interesting 
both from a historical contingency perspective and from the point of view of neoliberal 
governance reform. Rather than creating new decentralized, national or regional systems (or 
something completely different), states have chosen to modernize the old colonial firearms 
registries. Like stockpile security, weapon markings are a way to manage small arms that 
while presumably strengthening ‘state building’ (through reducing authorized use of 
violence), does not reduce the amount of weapons or make any investment into ‘positive 
peace’. Furthermore, the licensing, electronic marking and registration are similar processes 
of administrative reform to those Harrison found in the economic governance reform in the 
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same states. The idea that security can be achieved by keeping electronic records of means of 
violence is a highly modernistic and technical approach to security, and suggestive of the 
modernization tendencies underpinning neoliberal governance arms control practices in the 
region. More broadly, the focus on small arms control as designed to solve specific problems 
has generated narrow technical projects. 
 
State capacity building 
 
Institutions  
 
National Action Plans and national points of contact were requested in the politically binding 
Nairobi Declaration from 2000, as well as the politically binding 2001 UN PoA. In 2003, 
prior to the signing of the Nairobi Protocol, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Sudan, DRC 
and Ethiopia had established national focal points, but there was ‘little that suggests following 
the established guidelines and in some cases nothing suggesting an operational institution’.768 
By 2013, all fifteen states had founded national points of contact, and all but two states had 
established national Commissions or National Focal Points on SALW. The national 
commissions/focal points are interagency directorates made up of staff members from various 
ministries affected by SALW (interior, defense, education, justice, etc). In most states, the 
commission is not an independent body but is embedded in the government and has no 
permanent budget. Burundi is an exception, where the national commission is an independent 
body with an annual budget to cover fixed expenses such as staff costs. The heads of the 
National Commissions often hold double-hatted positions as the Commissioner of the Police 
(in Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda). This makes autonomy particularly problematic. This 
shows how embedded SALW control is in the police structures in the region, not just in 
EAPCCO but also at the national level. Hills’ study on policing in sub-Saharan Africa 
underlines the close relationship between the police and the Presidency: ‘In theory and in 
practice presidents have complete authority over their police. Legislative provisions usually 
mean they can direct police operations, for example. They also control the appointment and 
tenure of their commissioners.’769 From a broader relational perspective, this set up is highly 
problematic, given that it concentrates rather than spreading the decision making related to 
small arms. Within neoliberal small arms governance, however, which emphasizes effective 
governance, the Police Commissioner is well fitted to manage the office for SALW 
coordination. A high-level law enforcement officer with close links to the Presidency is more 
likely to have the mandate and capacity to carry out projects than an independent institution 
would. 
 
Two-thirds of the member states have adopted national strategies on how to address the issues 
of SALW–so called National Action Plans. The Action Plans make frequent references to the 
Nairobi Protocol. Although National Action Plans are supposed to lay out the priorities in the 
near to mid-term, they tend to cover everything related to small arms. The time span for 
implementation is usually five years, setting impossible expectations for implementing agents. 
Furthermore, the National Action Plans come without any budget commitments from the 
government. As a result, the implementation of the Action Plans has been slow. In Uganda, 
for example, the National Action Plan was adopted in 2003 and expired in 2008. The focal 
point asked for annual extensions for several years, ‘until it couldn’t be extended anymore’. 
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The focal point’s review of the implementation of the Action Plan showed that 70 per cent of 
the National Action Plans had not been implemented, in spite of a time frame twice as long as 
what was initially agreed. The focal point had to write a second Action Plan and get it 
approved by government. It goes without saying that the contents of the two National Action 
Plans are very similar.770 From a classical arms control perspective, an Action Plan is a Plan 
of Action – i.e. it should be clear, implementable within the time frame and leave no room for 
interpretation. Ideally an Action Plan should contain tangible goals that are easy to measure in 
evaluations. Therefore, the design of the National Action Plans leaves much to be desired and 
their implementation is doomed to fail. From a Historical-Relational perspective, the Action 
Plans emphasize framing and discourses over practical implementation, and signaling to 
donor states and the international community that the state has internalized the demands and 
are addressing the issue of small arms in a ‘comprehensive’ way. Harrison argues that over-
dependence on donors undermines the impact of and commitment to agreed policies, such as 
National Action Plans: 
 
The country strategies are clearly produced by African officials with an eye to the 
international orthodoxies within which donors work … This might be the orthodoxy 
that officials themselves believe to be the most effective way to ensure progress, but it 
is also the case that a country strategy which effectively taps into international 
orthodoxies of development and governance stands a much better chance of being 
funded by donors and, as we have seen, there is not a great deal that these states can 
do in the absence of donor funding. This has led some cynically to call country 
strategies “shopping lists” to present to donors.771 
 
The broadening of the agendas in National Action Plans to areas such as awareness raising 
and state-community confidence building are positive developments in the sense that they 
help address the need for local engagement in arms control processes, and open up for the 
empowerment of marginalized groups, which is essential for arms control that aims to 
contribute to ‘positive peace’.772 This may, if it is a two-way dialogue, also start to address 
some of the underlying social conflicts that fuel the demand for small arms. This would 
require that the action plans be translated into actual programmes. Although most National 
Action Plans are publicly available, the national action plan of Djibouti, drafted in 2009, is 
not. Table 3 provides an overview of the national institutions on SALW. 
 
Table 3. National institutions on SALW 
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 National Action 
Plan 
National 
Commission/Nation
al Focal Point 
Point of contact 
Burundi Y Y Y 
Central African 
Republic 
N Y Y 
Republic of Congo  N N Y 
Djibouti Y Y Y 
DR Congo Y Y Y 
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Source: Groupe de Recherche et d`Information sur la Paix (GRIP) and Small Arms Survey, Final Report–
Baseline Study for the African Union and European Union project: The Fight Against the Illicit Accumulation 
and Trafficking of Firearms in Africa, 20 June 2013, p. 18. 
 
 
Legislative reform 
 
In the early 2000s, several national legislations on small arms in the region dated back to the 
colonial era or to early independence. Since the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol, Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda have revised their legislations. Prior to 
reform, legislations in the region was very outdated in terms of coverage. In Rwanda, the 
former firearms and ammunitions act did not cover small arms held by the police for the 
simple reason that the adoption of the law predated the establishment of the Rwandan police 
in 2000.773 Other new elements in legislation are provisions for destruction and marking, 
regulation of ownership, import permits and of private security companies. The Nairobi 
Protocol outlawed all types of semi-automatic weapons for civilian use as well as for Private 
Security Companies. For states in the region, this was a novelty. For example, only some 
semi-automatic weapons were outlawed by the Ugandan 1970 Firearms act.774 Some states 
have moved beyond the minimum standard set by the Nairobi Protocol. Eritrea has prohibited 
all civilian gun ownership.775 Djibouti has a general ban on civilian weapon ownership, 
although exceptions can be made. In all countries legal reforms have been multi-annual 
projects, financially supported by external donors who have also provided experts in drafting 
the legal revisions. Not all states have enacted the legal provisions in the Nairobi Protocol into 
national legislation. Half of the states in the region have yet to address the legal ‘gap’ through 
reforms.  
 
The role of the EAC in the process of legislative harmonization is noteworthy. EAC has a 
Legislative Assembly which is made up of parliamentarians. To support the process of 
amending national legislation, an annual regional Parliamentary Forum workshop is held to 
promote and garner support from parliamentarians for legislative reforms. The workshop has 
highlighted the importance of strengthening legislation relating to the control of SALW. It 
works to encourage parliamentarians to support and promote the approval of bills once 
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Eritrea Y Y Y 
Ethiopia N Y Y 
Kenya Y Y Y 
Rwanda Y Y Y 
Seychelles  Y N Y 
Somalia  N Y Y 
South Sudan  N Y Y 
Sudan Y Y Y 
Tanzania  Y Y Y 
Uganda Y Y Y 
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drafted and submitted to national parliaments.776 Legal reform is important to the ongoing 
governance reform of African arms control and demonstrates the ideals of liberal 
institutionalism. The conclusions from the parliamentary forum indicate a circular logic, that 
regional parliamentarians now draw the same conclusions as the European Commission in 
2006, regarding the need to harmonize legislation related to the control of SALW in Africa at 
the regional level (see chapter 4). Legislative reform could provide an opportunity to break 
with colonial legal legacies as well as the Western liberal small arms discourse. Although 
there are examples of stricter gun ownership laws after the legislative reform compared to the 
laws in the EU (where civilians may own e.g. semiautomatic weapons), most of the 
amendments have not meant discontinuity. Instead neoliberal governance reform has been 
used to ‘modernize’ African national legislations in line with the legislative amendments that 
have been enacted in Europe in the past half a century with regards to firearms. It has also 
been used to ground technical arms control in legislation for example, in terms of introducing 
marking requirements.777 In doing so, technical programmes become ways to implement 
national law, rather than means to implement external standards. 
 
 
Regional institution building 
 
One shift in the provisions in the Nairobi Declaration to the Nairobi Protocol is the 
strengthening of the regional secretariat on SALW. The Regional Centre on Small Arms in 
the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is an 
intergovernmental organization established in June 2005 at the Third Ministerial Review 
Conference of the Nairobi Declaration in Kenya. RECSA acceded the Secretariat established 
under the Nairobi Declaration. The previous secretariat, based in the Kenyan Department of 
Foreign Affairs, was succeeded by an independent regional secretariat with its own legal 
mandate, budget and premises. RECSA is comprised of three organs, the Council of 
Ministers, the Technical Advisory Committee and the Secretariat.778  
 
The Council of Ministers is composed of ministers from signatory states. The council meets 
every two years in the country of the chairperson, whose post is rotated among member states 
(similar to the Council of the EU’s rotating presidency). The functions of the council include: 
‘approving RECSA’s budget and administrative documents, making policy and controlling 
the functioning of RECSA, appointing the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive 
Secretary, and reviewing reports received from the Secretariat’.779  
 
The Technical Advisory Committee is made up by the Executive Secretary, National Focal 
Point Coordinators and civil society representatives. The work of the committee is led by a 
chairperson and a deputy chairperson, both of whom are nominated to office for a two-year 
period. The committee convenes twice a year in the country of the chairperson of the 
committee. The functions of the Technical Advisory Committee include: ‘reviewing and 
revising the annual work plan and budget when necessary, supporting RECSA in resource 
mobilisation and advocacy programmes, evaluating and monitoring RECSA’s activities, and 
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identifying and endorsing strategies undertaken or to be undertaken by member states and/or 
partners to combat the illicit proliferation of SALW. The Technical Advisory Committee also 
sets the agenda for the meeting of the Council of Ministers’.780 
 
The RECSA secretariat’s task is to assist member states to effectively implement the Nairobi 
Protocol. The secretariat is staffed by officials from member states, and is a purely 
intergovernmental, rather than a supranational body. Its mandate is to coordinate action 
against illicit SALW proliferation in the region.781 Past activities have included supporting 
countries in developing national action plans, assisting in harmonizing SALW legislation 
throughout the region and developing a regional strategy for stopping the misuse and 
trafficking of firearms, including marking and stockpile management. RECSA also has 
programmes that aim towards building the capacities of law-enforcement agencies. The 
secretariat also develops partnerships between governments, civil society and donor agencies, 
and raises public awareness about the importance of combating illegal SALW. RECSA 
directed the development of the Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on SALW, approved by the Third Ministerial 
Review Conference in June 2005. The guide sets out general operational guidelines and 
procedures on all aspects of SALW, to contribute to the development of policy and the review 
of national legislation.782 A similar legislative guide was developed within the framework of 
the UN Firearms Protocol in 2002-2003. None of the 24 experts developing the guide was 
from the region of the Nairobi Protocol; only one expert was from sub-Saharan Africa, 
whereas 13 experts were from Canada, USA, Western Europe and Japan.783 As previously 
noted, the OSCE has also produced a more general guide on small arms control. 
 
RECSA and the signatory states to the Nairobi Protocol have been highly reliant on external 
support in implementing the Nairobi Protocol. One reason is that RECSA does not receive 
enough funding from the member states, which has caused it to depend on external donations. 
The annual fee for members is 70,000 USD per year. Some member states pay a little, while 
other do not pay anything at all–and have not done so since 2004. Mid-level officials from the 
member states staff RECSA, and in the past there has been an overlap between states’ 
payments of their annual member fees and the nationality of the RECSA staff members. The 
RECSA secretariat negotiates funding with external donors, but the secretariat and its staff are 
neither autonomous nor high level enough to initiate political or sensitive projects and so are 
trusted mainly with technical projects. National Focal Points have very little say in which 
areas should be supported. Several funders, in particular the EU, prefer to deal only with 
RECSA rather than directly with individual member states. International organizations, other 
regional bodies such as the African Union and NGOs often coordinate their work connected 
to small arms with RECSA for maximum impact. So far, the EU and its member states are the 
largest donors to national activities and to RECSA programmes. It is clear that the EU has 
influence over what type of projects, and deliverables, that they fund. On one occasion, when 
RECSA requested technical support and training in investigative techniques, the EU ‘wanted 
meetings’, according to RECSA.784 The centrality of RECSA in small arms control in the 
region has not been a pure rational choice of institutional design made by member states, but 
                                                
780 Dye (2009), Arms control in a rough neighbourhood, p. 3. 
781 Author interview with Regional Centre on Small Arms, Nairobi, 5 Sep. 2013. 
782 Dye (2009), Arms control in a rough neighbourhood, p. 5. 
783 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2004) Legislative guides for the implementation of the united 
nations convention against transnational organized crime and the protocol thereto (New York). 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf 
784 Author interview with Regional Centre on Small Arms, Nairobi, 5 Sep. 2013. 
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has emerged, at least partially, from donors’ preferences. It can be seen as one extension of 
the donor push for region building and regionalization in neoliberal governance in sub-
Saharan Africa during the past couple of decades (see chapter 4), in which the EU and its 
member states play leading roles. 
 
The EU SALW strategy, adopted by the European Council in 2005, singles out Africa as the 
continent most affected by the impact of internal conflicts aggravated by the destabilising 
influx of SALW, and the continent where assistance is most needed. Thus, the EU has made 
small arms control in Africa its own policy objective.785 The EU has funded multiple million-
euro projects, including a project on illicit SALW with a budget of €3.3 million in 2012-15, 
and provided €500,000 for RECSA to coordinate a project aimed at enhancing the role of civil 
society and national efforts in the prevention, control and reduction of illicit SALW.786 
Although not a lot of money in relative terms, the donations from the EU are equivalent to all 
member states’ fees combined for the three years period of the project. The money not only 
funds the majority of the activities carried out by RECSA but also buy out the member states’ 
own financial contributions. The national reports from countries in the region to UNPoA 
make several further references to external funding from EU member states. Tanzania reports 
financial support from the UK DfiD, the European Commission787 and from Germany.788 The 
UK funded the regional secretariat that preceded RECSA with  
£500,000 in start up funding 2001-2004.789 Netherlands financially supported Rwanda’s 
National Action Plan.790 The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency funded 
and managed a project on increasing the capacity of regional organizations in sub-Saharan 
Africa to prevent, manage and resolve armed conflicts on the continent, including the issue of 
state-building and small arms control.791 Denmark funded the Small Arms Survey and Kenya 
National Focal Point’s study on small arms in Kenya in 2012.792 Other donors include USA, 
Japan and UNDP. Japan and UNDP have provided close to one million USD for the 
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, including the development of guidelines and 
standards on practical disarmament, and for strengthening national and regional institutions 
on SALW.793 In 2015 RECSA received a grant of US$1.5 million from the African 
                                                
785 Council of the European Union, Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their 
ammunition, 5319/06, 16 Dec. 2005, pp. 4-6. 
786 Regional Centre on Small Arms, ‘RECSA signs Funding Agreement for Small Arms Work with the European 
Union’, <http://www.recsasec.org/> (accessed 26 Nov. 2012). 
787 Tanzania national report to United Nations, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA), 2006, p. 12. 
788 Tanzania national repor to United Nations, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA), 2008, p. 4. 
789 Thusi, 2003, p. 24. 
790 Rwanda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2009) Rwanda National Action Plan for 
Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Management (Kigali), p. 3. 
791 Nthiga, Monicah, ‘International Training Programme Peace and Security in Africa (PASA): 2012–2013’, 
Africa Peace Forum, 17 Oct. 2012 URL 
http://www.amaniafrika.org/index.php?option=com_newsarticle&view=newsarticle&n=15 (accessed 25 Aug. 
2015). 
792 Wepundi, Manasseh et. al. (2012), Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An 
Assessment (Geneva: Small Arms Survey). 
793 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons programme’, 
URL http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/regionalcentre.html 
(accessed 25 Aug. 2015). 
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Development Bank to finance technical assistance and capacity building to enhance regional 
and national stability through reduction of small arms proliferation.794  
 
The total dependence on external funding has serious implications but is also illustrative of 
African regional small arms governance as a neoliberal governance reform programme. First, 
donors tend to support projects with certain immediate tangible results, such as marking, 
stockpile management and weapon destruction, but are less likely to invest in more long term 
or political projects. Donors also have a vested interest in supporting successful projects.795 
Second, external funding tends to support the use of external consultants (frequently from 
their own country or region or origin) rather than building institutional capacity. Projects 
which lack national ownership will most likely run into problems the moment the funding 
runs out. As only one example, the setting up of a national monitoring function on small 
armed violence in Burundi crumbled the moment the UNDP withdrew its funding. Third, the 
maintenance of vertical ties to Europe inhibits the forging of horizontal ones in Africa. Close 
relations are strongest in the more reformed and stable African countries, such as Kenya and 
Tanzania, who are also the leaders in regionalism.796  
 
The EU and its member states play vital roles and enjoy great influence over policy, not only 
as the largest financial supporter to the regional arms control institutions and programmes but 
also as the region’s largest trading partner and aid donor. The lack of regional ownership 
opens up the field for foreign influences, in which effectiveness might be understood in a 
different manner. Success might be defined as incremental steps towards a standard or model 
based on another political context and runs the risk of creating an image mirroring 
developments elsewhere. Research in other areas of regional cooperation has underlined the 
role of European governments and the EU institutions in encouraging regional solutions. In 
his study on external influence on SADC, Buzdugan found that the EU had been absolutely 
influential on both policy and institutional developments. The Southern African regional 
organization was even staffed with British citizens in its early years.797 As the German foreign 
office announced in the launch of a major aid package to the EAC, which included a 14 
million euro grant for the new EAC Headquarters’ building in Arusha, German support was 
contingent on the use of its own historical experience as a model: ‘Influenced by its own 
positive experience of the merits of integration, the German Government considers regional 
integration key for economic development, prosperity, peace and security in the East African 
region’.798 From a neoliberal governance perspective, which favours technical and operational 
approaches, foreign financial contributions are not problematic, but even necessary due to the 
capacity constraints and competing priorities in the region. The chosen strategy adopts a 
legalistic or problem-solving approach to small arms, including incremental steps towards 
modernization as defined by Western donors. 
 
                                                
794 Regional Centre on Small Arms, Technical assistance and capacity building RECSA-African Development 
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Critiques against neoliberal governance models in Africa have stressed the role played by 
European donor agencies in promoting, enforcing, and supporting regional governance 
models based on neoliberal goals of generating an ‘enabling’ environment, which would 
allow for a closer integration of Africa into the world economy.799 The external involvement 
in the Nairobi Protocol is not accidental or unintended, but rather a central characteristic of  
neoliberal governance. Relating the regionalization of small arms control in Africa to other 
regional governance reform programmes, as well as to the entangled histories of Africa and 
Europe, suggest that these outcomes are constitutive of the neoliberal governance reform of 
arms control in Africa, as it has been largely driven and encouraged by outside actors within a 
particular development discourse. 
 
 
An emerging cross-national civil society  
 
The region has an emerging cross-national civil society dedicated to issues of SALW. The 
Eastern African Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA) is a regional civil society 
network with a secretariat in Kampala. EEANSA was set up in 2002 and is made up of 
national ‘network chapters’ of NGOs, individuals, community groups and professional 
associations in the member states of the Nairobi Protocol. Its mission is to contribute towards 
the achievement of a more just and violence-free environment, sustainable peace, 
development, human security and respect of human rights, especially through the curbing of 
excessive buildup and misuse of SALW in the region. EAANSA coordinates civil society at 
the regional level, while working to develop and manage the civil society national action 
network. It advocates to ensure human security as an essential part of the efforts to reduce 
demand and control of SALW. The organization works with the national focal points as well 
as other local and international partners. EAANSA monitors and advocates for the full 
implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol. In Rwanda, the national 
chapter has for example advocated for the office of the national focal point to be more 
approachable to the public. 800   
 
The Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa 
(FECCLAHA) is a regional network of churches which runs multi-annual projects on SALW 
and peace building. FECCLAHA’s small arms work, which is funded by Norway, focuses on 
sensitization, training, advocacy and engaging church leaders throughout the greater region. 
In 2014 FECCLAHA signed a five-year Memorandum of Understanding with RECSA. 
Following the MoU, RECSA signed an agreement with the African Peace Forum. The 
agreements will enable RECSA to collaborate with the two organisations to undertake joint 
small arms work in the areas of advocacy, research and documentation, peace building and 
conflict transformation and capacity building, among others.801  
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that the mission and mandate of EAANSA is a clear 
example that issues of small arms control in the forms of political, more transformative 
projects reside among citizens in the region, even when this is neglected by funders. 
EAANSA could thus be interpreted as an alternative, or resistance to, neoliberal governance. 
According to Slater, however, working with civil society in the global south is the third step 
in neoliberal governance reform, which he calls ‘building social capital’ (after SAPs and good 
                                                
799 Söderbaum (2004), ‘Modes of Regional Governance in Africa’, p. 423. 
800 Author interview with Eastern Africa Action on Small Arms (EAANSA) representative, 22 Aug. 2013. 
801 Regional Centre on Small Arms, ‘RECSA Signs MoUs With FECCLAHA and APFO’, URL 
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governance).802 From this perspective, the neoliberal governance reform of arms control in the 
region has rather surprisingly been dominated by intergovernmental cooperation. Neoliberal 
governance reformists could probably find great allies within civil society, quite possibly 
resulting in more resources being funded through civil society in the future. 
 
Transparency  
 
Transparency provisions under the Nairobi Protocol refer mainly to civilian-held weapons, 
and to information exchange between member states, which is not publicly available. Member 
states are meant to submit monthly reports to RECSA on developments at the national level. 
The reports are inconsistent, according to RECSA, and not available to the public, which 
make them difficult to assess.803 In the UN, countries have committed reporting every two 
years on the implementation of the PoA and the international tracing instrument. States are 
required to present reports during technical advisory committee meetings on progress made in 
implementing the protocol. In addition, they also are required to submit biannual reports to 
the UN prior to PoA review conferences. These reports are accessible on the website of the 
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.804 The reports submitted to UNPoA from member states 
of the Nairobi Protocol have developed and in general become much more detailed and 
informative during the period 2003-14. All national reports refer to the Nairobi Protocol, its 
activities and to RECSA, showing the importance of the regional protocol in implementing 
the UN level agreement. 
 
 
Table 4. National reports submitted to UNPoA 2003-14 
                                                
802 Slater (2004), Geopolitics and the post-colonial, p. 88. 
803 Author interview with RECSA representatives, 5 Sep. 2013. 
804 Dye (2009), Arms control in a rough neighbourhood, p. 6. 
 Number of submitted 
reports 2003-14 
Level of detail/progress 
Burundi 8 Detailed, great improvement 
over time 
Republic of Congo 
(signatory) 
3 Detailed, some 
improvement 
Central African Republic   
Djibouti 3 Fairly detailed, no 
improvement 
DR Congo 3 Detailed, with improvement 
Eritrea 3 Not very detailed, no 
improvement (same info 
provided)  
Ethiopia 1 Fairly detailed, More 
detailed in 2008 compared 
to 2002. 
Kenya 7 Very detailed, have 
maintained high level 
Rwanda 3 Detailed, same over time (a 
lot of the information 
resubmitted) 
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rency instrument is the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The register is a database to 
which states submit annual national reports on national conventional arms imports and 
exports (including SALW). Thus, the Register goes beyond the provisions in the Nairobi 
Protocol and is arguably not a good indicator for implementation of the regional regime’s 
article on transparency. The participation of all African states in the Registry is the lowest in 
the world. During the period 2009-2013, participation decreased from four African states to 
only one state submitting a national report.805 Although arguably not directly applicable to the 
Nairobi Protocol, contributing to the Registry at least applies to the objective of the Protocol 
on encouraging accountability and effective management of SALW held by state parties. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The types of projects which have been created as part of implementing the Nairobi Protocol 
are strongly indicative of what Galtung refers to as ‘legalist’, Krause and Latham refer to as 
‘Western arms control culture’ and Harrison refers to as a governance approach to small arms 
control. For this thesis, the implementation record of the Nairobi Protocol shows what type of 
arms control practices are generated or encouraged in the neoliberal governance period of 
small arms control in Africa. Small arms control practices have been designed as an 
incremental process with a limited reach, focusing almost exclusively on technical material 
programmes. Several aspects of existing programmes refer to modernizing and formalizing 
legal-bureaucratic practices. Within this framework, states in the region show great progress 
in implementing many of the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol, including on weapon 
management systems, national capacity building, legislative and administrative reform and 
regional institution building. The implementation records in the different countries show a 
gap between states that have internalized the obligations and discourse of neoliberal small 
arms governance (Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi) and those that are more isolated and 
resist external pressures (Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan). The two groups of 
states follow Harrison’s definition and prediction of liberal governance reform, namely that 
the success of such efforts depends on their embeddedness in so-called ‘governance states’, 
i.e. those states which are undertaking liberal governance reforms broadly in both political 
and economic developments. Following Slater’s expectation of neoliberal reform as including 
both SAPs, good governance and social capital, some projects are involving more 
marginalized stakeholders, such as local civil society organizations. In spite of the positive 
implementation record of the Nairobi Protocol, arms control is perceived not to have 
addressed core issues related to armed violence, which points to limits inherent in the 
neoliberal governance approach in generating substantial results in terms of improved 
                                                
805 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) database, <http://www.un-register.org/>. 
Seychelles (signatory) 0  
Somalia (signatory) 1 Not very detailed 
South Sudan (signatory) 2 Not detailed to fairly 
detailed 
Sudan 4 Not very detailed/fairly 
detailed 
Tanzania (signatory) 5 Very detailed, have 
maintained high level 
Uganda 6 Very detailed, have 
maintained high level 
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security. From a peace research point of view, this type of arms control regime at best 
contributes to a reduction of personal violence, but it does not contribute towards social 
justice or vertical development. It does not seek to empower marginalized groups or to share 
the power of deciding over the distribution of (military) resources more evenly. It seems 
important then to investigate whether it is possible to make the claim that the Nairobi 
Protocol, as a case of neoliberal governance, indeed contributes to the reduction of personal 
violence. 
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Chapter 7. The limits of neoliberal governance of small 
arms: the case of the Nairobi Protocol  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 identified the Nairobi Protocol as one outcome, and constitutive aspect, of 
neoliberal governance reform in African small arms control practices commencing in the 
1990s. Chapter 6 analysed the Protocol’s implementation–not primarily in order to measure 
its ‘effectiveness’ in the typical regime-analysis sense, but to identify what type of arms 
control practices neoliberal governance reform has generated in Africa. This chapter delves 
deeper into this question by considering the shortcomings of neoliberal governance of small 
arms, through investigating small arms related security aspects not addressed by the Protocol.  
 
The previous chapter concluded that neoliberal governance reform has pushed for addressing 
what has been framed as dysfunctional arms control institutions in Africa by applying 
Western standards of reform, with a focus on technical, quantifiable outcomes. Understanding 
the meaning of neoliberal arms control governance does not only entail the unpacking of 
practices, but reflecting on what practices are left out from such an approach. Although such 
issues may be considered besides the point or irrelevant, they could also be considered as 
indirectly enabled through their lack of incorporation in neoliberal arms governance, and 
therefore relevant in thinking about the meaning and value of neoliberal small arms control.  
 
The following sections consider arms import, military spending, political stability and 
military-civilian relations in the region since the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol in 2004. 
Although Betts argues that ‘the function of a security system is to produce security, and the 
system should be judged by how it does so rather than by other things associated with it’, 
regime theory would argue that measuring the effectiveness of a security regime based on 
indicators that are outside the agreement is deeply inappropriate.806 Although regime theorists 
would not expect implementation to go beyond agreed commitments, the value of neoliberal 
arms governance practices such as the Nairobi Protocol is doubtful if evidence of 
militarization, conflict or instability prevails or is increased in the particular region, 
potentially even as a result of the existence of a highly regarded structure of arms control, at 
least from a broader perspective of small arms control or peace research.  
 
Arms imports and military expenditure 
 
A government’s arms imports, unless that state is under an arms embargo, is not covered by 
the Nairobi Protocol, which clearly confirms the right of states to self-defense. Yet a rather 
fundamental question–also for mainstream perspectives such as neoliberal governance–is 
whether the weapons in the region have actually been reduced as a result of the Nairobi 
Protocol. One paradox, noted by Glismann and Horn, is that arms control regimes that 
increase trust between states may lead to increased trade, including in military products.807 
According to NISAT, the 15 states in the region have imported SALW from over 50 states 
since the signing of the Nairobi Protocol (2004-2013). The largest exporter is China. Other 
large exporters include France, Italy, United States, South Africa, India, Israel, Russia, UK, 
                                                
806 Betts (1992), ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War’, p. 8. 
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vol. 16, no. 1, p. 12. 
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Ukraine, Pakistan and South Korea. There are several indicators that SALW imports have 
actually increased after the adoption of the Protocol compared to the previous decade. For the 
period 1991-2003 the region imported SALW for 190 million USD in current prices (on 
average 14.6 million USD per year), of which Kenya imported SALW worth 120.7 million 
USD. Since the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol in 2004, the value of imports has increased 
to 398 million USD.  
 
The population increase between 2003 and 2013 was between 12.5 per cent (in the 
Seychelles) and 40.5 per cent (in Uganda), with most countries experiencing an increase of 
about 30 per cent. Kenya and CAR have significantly reduced their imports of SALW during 
this period, and Kenya has significantly reduced its share of the region’s overall recorded 
imports. Kenya’s recorded imports fell from 9.3 million USD per year in 1991-2003 to 5.2 
million USD per year 2004-2013, a drop of 46 per cent. In CAR, recorded imports were 
reduced from 10.6 million USD per year 1991-2003 to 6.2 million USD per year 2004-2013. 
In the period 2004-13, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya were the largest absolute importers of 
SALW; however, the ROC was the per capita largest importer (table 5). According to SIPRI, 
Uganda (17%) and Kenya (23 %) were the largest importers of SALW in all of sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2013.808 
 
The increase in SALW import data primarily reflects greater transparency in documentation 
of imports, in Burundi, Ethiopia, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. More 
transfers are recorded and at greater values during the period 2004-13 compared to 1991-
2003. A significant change is enhanced records on Chinese transfers. A complete lack of 
transparency in SALW imports remains in Djibouti, DRC, Eritrea and Somalia. In these four 
states, the Nairobi protocol has not achieved greater transparency. Also, there are no records 
for South Sudan after independence from Sudan in 2011.  
 
Table 5. Recorded SALW imports 1991-2013 
 Value SALW 
imports (1991-2003) 
Value SALW imports 
(2004-2013) 
Burundi 125,384 11,590,698 
Central African 
Republic 
10,556,507 6,170,948 
Republic of 
Congo  
7,806,575 32,651,741 
Djibouti - 45,498 
DR Congo - - 
Eritrea 55,363 - 
Ethiopia 20,149,860 81,182,439 
Kenya 120,737,673 50,236,365 
Rwanda 16,189 1,029,539 
Seychelles  265,645 282,792 
Somalia  - - 
South Sudan  - - 
Sudan 25,662,441 186,705,643 
Tanzania  2,762,780 7,114,888 
                                                
808 SIPRI data, quoted in Matsiko, Haggai, ’Uganda, Sudan enter arms race’, The Independent, 19 April 2013, 
URL http://www.independent.co.ug/cover-story/7682-uganda-sudan-enter-arms-race (accessed 5 Sep. 2013). 
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Uganda 2,328,849 20,791,634 
Regional total 190,467,266 397,802,185 
 
In addition to recorded transfers, there are illegal sales of weapons. According to the UN 
report of the Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia, 445 instances of arms transfers or 
seizures, involving almost 50,000 SALW, were recorded between May 2004 and July 2011. 
According to unconfirmed data from the EAANSA, a total of 300,000 SALW were smuggled 
into EAC countries in the period 2002-12.809 Since we do not know how many weapons were 
smuggled into the region before the Nairobi Protocol, and the data on smuggling after its 
adoption are also highly uncertain, it is very difficult to know whether the Nairobi Protocol 
has achieved one of its primary objectives, namely to reduce illicit weapons flows in the 
region. From an historical-relational perspective, however, the liberal reform in the region 
although it might have missed its target to reduce trafficking, can still be on track to realize its 
much broader objective: to build governance states. Although the data available is incomplete 
and inconsistent, it is possible that the region is in the process of formalizing at least part of 
its previously undeclared weapon imports.  
 
Military expenditure has almost doubled at the regional level, an increase from 16.6 billion 
USD to 31.8 billion USD in real terms (92 %), equal to the African total, which indicates a 91 
per cent increase since 2005. At least ten countries have increased their military expenditure 
in the first decade after the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol, compared to the decade before. 
No data is available for Somalia. South Sudan had the highest military spending during the 
entire period. Only Burundi and Djibouti have reduced their military spending since the 
adoption of the Nairobi Protocol. Sudan’s spending officially decreased after the 
independence of South Sudan, but has divided into two national outlays rather than actually 
being reduced. Seychelles, Djibouti, Eritrea and Tanzania had the highest military spending 
relative to population in the region. 
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Table 6. Changes in military expenditure 1995-2004 to 2005-2014 (in USD million, in 
2014 prices) 
 
 
Source: SIPRI military expenditure database, April 2015. 
 
 
A country’s military expenditure as a share of GDP—also known as the military burden—is 
the simplest measure of the relative economic burden that the military places on the country. 
In general, most countries worldwide have seen a decline in their military burdens since the 
end of the cold war, although this trend has reversed slightly in recent years. In 2014 about 55 
per cent of countries for which SIPRI had data bore military burdens below 1.5 per cent of 
GDP. South Sudan and ROC have the third largest and sixth largest military spending per 
GDP in the world, and both have experienced a significant increase of military spending as 
part of GDP since 2005. For South Sudan, spending has gone up from 6 to 9.5 per cent of 
GDP, for ROC spending was a little under two per cent in 2004 and close to six per cent in 
2014.810 Seen over a ten-year period, however, ROC has only slightly increased its military 
spending compared to 2004. Sudan and South Sudan have had the largest increases of military 
spending in 2005-2014, compared to 1995-2004. Seven states in the region have decreased 
military spending as part of GDP, in six countries significantly so: between 42 and 95 per 
cent.  
 
Official defence spending is likely to be an underestimate of actual defence spending, since it 
tends not to include external sources or classified expenditure. Ugandan defence spending has 
increase substantially in recent years. The figure does not include classified expenditure, 
which is usually the largest component of Uganda’s defence budget. The army does not reveal 
certain expenditures due to national security.811 
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Table 7. Military spending as part of GDP 
Yearly 
average 
1995-2004 
Yearly 
average 
2005-2014 
Change in 
% 
Burundi 6.4% 3.0% -53 
CAR 1% 1.6% 60 
ROC 2.4% 2.6% 8 
DRC 1.29% 1.8% 39 
Djibouti 5.45% 5.1% -6 
Eritrea 4.4% .. 
Ethiopia 23.9%  1.3% -95 
Kenya 1.5% 1.9% 27 
Rwanda 3.7% 1.4% -62 
Seychelles 1.9% 1.1% -42 
Somalia - - - 
South 
Sudan 2.7% 6.8% 152 
Sudan 1.4% 3.3% 136 
Tanzania 2.4% 1.1% -54 
Uganda 6.4% 2.3% -64 
 
The neoliberal governance reform of small arms control does not aim to reduced trade in 
military technologies, but only to reduce the informal trade, which is seen as undercutting 
formal markets, institutions and arms production. Available data on small arms imports in the 
region since the entry into force of the Nairobi Protocol highlight this aspect. According to 
Kienscherf, liberal security governance is based on forms of ‘risk management’ in which 
some individuals, populations and spaces are profiled as enemies of the liberal order. A 
similar categorization can be seen in neoliberal small arms control governance, in which 
manufacturing, trade and users outside of the liberal sphere need to be excluded because they 
are held to pose a threat to the free circulation of safe forms of life.812 Hence neoliberal 
governance of small arms is characterized by its enabling purpose, including with regards to 
the neoliberal proliferation of small arms technology. The problem of small arms, according 
to neoliberal governance, is not the weapon technology itself or the profits generated by 
production and proliferation, but the dysfunctionalities of the control system. Hence 
neoliberal governance with regards to arms control is rather about small arms ‘management’ 
than reductions. As argued in previous chapters, the ‘illiberal space’ and ‘inappropriate 
conduct’ are perceived as being in need of improved management through formalization and 
modernizing neoliberal governance reform. Black and grey markets need to be ‘whitened’ 
into formal trade markets, not disappear or be reduced. States can, it is perceived, move along 
a continuum from illiberal to liberal space, or as Kienscherf argues, move in the process of 
‘becoming-liberal’. Reformed states may transcend the illiberal space to become appropriate 
end-users, and thereby shift their location on a hierarchy of liberal development.813   
 
                                                
812 Kienscherf, Markus (2016), ‘Beyond militarization and repression: Liberal social control as 
pacification’, Critical Sociology, vol. 42, no. 7, p. 1183, p. 1187. 
813 Kienscherf (2016), ‘Beyond militarization and repression’, p. 1183. 
 155 
Political stability and absence of violence  
 
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators measured political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism at national level in the region at three points in time: 2003, 2008 and 
2013. In table 8 below, estimated governance scores range between approximately  
-2.5 to +2.5 worldwide, with higher values corresponding with better governance, according 
to the World Bank’s definition. Several states in the region rank in the bottom worldwide 
(notable Somalia, followed by Sudan). Nonetheless, nine states in the region rank higher in 
2013 compared to 2003. Burundi, Djibouti, Tanzania, ROC, Rwanda and Uganda show more 
significant improvement on the World Bank’s governance index, i.e. a partial movement in 
neoliberal governance reform. There is an overlap between those states that have performed 
well in the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol and those of which the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators show overall improved political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism. Although general indicators of governance have their weaknesses in terms 
of measuring actual environments or changes in security, they do illustrate an overlap 
between states which have internalized security reform and general neoliberal governance 
reform as it is identified by the international community. The sort of indicators created by the 
World Bank can therefore be said to measure neoliberal governance reform as understood by 
the international financial institutions, in which performance in one set of indicators will 
create a positive feedback loop, resulting in high performance ratings in other governance and 
development indexes. 
 
Table 8. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, accessed Mar. 2015, 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>. 
 
 
Both on the measures on Accountability and on Anti-corruption, only six states in the region 
have improved governance over the period, and the scale of improvements has been 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Burundi
CAR
DRC
ROC
Djibuti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Rwanda
Seychelles
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
2013
2008
2003
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smaller.814 As has been noted, the Nairobi Protocol lacks provisions on such aspects (see 
chapter 5). 
 
A worrying aspect of the limited effectiveness on violence reduction in the region is reports of 
human rights abuses by security forces, including during disarmament campaigns, 
peacekeeping missions and national elections. There are many reported incidents of abuse by 
national armies during disarmament programmes in the region. According to civil society 
organizations, poorly coordinated disarmament initiatives in the region have actually been 
found to increase SALW proliferation pressures. Such was the result in the case of the attempt 
at forcible disarmament in the Karamojong region of Uganda in 2002. The local pastoralists 
refused to relinquish their weapons for fear that neighbouring communities would take 
advantage of their weakness. When Ugandan forces moved in, armed violence erupted, 
resulting in many deaths on both sides. In some documented cases, the national forces 
gathering the weapons later traded them to others as a means of supplementing their income 
or even for food.815 In a disarmament campaign in the same region in 2011, Ugandan military 
defence officials acknowledged that soldiers killed ten civilians in Karamojong, four of them 
children, in a crossfire in Kotido. Two Karamoja parliamentarians accused the army of killing 
between 48 and 55 civilians in April-August 2011. Furthermore, the Rapid Response Unit, a 
section of the Ugandan police created to combat armed crime, has been reported to detain 
people without charges, resulting in the death of at least two people in 2011.816 In spite of 
being in the forefront of the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, Uganda’s security forces 
regularly use lethal force, especially during political demonstrations, according to Human 
Rights Watch:  
 
Opposition politicians, their supporters, and some journalists face harassment, beatings, 
and arrest. The Ugandan military, despite efforts by key donor countries to 
“professionalize” them, has yet to address the severe due process violations in military 
courts–especially the prosecution of civilians, who should be tried in civilian courts. 
Torture in detention is endemic, with torturers rarely brought to justice.817  
 
Soldiers carrying out a civilian disarmament operation in South Sudan were accused of 
violating human rights during the operation. Soldiers in ‘Operation Restore Peace’, which 
started in March 2012 in response to inter-communal violence, have reportedly committed 
serious crimes against civilians while carrying out the campaign, including specific incidents 
of soldiers shooting at civilians, beating civilians, tying them up with rope and submerging 
their heads in water to extract information about the location of weapons. At least 14 people 
were killed in the disarmament campaign.818 Kenya, another prominent state in the 
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, has been accused of human rights abuses by Kenyan 
security forces in the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya and for using excessive 
                                                
814 World Bank, ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’, accessed Mar. 2015, 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>. 
815 Mkutu, Kennedy (2003), ‘Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region’, 
(Saferworld), URL http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral conflict.pdf (accessed 1 Mar. 2013), 
p. 13. 
816 Human Rights Watch (2011), ‘World Report–Uganda’, URL http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/uganda 
(accessed 1 June 2013). 
817 Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda’ URL http://www.hrw.org/africa/uganda (accessed 1 June 2013). 
818 Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan: End Abuses by Disarmament Forces in Jonglei–Urgent Need for Justice 
and Accountability’, 23 Aug. 2012, URL https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/23/south-sudan-end-abuses-
disarmament-forces-jonglei (accessed 25 Aug. 2015). 
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force in disarmament operations in Mandera and Samburu districts.819 Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice-President William Ruto face charges in the International Criminal 
Court for leading opposing sides in the ethnic violence that followed disputed elections in 
2007. This violence killed 1,500 people and left 600,000 homeless. During the 2013 elections 
in Kenya, the government deployed over 90,000 military personnel to guarantee ‘peaceful’ 
elections.820  
 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has deployed troops in Somalia since 
2007 to re-establish and train Somali security forces and to assist them in the fight against Al-
Shabaab. The troop-contributing countries are Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti 
and Sierra Leone. In 2014, Human Rights Watch published a report on the extensive sexual 
violence committed by the AMISOM soldiers on internally displaced girls and women in 
Mogadishu in 2013-14. During this short period of time, Human Rights Watch documented 
10 separate incidents of sexual abuse, including rape and sexual assault, and 14 cases of 
sexual exploitation. The abuses were predominantly carried out by personnel of the Ugandan 
People’s Defence Forces at and around AMISOM’s headquarters, the AMISOM base camp, 
and at the camp of the Burundian National Defense Forces.821 Sexual abuse by government 
forces on civilian population is not unique to Somalia. In February 2015, Human Rights 
Watch reported the rape of 221 women and girls by the Sudanese military in Tabit, Darfur, 
within a period of 36 hours on 30-31 October 2014.822 
 
The seemingly contradictory result of emerging regional governance of small arms on the one 
hand and lingering militarism on the other in greater East Africa in the past decade, may not 
be so paradoxical when seen from a critique of neoliberal governance.823 Outside Africa, 
neoliberal governance states have been associated with comparatively high levels of inter-
personal violence and solutions based on punitive criminal justice systems rather than social 
welfare approaches to reduce inter-personal violence. Although often associated with an 
overall reduction of state spending, neoliberal states have also been linked with comparatively 
high state spending in the area of law and order, including the military.824 There are key roles 
for militarism in neoliberal governance states: to exercise control and establish the state 
monopoly of violence; to extract and allocate resources; to enable integration in the 
international economy and capital accumulation. Because there are very few preventive 
conflict management strategies in African regional security governance, military force is seen 
as the conventional solution. According to Söderbaum, military interventions can be 
characterized as quick-fix operations, often conducted on an arbitrary basis in which personal 
relationships and the mood and strength of political leaders determine the outcome.825  
 
                                                
819 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2011: Kenya’, URL http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/kenya 
(accessed 25 Aug. 2015). 
820 Macharia, Keguro, ‘The Kenya election and the militarisation of “’peace”’, The East African,  9 Mar. 2013, 
URL http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/The-Kenya-election-and-the-militarisation-of-peace/-
/434750/1715508/-/y62oo7/-/index.html/ (accessed 5 Sep. 2013). 
821 Human Rights Watch (Sep. 2014), “The Power These Men Have Over Us” Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by 
African Union Forces in Somalia (Human Rights Watch: USA). 
822 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sudan: Mass Rape by Army in Darfur’, 11 Feb. 2015, URL  
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/sudan-mass-rape-army-darfur (accessed 25 Aug. 2015). 
823 Sjögren, Anders (2013), pp. 1-3. 
824 Walby, Sylvia (2009), Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested Modernities (Sage 
publications: London), p. 210. 
825 Söderbaum (2004), ‘Modes of Regional Governance in Africa’, p. 428. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has looked at some specific broader trends related to small arms and violence, 
which are outside the obligations of the Nairobi Protocol but nevertheless relate to the 
objectives and scope of the Protocol and more broadly to small arms control as a 
peacebuilding process. Given that several states in the region have quite successfully met the 
arms control obligations under the Nairobi Protocol found in Chapter 6, has this translated to 
any positive impact in terms of reducing small arms availability, or increasing stability, 
security or demilitarization in the region? This chapter drew on data on small arms imports, 
military spending, political stability and absence of violence. It has not presented evidence for 
any causal link between these developments and the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol, thus it 
would not be correct to frame these developments as ‘harms’ or ‘consequences’ of the 
Protocol. Nonetheless, the data considered in the chapter suggest two things. First, although 
the data are inconclusive, it cannot be ruled out that small arms imports and military spending 
on average have not increased in the region. This raises questions about the legitimacy of the 
current neoliberal small arms control regime and the effectiveness of these arms control 
practices in terms of enhancing security of citizens. Secondly, a preliminary analysis across 
states in the region on the use of force by law enforcement and defense forces during 
disarmament operations or capacity building of security forces shows that the Nairobi 
Protocol has not managed to establish a clear distinction between private and public violence, 
including in states usually conceived as fairly advanced on neoliberal governance reform. 
This suggests that one of the shortcomings in the neoliberal governance approach is that its 
main beneficiary is the state, particularly law enforcement, without addressing the issue of 
militarism. It leaves little room for a radical change of the status quo for enhancing public 
oversight of the conduct of national security forces. In spite of success in practical arms 
control projects, this evidence suggests that the Nairobi Protocol has failed to empower 
marginalized groups in the region, including rural communities and women, but rather that 
state administrations and security forces are the main beneficiaries of current policies and 
programmes. While the Nairobi Protocol is only one case of neoliberal governance applied to 
small arms control, it further problematizes the role of militarism in neoliberal governance 
states as suggested in previous literature. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions  
 
This thesis set out to explore the origins of Africa’s small arms control and how practices 
have evolved over time. It sought to understand why and to what effect small arms control is 
increasingly defined within regional regimes.  
 
The general literature on small arms control has largely been policy-oriented and studies of 
African regional security cooperation have mainly been developed within the framework of 
mainstream IR theories. A deeper theoretical discussion on small arms in Africa taking in 
different contrasting perspectives has been missing, resulting in a broad consensus and 
‘common knowledge’ regarding the rationale for small arms control, which has been left 
largely uncontested. In particular, the mainstream literature on small arms control has 
neglected to explore historical arms control practices, specifically in the African context, or 
the historical conditions under which contemporary practices have emerged. Furthermore, the 
literature has been inconclusive on several vital points within the small arms discourse, 
especially regarding the origins, content, meaning and significance of the development of 
legally binding arms control agreements at the regional level. Hence this study sought to 
answer three questions:  
 
1. What is the origin of African small arms control?  
2. What are the key features of African small arms control, in terms of continuities, 
discontinuities and contingencies? 
3. Why and with what result has small arms control recently been regionalized in Africa? 
 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the respective 
empirical chapters. Chapter 3: Historical narrative analysis of the imports, impact and control 
of small arms in Africa; Chapter 4: Small arms control in the period of neoliberal governance 
reform: overview and competing narratives; and chapters 5-7 on the Nairobi Protocol, 
focusing on its rationale and content, implementation and limits. This section synthesizes the 
empirical findings to answer the study’s three research questions.  
 
On the first question ‘What is the origin of African small arms control?’ African arms control 
has experienced a number of different phases and is far from being a set of coherent practices. 
Chapter 3 showed how small arms control is not a new phenomenon, but has developed over 
time in relation to changes in political organization (e.g. centralization, militarization) and 
international political economy, including the international arms trade, while the specific form 
and significance of arms control practices have been shaped by wider political processes, 
North-South relations and colonial experiences in particular. The study found evidence that 
small arms control dates back to at least the early transatlantic slave trade and the beginning 
of small arms imports of scale in Africa. Although there appears to have been no 
comprehensive international system, there is evidence that both exporters and importers 
created more than ad hoc measures to control access to small arms. Small arms control 
considerations were evident both in the domestic policy of importing states and in foreign 
policy in exporting states. Different control measures emerged as means to manage expanding 
North-South relations broadly, of which arms trade was one aspect. Arms control was 
occasionally imposed on African states as a ‘denial’ strategy, in which European weapon 
exporters used trade restrictions to specific groups, on for example religious grounds. It is 
difficult to say to what extent merchants at the time actually implemented these regulations. 
Historical evidence shows that African polities had rules regarding arms acquisitions. These 
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were both domestic, in the case of Dahomey, in which all imports had to go via the king, as 
well as external, in the case of Asante and Dahomey, where the kings denied sales of small 
arms to inland territories. These structures were overruled over time, as evident from the 
proliferation of small arms across the continent in the 18th and 19th centuries. In pre-colonial 
Africa, small arms were used in the militarization and centralization of African states and 
played a key role in important resource revenues and production of key export commodities, 
including slaves and ivory. Firearms also had symbolic, cultural and non-military applications 
at the time. The findings of this study thus suggest that the historical conditions under which 
small arms control emerged and which affected its growth and differentiation were the trans-
oceanic slave trade in the Atlantic and Indian oceans, followed by imperial-colonial 
expansion in Africa. Although other researchers might choose to challenge this finding, 
simply ignoring previous practices or the historical conditions under which contemporary 
practices developed should be difficult if the arguments advanced in this thesis are valid. 
Defined in this way, African small arms control neither depends on nor excludes African 
initiative or ownership, but rather implies practices that in some way limit, restrict or 
determine the availability of small arms in Africa. 
 
One the second question ‘What are the key features of small arms control practices, in terms 
of continuities, discontinuities and contingencies?’, I used an historical narrative methodology 
and identified five broad categories of African small arms control practices: the pre-colonial 
(under the transoceanic gun-slave trade), the imperial, the colonial, de-colonial and neoliberal 
governance.  
 
During the pre-colonial period, arms control was used by importing leaders to centralize 
power and reduce threats from neighboring polities. Some voices in Europe were raised 
against trade with non-Christian African natives. However, the overall economic benefits 
from the trans-oceanic trade prevailed over arms export control. The trade in small arms was 
liberalized and firearms became a global commodity central to the trans-oceanic trade with 
Africa. 
 
In the imperial period, Europe had undergone an industrial revolution, including a revolution 
in small arms technology, whereas Africa had seen its economic significance redeuced and 
was experiencing internal political fragmentation following rapid changes in political 
organizations and leadership by force. Whereas small arms trade was widespread, European 
exporting states appear to have been supportive of greater small arms control whereas 
merchants and African states wanted unlimited access. In 1890 the largest European powers, 
together with the Ottoman Empire, Russia and the USA, came together to ban both slavery 
and small arms exports to Africa. However, merchants and African importers continued to 
take advantage of the external powers’ rivalries to play different states against each other and 
frequently bought weapons from multiple sources. This only came to an end with the partition 
of Africa and the colonial occupation.  
 
In the colonial period, small arms import in Africa was limited to colonial end-users. 
European powers banned all export to African stakeholders, and only colonial regimes were 
allowed to import weapons. The League of Nations introduced annual arms trade reports. 
Further distinctions were made between military and non-military weapons. Colonial powers 
introduced colonial regulations, firearms registries and licensing units within the colonial 
police. A structure for legal gun ownership was formed, partly based on weapon technology 
(e.g. hunting weapons were less controlled than military weapons), and especially based on 
race: black Africans were not allowed to possess weapons. 
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During de-colonization and the early decades of independence, African arms imports again 
intensified and liberal trade was re-opened with the newly established states. Wars of 
independence, followed by civil wars and state-building processes created a relatively large 
demand base for weapons. Furthermore, international law and the expansion of the UN 
favored African state sovereignty, hence facilitated weapons supply. Moreover, the cold war 
meant that superpowers used arms transfers to influence political developments. 
Domestically, African states appear to have done little to create their own arms control 
practices in the often-volatile situations during and after the wars on independence. 
Internationally, the cold war led to a collapse of the multilateral transparency regime. Instead, 
the UN arms embargo was created under the authority of the UN Security Council. 
 
The neoliberal governance period is characterized by the framing of ‘illicit’ trade in and use 
of small arms as a major security concern, in Africa and for the international community. 
Neoliberal governance of small arms is characterized by reform in security practices. By 
seeking to fix or manage ill-equipped institutions by capacity building and reform. Emphasis 
is put on the role of ‘diversion’ of arms from legal channels (including existing stocks) to 
black markets, and therefore to reduce transfers to non-state actors and certain inappropriate 
regimes. Control practices revolve around capacity-building, modernization of standards and 
procedures, such as electronic marking and registration of weapons, drafting of new 
legislations and re-activating licensing procedures and national firearms registries. The 
neoliberal governance period is also characterized by an expansion of multilateral arms 
control, especially at the regional level.  
 
These five systems of practices contain both discontinuity and contingencies. In terms of 
discontinuity, the different systems have fluctuated in relation to more or less control on small 
arms transfers, more or less international cooperation and more or less conflict of interest 
between exporting and importing states on whether, and how, to regulate small arms. During 
the neoliberal governance period, there has been a move towards an international arms control 
system that is legally binding on states. Although European states have historically 
cooperated in aligning their arms exports policies (which in practice were difficult to 
implement due to conflicting economic interests), there is no clear evidence of similar 
cooperation among importing states. The new regional measures include greater transparency 
with regards to, for example, weapon availability. Both policy developments and programmes 
include civil society, at least in some states. However, the regional arms control cooperation 
is foremost an intergovernmental exercise which strengthens states as actors and enhances the 
legitimacy of those regimes open to governance reform in the eyes of the international 
community.  
 
In terms of contingencies, the study found that current African small arms control contains 
many legacies from the colonial rulers, including legislation, arms registries, licensing 
practices, requests for end-user documentation, weapon marking, etc. Moreover, the framing 
of security practices includes safeguarding the legal weapon trade and state-building partly 
through military means. The result has been to create a certain type of state-centric arms 
control, based on a Western blueprint where access to weapons is fairly liberalized and 
structured in a legal-bureaucratic framework of oversight. The long-term effectiveness of 
applying this to African states is doubtful; furthermore, the more this image is internalized, 
the more difficult it will be to break free from these restrictions and imagine new ways of 
thinking about small arms control: especially moving towards arms control as a peace 
practice, through, for example, empowerment of marginalized groups. Therefore, this study 
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found support for the historical institutionalism’s assumption of positive feedback loops and 
the relative costs of reversing decisions and the foundational agreements of established 
partnerships. Although perhaps disregarded as banal, limits on existing knowledge about 
international small arms control concepts and meanings should not be disregarded. One 
reason as to why states in the region chose to adopt a regional arms embargo on Burundi in 
1996 seems likely not to have been influenced by the proven effectiveness and superiority of 
arms embargoes, but rather that the arms embargo was the only well known ad hoc small 
arms control measure. 
 
Normative aspects of arms control have shifted in formulation but have been present in many 
systems. Arms producing states have denied arms sales to specific groups based on religion 
(as was the case with Portuguese traders in the 15th century), race (during imperialism and 
colonialism) or human rights records (1990s onwards). Patterns of normative trends and 
denial strategies have largely been ignored in the small arms literature and require more 
research to be fully explored. The initial findings of the study, however, suggest a deeply 
problematic relation between small arms control practice and humanitarian norms. First, arms 
control has not been a means to reduce overall violence–there were arms control systems 
under slave trade, under militarization of African states and during European imperialism and 
colonialism. Some of the most brutal regimes and non-state actors in Africa after 
independence have been targets of international arms embargoes. Arms control has flourished 
in undemocratic regimes. Arms control has frequently been used not as an overall violence 
reduction measure, but to reduce the threat of violence from perceived enemies. Therefore, 
arms control should not be understood as a common good as it has often been framed since 
the second half of the 20th century, but rather that arms control as it has played out is fully 
compatible with highly unacceptable social orders. Understanding small arms control in this 
way is sobering. It means that adoption of all small arms control measures cannot be 
considered an uncontested ‘win’ for human security or peaceful coexistence. It further 
challenges perspectives that treat emerging norms as a causal factor of behavior change, but 
disassociate norms from imperial power concepts.  
 
Small arms imports have ebbed and flowed, yet shown some continuity for half a millennium, 
suggesting that small arms are more diffused in African societies than perhaps sometimes 
understood. A historic narrative shows more fully the role, scale and impact of small arms in 
Africa. However, more could be said about the causes of the various systems of practices and 
the changes from one system to another. 
 
First, arms control has been a reflection of, and relational to, the constant small arms imports 
into Africa, and reflects the fact that the continent has, today and historically, been dependent 
on small arms imports. Africa has not had the power to control the production of small arms, 
or the scale or quality of weapons available. At times, the African markets were flooded with 
cheap small arms (such as in the early 18th century, when the price of slaves in relation to the 
price of small arms were strongly in slave traders favour); at other times, access was largely 
denied, such as during colonialism and under certain arms embargoes. African arms control 
had to adjust to the small arms market, fundamental aspects of which were decided elsewhere. 
Access to small arms has thus been more dependent on forging alliances with foreign powers 
or ascertaining contacts with small arms merchants, than on industrialization. Finding 
strategies to manage external shocks, such as the influx of new military technology, has 
generated arms control practices. Africa’s role in the global distribution of military power, in 
particular its dependence on developing or maintaining relations with arms producers, has 
therefore been fundamental in shaping its arms control practices. African stakeholders’ 
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strategies have gone from entrepreneurial during the pre-colonial period, to playing exporters 
against each other during the imperial and de-colonial period, to a partly cooperative strategy 
under neoliberal governance. The colonial period was unique in that producing states took 
control over African arms imports, distribution and possessions, with a significant reduction 
in arms diffusion. So far, this finding is not contradictory to the balance of power theory, and 
arguably, the rise of African domestic production capacity and in particular the creation of 
substantial stockpiles of imported small arms in Africa challenge the possibility for external 
influence on arms control in the future. However, this argument misses several important 
causes of small arms control practices. 
 
The second cause of small arms control practices has been the demand for and strategies to 
access power and resources within states. During the period of transoceanic gun-slave trade, 
small arms control was used by newly emerged militarized ruling classes in coastal states to 
centralize or maintain power and to reduce threats from neighboring polities by preventing 
arms trade with inland states. Simultaneously, small arms were essential in the economy of 
that time, both as a means for European stakeholders to buy slaves and for Africans in slave 
raiding and elephant hunting. The colonial rulers used arms control to protect the colonial 
regimes and their access to natural resources. Currently, neoliberal governance in arms 
control is used to create an image (real or imagined) as responsible states and so aid in access 
to resources, in the form of international development cooperation and foreign investments.  
 
Third, changes in arms control practices have been embedded in transformative political 
processes, and are therefore determined by as well as constitutive of, such processes. Just as 
arms control has been embedded in processes of state formation, militarization and colonial 
rule in the past, arms control today is not an isolated process but embedded in processes of 
shaping a type of neoliberal governance state in Africa and enhancing regional integration. 
This study has noted both the timing of the emergence of regional arms control in Africa, the 
large presence of external experts, the agendas of funders, and overlapping language and 
problem solving methodologies, as evidence for regional small arms control as a historical-
relational process, embedded in a larger governance reform programme for Africa. 
 
Fourth, and related to the causes above, is the role of imperial power and the ‘civilizing 
mission’ in shaping small arms control practices. The exchange of small arms for slaves, the 
denial of arms transfers to non-Christians, natives, Africans and blacks and the enduring 
invasiveness to impose on Africa a set of values, standards and practices have continuously 
shaped the particular form, significance and content of African small arms control practices, 
as well as external small arms control policies vis-à-vis Africa. 
 
On the third question ‘Why and with what result has small arms control been ‘regionalized’ in 
Africa?’, Chapter 4 found that the regionalization of arms control does indeed meet a security 
demand partly caused by the nature of the African state system and a diffusion between public 
(state) violence and private (civilian) violence, partly facilitated by small arms. More 
importantly however, the timing of the regionalization of small arms control coincided with a 
push by external donors for deeper regional cooperation in Africa and elsewhere. The 
consensus among donor countries, the United Nations and international financial institutions 
created a strong preference for regional integration and for ‘African solutions to African 
problems’. At the turn of the millennium, there was a general understanding in the UN and 
Interpol that small arms proliferation was a security challenge with a strong regional 
character. The 1990s was also a time when weapon-exporting states started to craft a number 
of common policies to restrict arms exports to developing countries. These restrictions, 
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including the arms embargoes of the UN and the EU, targeted African states 
disproportionately. In order to secure development funding and future arms imports, African 
states needed to conform to the external preferences for reform. This resulted in a regional 
approach as a cornerstone for small arms control in Africa, as well as processes to formalize 
weapons ownership and circulation. 
 
This thesis identifies the regionalization of small arms control as a result of, as well as one 
process in, an era of neoliberal governance reform in Africa. Using the theories of Harrison 
and others that argue that most African states have been experiencing a governance reform era 
in the economic sector since the 1990s, I found support for many overlapping developments 
in arms control during the same period. One overlap is the focus on capacity-building and on 
institutional and administrative reform. Other overlaps include the language and methods 
through which foreign engagements are suggested, and the quest for local participation. As a 
process mainly driven by external donor states and ‘governance states’ (those states in the 
region which have internalized key concepts), neoliberal small arms governance seeks to 
create institutional platforms and establish practices which are more in line with the policies 
of the West in order to move African arms control practices from ‘poor governance’ to ‘good 
governance’. The study found that in the case of East and Central Africa, a common regional 
arms control regime is implemented with a high degree of donor dependency and has led to 
closer interventions by foreign actors in state security and defense institutions in many 
countries in the region in the name of technical assistance and capacity building. The regional 
institutions for implementation are only quasi-regional as they are sustained by external 
economic support and promoted and crafted by external experts. The absence of governance 
states in the Central African region may explain why the SALW convention of the Economic 
Community of Central African states has not yet entered into force, and why the preference of 
states in the region has been rather to engage in the conventions under ECOWAS and 
RECSA. 
 
The case study of the Nairobi Protocol found that the process of crafting and adopting a 
legally binding regional convention on small arms control in East Africa, the Horn of Africa 
and bordering states was driven by a handful of states in the region, international civil society, 
donors and international organizations, notably the UN and Interpol. From an institutionalist 
or ‘legalist’ perspective, the Nairobi Protocol has been highly successful in terms of 
furthering regional cooperation and formalizing procedures. These technical and formalizing 
processes have primarily focused on modernizing colonial legacies, such as firearms 
legislative acts, state armouries and national firearms registries. Not all countries under the 
Protocol have started to implement it beyond basic steps and most actions have been 
accomplished in so-called governance states with donor funding. There are several 
shortcomings in the impact of the implementation that are at least partly caused by neoliberal 
governance’s strategic approach in itself, which largely fails to offer violence reduction 
strategies. As a result, processes to formalize small arms control come before–or without–
structural reform for violence reductions. 
 
While this thesis questions the effectiveness of the modernizing neoliberal governance 
approach in meeting its own overall objectives through ongoing technical and capacity-
building activities, the neoliberal governance approach to small arms control can also be 
assessed through what it leaves out, ignores, or maintains. The neoliberal governance system 
is structured by the logic of liberal trade theory and modernization theories, emphasizing the 
need for formal, institutionalized and managed arms trade. It is built on prior social 
hierarchies associated with colonial order, which have been rearticulated to regional post-
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colonial social hierarchies. Nevertheless, the neoliberal governance system also includes, in 
modest forms, the opportunity to engage and empower marginal groups, including rural 
communities and women. Although African arms control regimes face challenges which may 
surpass the resources allocated to them, the primary shortcomings with small arms control–its 
failure to reduce violence, arms imports and military spending–lie in the circumstance that 
these are not the objectives of the current regimes. The primary objectives are to reinforce 
state sovereignty, create outward-oriented societies, enhance regional trust and eventually 
regional integration–in order to increase interdependence and thus stability and economic 
growth. It is now, as it has been the case in the past, to reduce the threat of violence by groups 
perceived as threats to the sitting regimes, currently primarily identified as armed non-state 
actors and the informal, uncontrolled, economy. 
 
As this study explored just one of the regional arms control regimes which has been 
developed in Africa in the past two decades, future studies that might relate, compare and 
contrast the findings on the Nairobi Protocol to Central, Southern and West African 
experiences would be welcomed. The Nairobi Protocol and its implementation phase suggests 
that neoliberal governance as applied to small arms control, is weak as a violence reduction 
measure by failing to prevent militarization and autocratization. This study began to explore 
some of the violence committed by state actors during the disarmament campaigns which 
have been conducted as one step in implementing the Nairobi Protocol, but was in no way 
comprehensive in this regard. Future research may seek to explore the consequences of state 
based arms control on local communities more broadly. Naturally, more research on 
neoliberal arms governance, both in and outside of Africa, would be welcome. 
 
The small arms community has moved towards an understanding of the link between arms 
accessibility and violence based on social and political contexts. Although this initially 
opened the field for more radical reform, the perspective soon became dominated by the 
neoliberal governance reform in which current social and political context are mere factors 
that shape interest and capacity–and can be overcome. The mainstream IR theories have 
overwhelmingly focused on national and international levels of analysis, in spite of much 
recent evidence that small arms violence often is localized at the sub-national level. This 
approach tends to favor formal institutions and thereby Western states, which are perceived to 
have the capacity and the institutions to manage large-scale civilian and military gun 
ownership. In this view, access to small arms is more dangerous in countries without formal 
systems of gun control. In a way, this can be said to mirror domestic gun control in Western 
states in which access to weapons is relatively free to sane, law abiding citizens, but denied to 
‘risk groups’. The link between small arms and violence or threat of violence appears to 
depend on social control functions. Neoliberal arms control practices have a preference for 
formal state-based control functions, such as licensing systems, registrations, law enforcement 
and legal frameworks, over informal or community-driven control functions. The references 
to local or informal control functions as ‘traditional’ social control, implies the modernist 
foundations of small arms control. The question is, does formalization of practices, in line 
with the Western experience, apply to Africa? Will it bring about the desired objectives? 
Although more research is needed on the impact of formalization on undermining local arms 
control and violence reduction practices, this study found evidence that the formalization 
process is not well grounded in local practices but instead uses imported blueprints, particular 
from the former colonial powers.  
 
This study found that at least part of the problem of small arms proliferation and misuse can 
be traced back to the breaking down of traditional/domestic mechanisms to control arms in 
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favour of foreign practices through the use of imperial power. This is at odds with the 
mainstream small arms literature, which tends to take for granted that arms control in Africa 
was non-existent before international engagement in the 1990s. One of the assumptions of 
neoliberal governance is that politics and statehood in Africa in the past has been too informal 
and is in need of ‘formalization’ in terms of proper institutions and legal frameworks. From 
this perspective, there is nothing in Africa’s historical societies that provides appropriate 
frameworks for small arms control, which leaves African states and societies needing to 
reproduce the practices of Western states. This study has only begun to explore Africa’s 
historical arms control practices and much more research is needed in this regard. In order to 
fill the large gaps in the literature, specific case studies based on historical archive sources 
would be especially valuable. 
 
Beyond the empirical findings this thesis also sought to contribute to the conceptualization 
and theorization of small arms control. Although the historical-relational theoretical 
perspective formed in this thesis builds on emerging critical literature on small arms and 
neoliberal governance, as well as established theories in international historical sociology, 
historical institutionalism and relational sociology, there has never before been a critical 
theory formulated on small arms control in international studies. Historical-relational theory 
and narrative methodology generated a new research framework for arms and arms control, 
and were able to categorize the development of arms control in Africa through stages: the pre-
industrial, imperial, colonial, de-colonial and neoliberal governance, which would not have 
been possible through the use of theories such as balance of power, international regimes, or 
emerging norms. This sequence analysis and categorization allowed the uncovering of the 
specifics of Africa’s small arms control systems at different historical times. Although the 
perspective agrees that power, regimes and norms are valuable concepts, it qualifies that the 
concepts in themselves do not cause or constitute arms control. Arms control practices have 
differed in, for example, more or less openness/restraint, more or less international character, 
as well as in form, content and purpose. Mainstream IR theories cannot capture these 
variations over time and in different locations. Norms, for example, have underpinned arms 
control practices but have not caused them. Rather than being an independent cause of arms 
control practices, norms have been constitutive of them, used as a form of domination, and as 
motivation for interventions and civilizing missions. African actors’ strategies to manage 
relations with the North and external shocks, in particular their dependence on developing or 
maintaining relations with arms producers, have been fundamental in shaping its arms control 
practices, determined by fluctuating strategies to access power and resources and embedded 
in transformative political processes. 
 
The findings in this study suggest a somewhat negative impact of small arms control on both 
positive and negative peace, namely that arms control has a questionable correlation with both 
social justice and empowerment, as well as in its ability to reduce violence. With a better 
knowledge of historical conditions of its development, contingencies and biases, African 
stakeholders stand a better chance to shape institutional designs and arms control practices to 
enable a more positive impact on reducing armed violence and truly engaging local 
communities in the future. However, breaking with past practices would require rethinking 
current strategies for managing relations with the North, as well as strategies towards dealing 
with changes in the external environment and for political-economic management, and would 
therefore likely need to be embedded in transformative political processes. 
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